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9Executive summary
The gig economy, in which digital platforms 
bring together workers and the purchasers of 
their services, is expanding globally. Though 
exponential growth is forecast in traditionally 
female-dominated sectors – notably on-demand 
household services including cooking, cleaning 
and care work – little research to date has focused 
on gendered experiences of gig work or on gig 
workers outside of North America and Europe. 
This report presents findings from an in-depth 
study of women’s engagement in the gig economy 
in Kenya and South Africa, two middle-income 
countries at the forefront of developments in 
digitally mediated work in sub-Saharan Africa. It 
aims to understand the impact of this engagement 
on workers’ lives, considering the quality of 
work on offer and its implications for workers’ 
management of paid work and unpaid care and 
domestic work. Our novel research methods in 
South Africa include a longitudinal survey of  
gig workers combined with analysis of platform 
data. In both countries, our findings are based on 
interviews with workers and other key informants.
We find that many gig workers face significant 
financial precarity and engage in a patchwork of 
income-generating activities to survive. This includes 
work on more than one platform and other types 
of employment, largely in the informal economy. 
Gig workers typically perceive that platform 
work offers better options than they would have 
otherwise, though many would prefer the stability 
afforded by a more regular engagement.
Our exploration of the quality of gig work 
focuses on earnings and income stability; flexibility 
in the location and timing of work; safety and 
security; social protection; opportunities for 
learning and the professionalisation of service 
provision; and possibilities for collective 
organisation and bargaining. Relative to other 
options open to them, platforms offer workers 
some positive features that they value (and which 
improve their working conditions). However, 
workers also identified significant difficulties, 
underscoring that improvements are needed if  
the gig economy is to provide high-quality jobs. 
More broadly, adverse economic conditions limit 
the availability and quality of work accessible to 
marginalised women in both countries who face 
widespread unemployment and informality. The 
physical urban environment presents further 
obstacles, distinguished by long distances, poor 
transport links and, notably in South Africa, 
extremely high levels of crime and insecurity. There 
may be little that gig platforms can contribute to 
alleviate these deeply rooted challenges at present, 
given their current small scale. However, we argue 
that, at times, these challenges are experienced  
in new ways during gig work and that platforms 
have a responsibility to respond to workers’ 
concerns as well as to ensure the realisation of 
worker rights and social protections.
The picture in relation to gig workers’ unpaid 
work is mixed. In line with existing evidence, our 
findings suggest that unpaid care and domestic 
work responsibilities are strongly gendered – with 
women taking on the bulk of related tasks and 
engaging in a range of strategies to manage unpaid 
care. Many workers identified childcare as the 
biggest challenge to their economic opportunities 
and work–life balance. We identified a strong 
reliance on informal childcare, notably by family, 
neighbours and friends, but when such support 
was lacking, a sizeable share relied on high-risk 
strategies, such as leaving young children alone or 
in the care of slightly older children. 
Again, gig work appears to affect the strategies 
that (mostly) women use in combining paid work 
with unpaid care. Although many workers viewed 
gig work as more flexible and conducive to a 
manageable work–life balance than other paid work 
available to them, they were nonetheless still forced 
to make difficult trade-offs between their time-use, 
income-generation and caring roles. Moreover,  
in practice, the extent to which the platforms can 
offer flexible working schedules that facilitate the 
management of paid and unpaid work is often 
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limited. Therefore, while flexible work modalities 
may be one means to manage paid and unpaid 
work, a broader approach is needed. 
The gig economy looks set to grow in the years 
to come, making it critical to ensure it works for 
all involved. There are grounds to believe this can 
be achieved: a long history of improving conditions 
in the informal economy and increasing access  
to care support for marginalised workers, often 
through informal worker organisation and 
collective action, offer positive examples to draw 
on as the gig economy grows. An increase in gig 
work will boost the impetus for policy-makers 
and workers’ groups to ensure the policy and 
regulatory environment is fit for purpose and 
strongly implemented. And reaching scale can 
provide platforms with more leverage to develop 
supportive modalities – from better-designed 
platform technology, to training, certification  
and increased worker access to protections, to 
developing partnerships with complementary 
financial, care or transport services. 
We make specific recommendations to those 
seeking to support the economic empowerment 
of women gig workers. Notably, we argue that 
policy-makers and platform companies should 
play a central role in ensuring quality work, 
which includes improving economic security, 
supporting unpaid work, giving workers more 
control over schedules, ensuring their safety, and 
basing policy and practice on worker preferences 
– which also requires fostering collective action. 
Governments also have a key role in tackling the 
broader structural constraints to better work 
(through better infrastructure for transport, 
childcare, etc.) and in implementing regulation 
that ensures platform companies provide a 
minimum set of rights to their workers, in line 
with relevant national labour regulation and 
social protections.
11
1 Introduction
The gig economy, characterised by digital 
platforms bringing together workers and the 
purchasers of their services, is expanding globally 
(see Box 1). Exponential growth is forecast in 
traditionally female-dominated sectors, notably 
on-demand household services including cooking, 
cleaning and care work.1 In turn, women’s 
increasing participation in gig work carries 
potentially significant implications for their 
working conditions and ability to negotiate paid 
work and unpaid care responsibilities (Hunt and 
Samman, 2019). However, little research to date 
has focused on gendered experiences of gig work 
nor on gig workers outside of North America 
and Europe. Through an in-depth study of 
women’s engagement in the gig economy in 
Kenya and South Africa – two middle-income 
countries where the gig economy is rapidly 
taking hold – we seek to understand its impact 
on their working lives. 
Our review of the global evidence identified 
two pivotal debates over the gig economy. The 
first concerns whether gig work signifies a 
retrenchment in working conditions in low-  
and middle-income countries (LICs and MICs), 
given that in high-income countries (HICs) it is 
described as reinforcing an erosion of workers’ 
access to labour and social protections (Standing, 
2016; Carré, 2017). Platform companies in 
lower-income settings challenge this narrative, 
arguing that they are trying to expand economic 
opportunities and improve on the poor labour 
conditions traditionally associated with informal 
and casual work.2 Indeed, recent research points 
to some ways that gig platforms may help to 
improve working conditions – e.g. through 
design features that increase workers’ ability  
to track their earnings and which promote 
financial inclusion (Hunt and Machingura,  
2016; Surie, 2017). 
The second debate addresses women’s 
motivations for participating in gig work and 
whether the flexible working arrangements that 
platforms highlight afford them greater choice 
and independence than other forms of labour-
market participation. It is argued that women’s 
ability to engage in gig work at their preferred 
time (and place, in the case of online gig work) 
enhances their ability to balance remunerated 
activity with other work, study or leisure (Hall 
and Krueger, 2015; Harris and Krueger, 2016; 
Manyika et al., 2016). Therefore, the flexible,  
ad hoc nature of gig employment can support 
women in balancing unpaid and paid work, as 
the following quote exemplifies: 
. . . women handle a disproportionate 
share of household work, childcare,  
and care for elderly dependents, so 
flexible independent work helps them 
juggle these other responsibilities.  
(Manyika et al., 2016: 43) 
But this debate is problematic for several reasons. 
First, it fails to recognise or challenge women’s 
disproportionate unpaid care and domestic 
workload relative to that of men, and therefore 
accepts a situation in which the gig economy 
simply offers women a way to fit in still more 
hours of work. Yet the redistribution of unpaid 
care is a prerequisite for women’s economic 
empowerment. Second, it presumes that women 
decide to enter the gig economy to manage their 
work–life balance. While some workers may desire 
flexibility in the timing and structure of their 
paid work, and find this through gig work, many 
1 For example, PwC projections forecast that on-demand household services will be the fastest growing sector of the gig economy 
in the European Union (EU), with revenues estimated to expand at roughly 50% yearly through 2025 (Hawksworth and 
Vaughn, 2014 and Vaughn and Davario, 2016, cited in Hunt and Samman, 2019: 10).
2 See, for example, Lynk founder Adam Grunewald at https://vimeo.com/166649277.
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Box 1 Gender and the gig economy: opportunity or challenge? 
The gig economy refers to labour-market activities that link supply and demand via digital/mobile 
platforms. Companies operating these platforms act as intermediaries, enabling purchasers to 
order tasks at an agreed price from an available worker (and which can be time-based), usually 
taking a fee or commission when the service is paid for or completed. Workers take on individual 
‘gigs’ without any guarantee of further employment, and they are invariably classified by platform 
companies as independent contractors, rather than employees. 
On-demand work – on which this report focuses – refers to services that are provided physically, 
with the purchaser and the provider in geographic proximity (as opposed to crowdwork, in which 
tasks are carried out online). These tasks are generally organised via mobile platforms, by companies 
that set the terms of service (including fees, commissions and minimum quality standards) and 
have some role in worker selection and management (De Stefano, 2016). In some contexts, notably 
in poorer countries, workers also engage with work platforms using lower-tech methods, such as 
text messages or phone calls, instead of via a smartphone app. 
While the gig economy offers consumers access to services at the touch of a button, and economic 
opportunities to workers, it can also reproduce gendered divides in ‘traditional’ labour markets. 
Notably, in Africa, women are, on average, 15% less likely to own a mobile phone than men are, 
and 41% less likely to use the mobile internet (Rowntree, 2019).3 Gendered social norms that 
constrain women’s mobility and entry into the labour market may also be experienced in new, 
digitally enabled ways, e.g. where male relatives restrict women relatives’ use of digital technologies 
(Hunt and Machingura, 2016; Hunt et al., 2017). Moreover, existing intersecting inequalities, 
discrimination and power differentials – including those based on gender, race/ethnicity, class 
and migrant status – can be reinforced in the on-demand economy, a dynamic which has been 
documented on domestic work and care platforms in the United States (US), India, Kenya, Mexico 
and South Africa (Hunt and Machingura, 2016; van Doorn, 2017; Ticona and Mateescu, 2018). 
Source: Hunt and Samman (2019)
women do not engage in part-time or temporary 
gigs out of choice, but owing to a lack of better 
jobs and social services (Balakrishnan et al., 2016).
To date, the extent to which gig employment 
affects women’s total workloads, their working 
conditions, their choices over work–life balance, 
and therefore their economic empowerment, 
remains unclear. In their study of domestic workers 
in the gig economy, Hunt and Machingura (2016) 
identified significant trade-offs, especially for 
women in low-paid sectors, i.e. that workers’ 
choices over their hours is de facto limited as 
they are forced to work long hours to earn a 
liveable wage. But the realities of women’s 
experiences of balancing unpaid work and gig 
work – and the extent to which this differs 
between different sectors within the gig economy 
– is largely unknown. 
This report brings together findings from a 
two-year project that employed novel forms of 
data collection – a longitudinal survey with gig 
workers combined with platform data on their 
experiences as well as and qualitative fieldwork 
– to provide new insights into women’s experiences 
of the gig economy and their management of gig 
work alongside unpaid care and domestic work. 
In Kenya and South Africa, countries at the 
forefront of developments in digitally mediated 
work in sub-Saharan Africa, we explored how 
women’s experiences of gig work differs from 
other employment they might find, and the extent 
to which gig work offers independent, flexible 
3 In Kenya and South Africa, the gendered digital divide remains sizeable, especially with respect to the use of mobile data: 
26% of women use mobile data in Kenya compared with 43% of men, while in South Africa, the figures are 54% and 63% 
respectively (Rowntree, 2019).
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working patterns that support them in managing 
paid work and unpaid care. The focus is localised, 
on-demand labour which typically provides less- 
skilled and lower-remunerated work than other 
forms of gig work (Box 1 on p.12). This research 
identified similar assumptions among our 
respondents to those in the literature on HICs:
. . . when you empower women, you are 
empowering the whole society. This 
platform provides them with flexibility 
where they can earn a living, a decent 
living. Have good incomes while they 
are also taking care of their children . . . 
[these are] some of the challenges that 
come with bringing up the society.  
(Key informant Interview (KII), Kenya 
Federation of Employers, Nairobi)
Indeed, we did find some evidence of flexible 
working arrangements, in which workers had  
the ability to stipulate their availability and to 
opt for or turn down specific gigs. However, it 
often appeared to be outweighed by other  
issues that they faced, as this quote from South 
Africa attests:
There are too many issues [with my 
platform work] man. I’m not getting 
enough bookings and the money I earn 
is too little. Sometimes when I do get a 
booking its only for three hours and I 
am not happy with that. Imagine I live 
all the way in [area A] and I have to 
travel to a booking in [area B]. So I’m 
not happy. Interviewee: OK, so why are 
you still working through the platform 
given all these issues? Interviewer: It’s 
easier working through the platform 
because in this day and age, jobs are 
scarce. You cannot go to someone’s gate 
and knock for a job, otherwise they will 
shoot you. (Jane, Johannesburg)
Our research suggests that there are ways in 
which gig work can specifically affect working 
conditions and how women manage care and 
unpaid care. At the same time, the broader 
context in both countries is one in which 
structural constraints have a negative impact on 
the overall working conditions of marginalised 
and disadvantaged workers and the supportive 
infrastructure available to carers. Given its current 
small scale, gig work is unlikely to provide a 
meaningful way to overcome these constraints  
at present. Yet platform companies and policy-
makers alike have a responsibility to better 
understand the implications of the new operating 
model for workers and respond to their specific 
concerns, and to ensure access to established 
labour rights and protections, in line with national 
legislation (which is increasingly recognising 
informal workers) regardless of their status.
These findings carry implications for ongoing 
national and international dialogues over the 
future of work and efforts to improve working 
conditions for women – notably, at a global level, 
through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and its commitments to promote decent work 
(Goal 8) and gender equality and women’s 
empowerment (Goal 5), and its overarching 
ambition to ‘leave no one behind’. This report 
calls for a strong gender lens in these debates and 
for women’s economic empowerment to be at the 
forefront of efforts to ensure the gig economy 
evolves to the benefit of all.
Chapter 2 introduces key concepts that 
inform this study in providing an overview of  
the evolution of the gig economy in LICs and 
MICs; of gender inequalities in informal work, 
unpaid care and domestic work; and of flexible 
working arrangements. It also provides a snapshot 
of the gig economy in our two focus countries, 
South Africa and Kenya. Chapter 3 outlines  
our methodology and Chapter 4 describes  
the background and circumstances of the gig 
workers who participated in this study. Chapter 5 
addresses whether and how the gig economy 
might improve working conditions, while 
Chapter 6 focuses on its effects on the ability of 
workers to manage gig work alongside unpaid 
care and domestic work. Chapter 7 discusses  
the implications of the burgeoning gig economy 
for working conditions in lower-income settings 
and our recommendations to address the key 
challenges identified. Finally, Chapter 8 briefly 
outlines future research directions emerging from 
this study.
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2 Women and the gig 
economy: key concepts 
This chapter outlines the key concepts that inform 
this study. We situate the evolution of the gig 
economy within wider economic trends in LICs 
and MICs, emphasising how gender intersects 
with other inequalities. Key concepts include 
informal work and employment quality, the nexus 
between labour-market participation and unpaid 
care and domestic work, and flexibility in work 
arrangements. We also introduce the two focus 
countries – South Africa and Kenya – and briefly 
explore the rise of the gig economy and trajectories 
in women’s work and care in each context.  
2.1 Key concepts: work, care  
and flexibility
2.1.1 Informal work and quality of 
employment
Women’s presence in the workforce began to grow 
from around the 1970s, at a time when work 
conditions were shifting globally (Standing, 1999; 
Heintz 2006).4 Standing (1999) recounts how  
the weakening protection of workers led to a 
deterioration of income and economic security, 
and how companies seeking to increase their 
competitiveness by cutting labour costs resorted 
increasingly to casual labour, outsourcing and 
home-based work. These shifts occurred in parallel 
with the expansion of the informal economy and 
the informalisation of employment relations, which 
has occurred as the formal economy has been 
unable to generate sufficient opportunity to absorb 
the ‘surplus’ labour active in informal economic 
activities (ibid.; Carr and Chen, 2002). Additional 
evidence points to the gendered segregation of 
labour markets and the specific disadvantages 
women face, such as their over-representation  
in informal work (see Box 2) and in its more 
precarious segments such as unpaid family work, 
and their higher likelihood of underemployment 
(Chen, 2012; World Bank, 2013; ILO, 2016a). 
Unpaid care has been widely identified as a  
key reason for women’s concentration in poorer-
quality sections of the labour market. It is argued 
that women participate in non-standard and 
informal work because these offer a way to 
combine domestic responsibilities, notably 
childcare, with paid work (Acs et al., 2013; ILO, 
2016a; Samman et al., 2016). Elson (1999) argues 
persuasively that women’s disadvantages in the 
Box 2 Defining informal employment
The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) defines informal employment as 
comprising all employment without labour 
or social protection, ‘both inside and outside 
informal enterprises, including both self-
employment in small unregistered enterprises 
and wage employment in unprotected jobs’ 
(Chen, 2007: 2). This is an expanded 
definition relative to that of the informal 
sector, which focuses on informal self-
employment and is based on a dualistic 
understanding of the economy, with 
separate formal and informal sectors 
(Chen, 2012). Both the neglect of informal 
wage employment and the formal–informal 
dualism are considered inadequate to capture 
the nature of the informal economy (ibid.). 
4 Just under half of women (48%) in LICs and MICs are active in the workforce (World Bank, 2019), but apart from in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, participation rates have stagnated in recent decades (Klasen, 2018).
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labour market intertwine with those they face at 
home and in society:
It is sometimes claimed that labor 
markets adapt so as to allow women to 
combine paid work with unpaid work 
– for example, part-time work and home- 
based work. But, this kind of adaptation 
is generally one-sided – more designed 
to allow the productive economy access 
to workers whose entry into the labor 
market is constrained by domestic 
responsibilities than to give weight to 
the contribution that women’s unpaid 
work makes to the productive economy. 
This is revealed in the way in which 
these more ‘informal’ types of work 
typically do not have contracts which 
give employees any rights to paid time 
for meeting their responsibilities in the 
reproductive economy – rights such as 
maternity leave, and time-off for caring 
for sick relatives. (Elson, 1999: 613) 
Elsewhere, we argue that the gig economy 
displays similar characteristics to ‘traditional’, 
highly informal labour markets across many LICs 
and MICs, and may reinforce many precarious 
aspects of informal employment, including 
disadvantages associated with gender (Hunt and 
Samman, 2019). Nevertheless, a critical question we 
address is whether and how the gig economy (and 
specific features of platform operating models) can 
allow better working conditions for disadvantaged 
or marginalised women. This, in turn, requires an 
understanding of what constitutes job quality. 
Academics and international organisations 
have advanced numerous frameworks that seek 
to define and standardise concepts associated 
with the quality of employment (see, for example, 
Lugo, 2007; Eurofound, 2012: ILO 2013a; OECD, 
2014, 2015; IDB, 2017). The ILO’s ‘decent work’ 
initiative has devised the most comprehensive 
and ambitious framework (notably, it underpins 
SDG 8 which aims at ‘decent work and economic 
growth’), although it has been argued that ‘only 
in Europe, where comparable indicators from 
harmonised surveys have become the norm and 
constitute extremely valuable data for analysts, 
has significant progress been made’ (Burchell et 
al., 2014: 460). The ILO framework includes 
employment opportunities; earnings; working 
time; the balance between work, family and 
personal life; the stability and security of work; 
fair treatment at work; safety; social security; 
worker representation; and the right to collective 
bargaining. However, the weight given by those 
looking to improve labour conditions to the 
different dimensions within the framework and 
how they are measured will depend on different 
starting points, preferences and experiences of 
work within specific country contexts, not least 
patterns of informal employment and of non-
standard work (ILO, 2013a, 2016a). Furthermore, 
individual, worker-level analysis based on 
perceptions around decent work in their own 
context can complement the framework, yet this 
is often missing from existing measures (Pereira 
et al., 2019). Therefore, we aim to foreground 
the voices and priorities of participating workers, 
situating the aspects of work they raised as crucial 
within this broader typology. 
2.1.2 The unpaid and paid work nexus
Our exploration of whether and how the gig 
economy fulfils its promise to support the 
management of unpaid care and domestic work with 
paid work is motivated by the challenges unpaid 
care poses to the realisation of women’s preferences 
around engagement in ‘traditional’ labour markets. 
We draw on an often-cited definition of unpaid 
care work: ‘the housework and care of persons 
that occurs in homes and communities of all 
societies on an unpaid basis’ (Budlender, 2010: 
1). The ways in which paid and unpaid work 
intersect, and how women manage and are 
supported to manage each, lie at the core of 
debates on women’s economic empowerment. 
The challenges women often face in managing 
unpaid care and domestic work and paid work 
are compounded by a lack of support – from 
their partners and other household members,  
and from outside institutions – and are shaped  
by context-specific histories and gender regimes. 
The care diamond illustrated in Figure 1 outlines 
potential sources of support for the reduction 
and redistribution of unpaid care, pointing to the 
role of families, the state, non-profit organisations 
(NGOs) and the private sector.  
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The evidence suggests that care continues to be 
overwhelmingly provided by women, and that 
when this work is accounted for, women have 
longer working days than men (Fagan et al., 2011; 
Rost et al., 2015; Samman et al., 2016). Kabeer 
(1997, 2012) contends that the type and quality 
of available employment are crucial to women’s 
abilities either to renegotiate domestic responsibilities 
or to reconcile different types of paid and unpaid 
work, and that wage employment, and formal 
and secure jobs, can offer women the economic 
independence to challenge patriarchal constraints.
According to past studies, many women who 
work reduced hours – including in part-time 
work – are compelled to do so owing to the lack 
of viable alternatives to support unpaid work, 
such as paid parental leave, and/or affordable 
and quality care services (ILO, 2016b). Part-time 
work, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a major 
source of inequality: often, it is only available in 
limited sectors and female-dominated occupations, 
which require a lower cadre of skills and therefore 
pay less. Moreover, because part-time working 
modalities are often designed to reduce employers’ 
labour costs such as social security benefits, they 
also limit women’s access to such protections. 
Where supportive services, notably childcare, 
are available, women are more likely to engage in 
the labour force. However, where childcare is lacking 
outside the household, women are more likely to 
take up informal and low-paid work (Alfers, 2015; 
Samman et al. 2016). Informal and precarious 
work arrangements, in turn, further hinder the 
redistribution of care responsibilities because 
they do not provide workers with adequate social 
protection, including a social infrastructure to 
support care. Currently, work–family balance is 
the biggest challenge that employed women face 
globally (Gallup and ILO, 2017). As a result of lack 
of care support, more than one-third of employed 
women work part-time, and women are more likely 
to be underemployed (ILO, 2016b).5 In some cases, 
the strategies employed to manage childcare also 
pose a risk to young children; across 76 countries 
(nearly all LICs and MICs) slightly more than 1 in 
5 children under age five were reported as having 
been left alone or supervised by another child under 
10 years old in the previous week,6 totalling some 
45 million children (UNICEF, 2017a), with 39% 
of children falling into this category in sub-
Saharan Africa (UNICEF, 2017b). Concerningly, 
this total figure is likely to be an underestimation 
given significant sub-regional data gaps, including 
in our focus countries of South Africa and Kenya. 
Data on time use illustrate the constraints and 
trade-offs that women, particularly those who are 
less privileged, face in balancing paid and unpaid 
work. The concept of time poverty – ‘the need to 
spend long hours working (in either the labour 
market or domestic work) because the alternative 
would be (even deeper) consumption poverty’ 
(Bardasi and Wodon, 2010: 45) – is pivotal in 
highlighting the level of agency within which 
work decisions are made). Where women perform 
paid work alongside the bulk of unpaid work 
within a household, time poverty is more severe 
(Hirway, 2015). 
In order to fulfil care responsibilities, women 
might reallocate leisure time to care, employ 
domestic help afforded using their additional 
earnings, or assign care responsibilities to 
grandmothers or daughters, potentially at the 
expense of young girls’ education (Quisumbing  
et al., 2013; Samman et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 
Figure 1 The care diamond
Source: Razavi (2007: 21)
State  
(federal/ 
local)
Markets
Not-for-profit
Families/households
5 Time-related underemployment refers to persons who are willing and available to work additional hours and whose working 
hours are below a given threshold relating to working time (ILO, 2016b).
6 Full category definition: ‘Percentage of children 0–59 months left alone or in the care of another child younger than 10 years 
of age for more than one hour at least once in the past week’ (UNICEF, 2017b).
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2018). Numerous studies point to negative effects 
of high care workloads for women and children 
– for example, a recent study in Tanzania, 
Rwanda and India highlights that excessive paid 
and unpaid work – often highly physical – limited 
women’s physical and mental health and reduced 
time for sleep, personal/self-care, hygiene and 
leisure (Chopra and Zambelli, 2017). The flexibility 
gig work purports to offer could offer a remedy 
or it could potentially exacerbate the problem by 
motivating overwork. 
2.1.3 Flexibility and its critiques
We explore flexibility in terms of worker ability to 
arrange the location and timing of their gigs to suit 
their preferences and other commitments. When 
considering the extent to which flexibility in the 
gig economy is a helpful asset to assist with the 
challenges that women face in managing paid 
and unpaid work, it is useful to draw on the 
existing literature on different types of labour-
market flexibility. 
One focus is on ‘employer-led’ flexibility, a 
strategy that employers use to cheapen the cost 
of labour and increase their ability to respond to 
fluctuating demand at no additional cost (Dolan 
and Sutherland, 2002). This strategy has become 
institutionalised or deepened (depending on the 
starting point) as part of a wider trend of structural 
labour-market flexibilisation since the 1980s, 
pursued by many countries to boost competitiveness 
and efficiency. The development of gig platforms 
can be seen as one manifestation. Critically, 
flexibility in LICs and MICs has been described 
as a tool that can be used to the detriment of a 
workforce that faces reduced rights and protections 
in relation to full-time, non-flexible workers 
(ibid.; Kenny and Webster, 1998; Valodia, 2001). 
Another emphasis of research in this area is 
‘worker-led flexibility’, which is framed in terms of 
workers having the choice to achieve their desired 
work–life balance – the narrative that gig platforms 
often adopt. This literature, which is focused on 
HICs and is only beginning to appear in relation 
to LICs and MICs, has been criticised for not 
adequately considering constraints that workers 
face through often not having full autonomy over 
their schedules and the employment opportunities 
available and suited to them (Fagan et al., 2011; 
Wood, 2016). Critically, workers’ level of agency 
and their ability to choose how to allocate their time 
in practice dictate whether flexibility is desirable or 
empowering, though there are also concerns that 
greater working-time autonomy may lead to an 
intensification of work and overtime (Lott, 2015).
The literature often portrays flexible work as 
being particularly advantageous for women, 
making it possible to maintain their primary role 
of caretaker and provider of unpaid work (Bardasi 
and Wodon, 2010; Allen et al., 2013). The logic 
is that women’s engagement in part-time work or 
self-employment can support women in providing 
unpaid care (Hilbrecht and Lero, 2014). 
However, it has also been argued that the 
concept of work–life balance, and an associated 
focus on flexitime and part-time work, might 
have little relevance for the many workers in 
LICs and MICs who are engaged in informal 
self-employment, and casual and subsistence 
agricultural work because no other options are 
available (Alfers, 2015). Furthermore, this focus on 
choice can detract attention from the structural 
constraints that lead women to prefer ostensibly 
flexible work arrangements to balance paid work 
and care, which have been described in terms of 
‘conditioned choice’ (Gregory and Milner, 2009; 
Jacques and Radkte, 2012; Vinkenburg 2015). The 
concern is that the perception of increased choice 
may veil the extension of the working day, blur 
the distinction between work and non-work and 
fail to challenge the gendered allocation of labour 
(Bourne and Forman, 2014). In other words, 
work flexibility may be a double-edged sword, 
especially where job control and earnings are low. 
There is an assumption that flexibility is an 
important feature offered by gig work, and that 
this is particularly relevant to women. This has 
not been rigorously interrogated so far – a gap 
this research contributes towards filling. 
2.2 Focus countries:  
South Africa and Kenya 
This section introduces our two focus countries, 
South Africa and Kenya, both of which have an 
increasingly established gig economy and can be 
regarded as trend-setters within Africa. Key factors 
fostering the rise of platform companies in each 
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country include the technological and business 
environment as well as labour-market conditions. 
Women’s participation in gig work in each context 
is shaped by prevailing labour market circumstances 
and patterns of managing unpaid care, which we 
also discuss, highlighting persistent gender disparities. 
This sets the scene for our subsequent exploration 
of how the gig economy is experienced and provides 
a basis upon which to consider the wider labour 
market that gig workers navigate before and 
alongside platform-mediated work. The comparison 
seeks to illustrate the extent to which the gig 
economy is disruptive – both relative to working 
conditions in ‘traditional’ labour markets, and in 
terms of how gig workers manage unpaid care and 
domestic work alongside paid economic activity. 
2.2.1 South Africa
South Africa ‘has been the entry point into the 
continent for several leading international players 
such as Uber, Airbnb, and Fon’ (EOS Intelligence, 
2017), while the gig economy, incorporating 
freelance workers and machines, has been identified 
as one of five major trends with significant 
implications for business in the country (Deloitte, 
2017). The flow of global companies has been 
said to bolster employment and local competition, 
with domestic gig companies providing similar 
services to globally established gig-economy giants 
(EOS Intelligence, 2017). Economic conditions 
within the country have also provided a ready 
supply of labour, including workers willing to 
engage in poorly remunerated employment due 
to lack of other options – notably, persistently 
high unemployment, which reached around 27% 
in 2018 (29.5% for women and 25% for men) 
after steadily increasing over previous years 
(STATS SA, 2019a). Among youth aged 15–24, 
the unemployment rate is twice as high, at 55% 
(STATS SA, 2019b). In this context, the 
coexistence of limited possibilities for formal 
employment, alongside a sizeable informal and 
un/underemployed workforce,7 help to explain 
the attraction of gig work. 
Women’s participation in South Africa’s gig 
economy is rooted within its unique historical 
trajectory and resulting labour market. Rising 
female labour force participation has been 
identified as one of the most significant changes 
in the nature of South Africa’s labour supply 
(Ackermann and Velelo, 2013),8 with a particularly 
notable effect on jobs involving a reproductive, 
caring aspect, such as cleaning, domestic work, 
nursing and teaching (Orr and van Meelis, 2014). 
The median gender wage gap, estimated at around 
23–25%, has remained unchanged since the end of 
Apartheid (Mosomi, 2019), and can be attributed, 
in part, to the low-paid informal nature of many 
women’s paid jobs, low female participation in trade 
unions, women’s unpaid care work and gender-
based discrimination (ibid.; Ncube, 2012). Black 
African women particularly continue to be over- 
represented in low-income, less secure employment.9 
Labour force survey data suggests that some 
48% of employed women work in the informal 
sector, relative to 31% of employed men (STATS 
SA, 2018a). Black African women have especially 
low formal employment rates, linked to Apartheid 
laws that prohibited them from entering the paid 
labour force – for most women, especially poor 
black women, the alternative was largely restricted 
to domestic work for white households (see Du 
Toit, 2013). Today, informal wage employment, 
especially domestic work, is the most important 
component of informal employment (Heintz and 
Valodia, 2008, Box 3). More recently, Casale and 
Posel (2002) argue that women, rather than being 
‘pulled’ by rising demand for their work, have 
instead been ‘pushed’ into the labour market due 
to falling male incomes. 
In addition, the Apartheid regime and legislation 
contributed to fragmented households and specific 
gendered patterns of childcare provision; amongst 
7 For 2016, the government (time-based approach) estimate was 6.2%; however, the ILO approach, which also identifies people 
undertaking work for which they are overqualified as under-employed (Beukes et al., 2017), estimates a rate of 28%. Combining 
elements of the two approaches suggests 12% under-employment (ibid.).
8 Female labour force participation stands at 49% relative to 63% for men (World Bank, 2019).
9 For example, just 18% of black African women and 20% of ‘coloured’ women were employed in skilled occupations in 2017, 
compared with more than half of white and Indian/Asian women (STATS SA, 2017). Note we adopt those (Apartheid-era) 
race-based categories still used by STATS SA since we draw directly on their statistics.
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other factors, male migrant workers were often 
housed in single-sex compounds on long contracts. 
This provided them with little opportunity to 
build relationships and engage with their children, 
and meant support was often delivered to their 
rurally based families via remittances (Posel, 
2001; Budlender and Lund, 2011). In 2008, most 
children in South Africa did not live with their 
fathers, but rather with their mother (40%), 
although women’s labour migration has increased 
in recent years. One outcome is that many children 
are left with other relatives despite the parents 
being alive (23%) (ibid.), raising concerns over 
the care needs of left-behind children in rural 
areas (Razavi, 2011; Schatz and Seeley, 2015). 
For example, Lund (1998) reports that half of 
women working as street traders in Johannesburg 
did not live with their children – children were sent 
to live with a grandparent or another relative,  
so the mother could engage in paid work. The 
importance of grandparents, grandmothers 
especially, for the provision of childcare is 
Box 3 ‘Traditional’ domestic work in South Africa
Domestic workers account for around 6% of South Africa’s workforce (STATS SA, 2018b). As 
the number of authorised and unauthorised migrants in South Africa has increased in recent 
years due to political unrest, economic instability and environmental degradation in sub-Saharan 
Africa, migrant labour forms a significant share of the paid domestic workforce, notably in its 
less formalised segments (Meny-Gibert and Chiumia, 2016). 
Government attempts to regulate the sector include the introduction of the ‘Sectoral Determination 
7’ in 2002. This mandates a minimum wage and basic working conditions, such as formal 
employment contracts and compulsory registration of workers with the Department of Labour, 
to enable them to contribute to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). One recent estimate 
suggests that approximately one-third of domestic workers who work the requisite 24 hours or 
more per month remain unregistered with UIF (STATS SA, cited in Liao, 2019). However, other 
estimates point to even more significant deficits, citing coverage rates as low as 20%.10 What is 
clear is that much domestic work remains informal, with an unknown (but presumably significant 
share) of workers engaged without contracts and several categories of domestic workers – notably 
part-time and migrant workers – excluded from social protection provisions (du Toit, 2013).
Domestic worker unions such as the South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union 
(SADSAWU) have long campaigned for decent wages and adequate workers’ compensation. The 
National Minimum Wage Act of 2018 specified a minimum hourly wage of 20 South African 
Rand (ZAR) as of January 2019, with the minimum wage for domestic workers set at 75% of 
the national minimum and entitlements to a 10% annual salary rise.11 SADSAWU and other 
domestic worker organisations continue to highlight the insufficiency of this wage to meet the 
cost of living, as well as its symbolism as a persistent undervaluation of domestic work vis-à-vis 
the multiple other forms of work to which the standard minimum wage applies. In 2018, the 
Department of Labour proposed to extend workers’ compensation to domestic workers (and in 
May 2019, the Pretoria High Court ruled that their exclusion from the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act of 1993 was unconstitutional). 
10 Based on 2011 STATS SA data, following a similar procedure, it was estimated that 74% of domestic workers were enrolled 
in the UIF, whereas actual UIF data from the same period suggested that 20% of active domestic workers were registered 
in practice (de Toit, 2013).
11 The Sectoral Determination of Minimum Wages for Domestic Workers (December 2018) adds additional detail based on 
location and on hours worked weekly. Domestic workers in ‘bigger metropolitan areas’ working more than 27 hours per 
week are entitled to a minimum hourly wage of ZAR 13.69, while those working fewer than 27 hours are entitled to ZAR 
16.03 per hour.
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enhanced by the system of social grants to older 
people, which provides a basic level of economic 
security to many (Hull, 2014). Nonetheless, the 
onus often remains on mothers to earn a living to 
support their children and the relatives caring for 
them – the need for many women to seek an income 
in a context of limited economic opportunities 
leads many into poor-quality paid work.
In short, the large numbers of job seekers, 
particularly women, in a context where women 
are disproportionately involved in informal 
economic activity and are often household 
breadwinners (whether living with or apart from 
their children), has provided a fertile ground for 
the rise of the gig economy, notably in female-
dominated sectors. 
2.2.2 Kenya
Kenya’s vibrant digital technology ecosystem 
boomed following the arrival of undersea fibre 
optics that more than doubled connectivity and 
rendered broadband more affordable (Stuart et al., 
2015). This led to the country becoming known 
as the ‘Silicon Savannah’. The gig economy has 
arguably flourished following this, due to the 
country’s pro-tech entrepreneurialism policies 
starting with the endorsement of outsourcing as  
a key driver of economic development under 
Vision 203012 (Graham and Mann, 2013), and 
continuing through active government programmes 
such as Ajira Digital, which aims to support one 
million young people to access digital work.13 
Similarly, the private sector and development 
partners are also driving gig-economy engagement 
with a focus on providing digital skills and 
infrastructure to unemployed youth and vulnerable 
communities through so-called ‘impact sourcing’.14 
Nairobi is emerging as a ‘freelance capital’ 
(KenDesk, 2017) with intermediary tech companies 
such as Uber, Airbnb, Taxify, Kuhustle, Lynk and 
Fundislink among many others providing platforms 
through which individuals can connect with 
available jobs. But gig work is undoubtedly rising 
in importance across Kenya – the most recent 
figures from 2017 estimate that 40,000 Kenyans 
(about 0.02% of the country’s labour force) 
found work through online platforms such as 
Kuhustle, Mechanical Turk, Elance, Upwork and 
through several business processes outsourcing 
(BPO) companies (Miriri, 2017). Given the pace 
of change, however, this statistic should no doubt 
be revised. 
Labour-market conditions in Kenya have also 
proved fruitful ground for the gig economy. 
Informal employment and other forms of non-
standard/casual work have increased over recent 
decades.15 Poor employment outcomes in the 
formal economy, coupled with decent work deficits 
and weak labour laws and enforcement, further 
motivates the rising unemployed workforce to 
seek alternative work opportunities (Chari et al., 
2017). While regular employment grew 7% 
between 2003 and 2011, casual employment 
grew by 87% (ILO and ILSS, 2013)16 and, as of 
2015/16, 13% of the Kenyan workforce was in 
casual work (KNBS, 2018). At the same time, the 
government and others in the technology sector 
are encouraging and promoting entrepreneurship 
and the status of independent contractor work 
(KenDesk, 2017; Ndemo and Weiss, 2017). 
Yet gender disparities prevail in low-quality 
work in Kenya, as in South Africa. The labour 
force participation of women is just below that of 
men (64% relative to 69%) (World Bank, 2019), 
but, on average, women earn 35% less (World 
Economic Forum, 2018). Around three-quarters 
of Kenya’s non-agricultural workforce are in the 
informal economy (Charmes, 2016), as are most 
working women in urban areas (Kinyanjui, 2016). 
12 This is the country’s long-term development policy that aims to transform the country into a modern, globally competitive 
MIC offering high-quality life in a clean environment for all citizens by 2030. See https://vision2030.go.ke/
13 See https://ajiradigital.go.ke/home
14 For example, in 2013, the Rockefeller Foundation invested in a seven-year $100 million ‘Digital jobs for Africa’ programme 
to enable one million youth in Kenya and another five countries to find work in the digital economy (Imaizumi, 2015), while 
in 2016, Google Africa committed to online digital skills training for a million young Africans (CIO, 2016).
15 Kenya’s definition of informal employment refers to employment in informal-sector enterprises and households, thereby 
leaving out those informally employed in the formal sector (ILO, 2013b).
16 Casual employment includes persons working for a short time period, generally not more than 24 hours at a time, and paid daily. 
They have no guarantee of work for more than 24 hours and can be dismissed at one day’s notice (Kituo Cha Sheria, n.d.).
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This leaves many women vulnerable to changing 
conditions of work that neither enable them to 
transition to formal work nor alleviate the 
constraints associated with informal work, as 
well as lacking access to basic social protection 
(Heintz and Valodia, 2008). 
The management of unpaid care with paid work 
is no less a challenge for women in Kenya than 
elsewhere. A study of employees in horticultural 
value chains showed that 43% of men and 63% 
of women experienced time conflicts between 
domestic responsibilities and employment.  
It highlighted the importance of social networks 
for women who migrated with children; in Nairobi, 
especially, family, friends and neighbours assisted 
workers with unpaid care (Dolan and Sutherland, 
2002). While stating that too little is known 
about care in Kenya, Dimova et al. (2015) 
highlight the growing problem of childcare in 
Nairobi, in which better-off families were more 
able than poorer families to manage care through 
paid-for services. Other literature emphasises the 
importance of local care chains, whereby women 
migrate from rural to urban areas to work as 
nannies and domestic workers, and highlights 
that care needs are compounded by HIV/AIDS 
and an ageing population (Moyer and Ingonya, 
2014; Schatz and Seeley, 2015). 
Finally, it is worth noting that literature in 
relation to ‘flexibility’ and the paid–unpaid work 
nexus is very limited in relation to both Kenya 
and South Africa. Most available evidence in 
these contexts draws on the literature on work–
family balance in HICs and attempts to assess 
empirically how flexible work arrangements may 
benefit workers in specific jobs, mostly senior 
roles in formal employment. This focus is likely to 
obscure important differences between workers 
in HICS, relative to LICs and MICs – for example, 
with regards to access to systems of care provision 
(Alfers, 2015) – and is therefore limited in 
providing a perspective on worker-led flexibility in 
LICs and MICs. Consequently, this research aims 
to provide new insights into how flexibility is 
experienced in relation to unpaid care by workers 
traditionally concentrated in the informal economy.
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3 Methodology
Our mixed-methods methodology focused on one 
platform company in South Africa, SweepSouth 
(in the following sections, we refer to this company 
simply as ‘the platform’ – see profile in Box 4), 
which agreed to cooperate in this research, and 
on several platform companies in Kenya, which 
we refer to anonymously. 
Two types of quantitative data informed this 
study. First, in South Africa, we collected data 
from registered workers, so-called ‘SweepStars’ 
through a nine-round longitudinal automated 
voice response (AVR) phone-based survey 
between August 2018 and February 2019, 
through survey company Ulula. Administering 
the survey in several rounds facilitated coverage 
of multiple aspects of working conditions and 
unpaid care and domestic workloads. Second,  
the platform company engaged in this research 
provided data on their workforce – which we 
were able to merge with the survey data at an 
individual level to obtain a fuller picture of 
worker experiences. We also analysed the platform 
data for South Africa separately to obtain a more 
comprehensive picture of supply and demand for 
the services offered, and worker availability 
(between November 2017 and December 2018), 
as well as earnings data (available for detailed 
analysis between June 2018 and September 2019).
In South Africa, nearly 650 workers (around 
one-third of the total) who were on the platform 
Box 4 A profile of SweepSouth
SweepSouth is a domestic work platform based in Cape Town, South Africa, which operates in cities 
in the provinces of Western Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and, to a limited extent, Mpumalanga. 
Founded in 2014, its operating model has evolved over time as the company experiments with 
diverse modalities, including the scheduling of bookings and payment of workers. At the time our 
data was collected, the platform enabled clients to make bookings of three hours or more and 
offered its workers an hourly rate based on their tenure with the platform (those who had worked 
at least 400 hours earned between 80% and 96% while those who had worked fewer hours earned 
between 65% and 96% of the average hourly booking fee of ZAR 42). The platform also operates 
a mechanism known as ‘Earn More’ where workers can sign up for gigs cancelled by others on a 
first come, first served basis, for a higher hourly rate. Clients can also opt to tip their ‘SweepStar’. 
The company communicates with its workers through a dedicated mobile phone-based app and 
covers the cost of their cleaning supplies, while workers pay for their transport and, until recently, 
the cost of their data (in November 2018, the company introduced a data-free app, see section 
7.1.5). As with other platform companies, workers are categorised as independent contractors. 
Clients rate the worker performance following each ‘gig’. Those with higher ratings are more 
likely to receive bookings, though worker preferences regarding when and where they would like 
to work are also influential. Workers also rate their experience with a client after each ‘gig’. 
According to Fairwork Foundation ratings (Fairwork, n.d.), SweepSouth ranks fairly high 
among platform companies in South Africa, having demonstrated ‘fair pay’ (in line with the local 
minimum wage), for its management and contracting of workers, its provision of work-related 
insurance and the facilitation of worker voice. 
Source: SweepSouth (n.d.a) and KII.
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as of August 2018 responded to an invitation to 
complete the first round of a survey covering 
their background and motivations for engaging 
with the platform. We could not investigate 
self-selection into the survey nor non-response 
comprehensively because, for privacy reasons, the 
platform deliberately collects minimal personal 
details regarding registered workers. We gave an 
incentive of ZAR 10 to all respondents who 
completed each survey round and entered those 
who completed at least six rounds into a lottery to 
receive the prize of a tablet. Subsequent response 
rates varied between 25% and 42% for the first 
five rounds of the survey, after which we had to 
reduce the sample size due to budgetary 
restrictions and a rise in the price of mobile 
phone airtime. The survey contained questions 
with pre-coded responses and some open-coded 
questions that enabled participants to answer in 
their own words (these responses were analysed 
and also post-coded). 
Though we faced certain challenges, not least 
month-on-month turnover of nearly 10%, we 
obtained rich data on worker perceptions of gig 
work, other work that they engaged in, and how 
they (and their partners) managed unpaid care 
and domestic work within their households.17 
Annex 1 explains the computations we made 
with this data. Our efforts to conduct a parallel 
AVR survey in Kenya did not succeed for financial 
reasons (including rises in the cost of airtime). 
Our attempt to launch a WhatsApp survey also 
proved unsuccessful after the first round.18 
Qualitative research also took place in both 
Kenya and South Africa. A qualitative methodology 
protocol was established, which defined procedural 
guidelines to be followed across the two countries 
covering participant sampling method, data 
collection, transfer and storage, ethics and consent, 
data protection and risk assessment, among other 
areas.19 In both countries, semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews were carried out with gig workers and 
key informants. Due to the participant sampling 
method employed for this study, key characteristics of 
workers include: having a caring role/responsibility 
for at least one child under eight years old or an 
adult, and having (at least until recently) worked 
on a gig platform. The participant group was split 
between single parents looking after children alone 
and married/partnered couples living with children. 
In South Africa, 16 women workers from the 
same domestic work platform were interviewed 
(10 active workers, 2 inactive workers and 4 
deactivated workers) as well as three key informant 
interviews (one academic team, one domestic 
worker union representative and one platform 
representative). In Kenya, 16 active workers were 
interviewed (12 women and 4 men), who were 
registered across three different platforms (one 
driving platform, two multi-services platforms) 
and provided services across a wide range of 
categories including appliance repair, tiling, 
plumbing, decorating, gardening, administration, 
beauty services, cleaning and childminding 
services, furniture-making and repair, catering/
restaurant trade and driving/ride-sharing. We also 
carried out nine key informant interviews, with 
one government representative, two platforms, 
one academic, four workers’ groups/unions, and 
one employer organisation. 
In addition, one focus group discussion (FGD) 
was carried out with workers in each country, 
aimed at (1) gathering gig workers’ current ideas 
and supporting them to develop new ideas as a 
group around what could/should happen to 
improve their experiences as gig workers, 
including with reference to unpaid care and 
domestic work, and (2) to provide a space for gig 
workers to share their experiences and ideas for 
improvements with others in a similar situation. 
Ten participants took part in South Africa and 
nine participants took part in Kenya. FGDs can 
provide a context within which ideas are formed 
and decisions are made (Kitzinger, 1994). As such, 
the format and focus of the FGDs attempted to 
encourage participants to reflect more deeply on 
their individual and collective situation, to provide 
an opportunity to build or strengthen links with 
other gig workers, to identify avenues for change 
and/or motivate them to take action for change, 
and potentially to make the gig worker participants 
feel less alone; as such, the focus groups could be 
17 The survey questionnaire and full descriptive results are available on request.
18 The number we used to launch the survey was restricted due to operational issues involving the use of WhatsApp.
19 Available from authors on request.
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said to have created an interface between research 
and political process (Laws et al., 2013).
A key issue we grappled with is that responses 
to our survey in South Africa suggested far more 
positive experiences and perceptions of gig work 
than those that arose in our interviews with 
workers. For example, as discussed below, most 
survey respondents (88%) reported being able  
to undertake platform work at hours that were 
convenient to them, whereas in the qualitative 
accounts, interviewees stressed security concerns 
arising from early starts. Similarly, in our survey, 
a clear majority of workers reported that their 
working lives and family lives balanced well, 
whereas in the qualitative interviews, workers 
– particularly single mothers – highlighted 
challenges of trying to balance paid work with 
childcare and other domestic responsibilities. 
There are several possible explanations for these 
differences. The survey had many more respondents, 
and therefore may be more representative of 
workers’ experiences than a smaller number of 
interviews. However, it could be that interviewees 
felt more able to respond honestly to open-ended 
questions and to trust the interviewers than they 
did in responding to the AVR survey (while we 
expressed clearly in the survey that the responses 
were confidential and independent of the company, 
workers may not have truly believed this). Another 
possibility is that workers may report aspects of 
their working lives in a relatively positive light 
compared to what they perceive as other options 
open to them and their peers (i.e. in the survey), 
but, when pressed on specific details, they relate 
accounts that problematise their experiences.  
It would be useful to probe these potentially 
diverging accounts further, possibly through 
qualitative interviews with survey respondents,  
in which they provide additional detail in relation 
to their responses.
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4 Situating the study
Based on our own primary data collection, this 
chapter provides a profile of gig workers in South 
Africa and Kenya focusing on their demographic 
and household characteristics, the work they 
undertook before and are undertaking alongside 
gig work, and their motivations for engaging in 
the gig economy. 
In South Africa, where we surveyed gig workers 
engaged in domestic work, we seek to illustrate 
how the characteristics of our respondents and 
their households compare with the broader 
population, drawing on national household 
survey data. We discuss gig earnings and other 
conditions of gig work in the following chapter.
 
4.1 Who are the gig workers? 
We first profile domestic workers involved in gig 
work in South Africa and their household 
circumstances (for full descriptive statistics, see 
Annex 2). Our results reflect the ways in which 
the country’s labour-market dynamics are shaped 
by mutually reinforcing relationships between 
race, gender and class (Orr and van Meelis, 
2014). Our respondents are nearly exclusively 
female (98%) and black African (97%). The 
share of black Africans is significantly above their 
share in the South African population (80%)20 but, 
in line with the paid domestic workforce – which, 
with the exception of the Western Cape (where 
the so-called ‘coloured’ population makes up the 
largest share) – is made up predominantly of 
black African women with a median age of 41 
(Budlender, 2016, STATS SA, 2016; 2017). The 
typical worker (median) in our sample is around 
35 years old. 
The share of single or widowed women among 
our study participants (63%) stands above their 
share in the wider adult population (56%), and 
workers typically lived in larger households than the 
norm – the average in our sample was 4.5 members, 
compared with 3.2 for the population. Moreover, 
just 5% of workers lived alone while 63% lived in 
households with four or more members. In contrast, 
in South Africa, 26% of households have just one 
member and 38% have four or more members. 
Nearly all workers (98%) lived with at least one 
child under 18 while 83% lived with one or more 
children under 6. In this, our sample appears to 
differ markedly from the broader population, in 
which 56% of households have a child under 18 
and one-third have a child under 6. 
There is some heterogeneity in gig workers’ 
education. While nearly 3 in 10 workers surveyed 
(27%) had not finished their schooling, more than 
half (54%) had either lower or upper secondary 
education and around 10% had a university degree 
or other tertiary qualification. Here, the platform 
workers appeared to have acquired more education 
than the adult population as a whole (in which 
54% had not finished their schooling, and around 
5% had some tertiary qualification). This may 
reflect the youth of platform workers relative to the 
adult population or, potentially, barriers to entry 
in other fields for migrants with qualifications 
acquired elsewhere. Moreover, platform work 
appears to offer a means of reconciling paid 
work and further education, given that around 
one-quarter of workers (26%) were also studying 
at the time of the survey (compared with 9% of 
adults in South Africa). 
Other notable observations include the 
workers’ place of residence; most, if not all,  
lived in township or other low-income areas in 
their city – with significant negative consequences 
for their ability to engage in paid work, owing  
to transport and security issues, as discussed 
below. Several interviewees were internal or 
international migrants, having migrated to large 
20  Population-wide statistics in this section are computed from the General household survey 2017 unless noted (STATS SA, 2018c).
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South African cities to seek work. Exploration of 
the household earnings of gig workers gives 
additional insights into their socioeconomic 
status (we focus on earnings from gig work and 
other income-generating activity in Chapter 5). 
The household income of platform workers and 
their perceptions of their income indicate 
economic insecurity. Just below half of workers 
(45%) reported a monthly household income of 
under ZAR 3,000 (purchasing power parity 
(PPP) $570), and an additional 40% reported an 
income of under ZAR 4,000 (PPP $650)  
Under ZAR 3000 per month 
Between ZAR 3000 and ZAR 4000 per month
Between ZAR 4000 and ZAR 5000 per month
Between ZAR 5000 and ZAR 8000 per month
Over ZAR 8000 per month
Figure 2 Monthly household income of platform workers surveyed and of South African households
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11%
8%
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14%
13%
1%
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28%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
 Survey respondents  SA-wide African/Black-headed households  SA-wide all households
Note: South Africa-wide incomes are truncated top and bottom 1%.
Source: Our survey, N=377. South Africa-wide (SA-wide) data is computed from STATS SA (2018c).
 
Figure 3 Perceptions of ease of living on current household income among platform workers surveyed in 
South Africa
1%
7%
26%
30%
36%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Source: Our survey, N=370.
Live very comfortably on present income 
Live comfortably on present income
Getting by on present income
Difficult to live on present income
Very difficult to live on present income
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(Figure 2).21 Just 15% of platform workers have 
a household income above the national median 
income of ZAR 3,800 ($ 619 PPP).
Fewer than one in five survey respondents 
(17%) felt their total household income was 
‘enough to cover basic necessities like housing, 
food, education, clothing and transportation’. 
Nearly half (46%) felt their household income 
was insufficient, while 37% reported that it was 
‘sometimes’ enough. Along similar lines, around 
two-thirds of workers felt it was very difficult 
(36%) or difficult (30%) to live on their household 
income (Figure 3). 
Single women appear to be particularly 
economically precarious, compared with married 
or partnered women, reporting higher levels of 
financial insecurity (Figure 4). Several single 
women described during interviews how they 
came to be in their situation – often citing the 
departure or death of their partner/husband. 
While most of the workers interviewed reported 
living in financial difficulty, those who became 
single particularly emphasised the precarity they 
lived in as a direct result: 
their father left me and does not even 
contribute a cent. (Michelle, Cape Town)
I was married and my husband passed 
away last year, now I am alone and it’s 
really difficult. (Simlindile, Johannesburg)
Data we obtained for one platform in Kenya 
showed that women accounted for just over 
one-third of workers and pointed to a very 
gendered distribution of many task categories, 
reflecting traditional occupational divides – for 
example, all but one housekeeper/nanny was 
female. Interviews suggested that the gig 
platforms involved in this study tended to attract 
individuals with lower levels of education, who 
were used to casual work in the informal 
economy or had been unemployed, and whose 
focus was on economic survival: ‘Because I’m like 
jobless, I can’t ignore [a gig]. I must go.’ (Patience, 
waitress, Nairobi).
4.2 Work before/alongside gig work
Our face-to-face interviews with workers in South 
Africa provided insights into the work they engaged 
in before joining the platform. Several workers 
described being unemployed, notably because of 
a lack of economic opportunities or their caring 
responsibilities – e.g., one participant cited having 
a baby and no childcare option. Those in paid work 
engaged in various activities before joining the 
platform – including work in shops and other types 
of casual or informal work, with several mentioning 
street vending. However, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
paid domestic work was the most frequently cited 
work engaged in before joining the platform, 
whether live-in or day labour within private 
homes, sometimes obtained via an agency. Some 
had engaged in other commercial cleaning work. 
Once registered, gig workers tended to engage in 
other forms of paid work alongside platform work 
with around half (52%) of survey respondents 
reporting an additional job or business or that 
they worked for another platform. Yet there were 
indications that the platform often provided the 
bulk of workers’ income: nearly three-quarters of 
Figure 4 Reports of financial insecurity among single 
and partnered platform workers in South Africa
Share of respondents
0% (1) Not enough 
money to cover 
personal  
emergency
(2) Household 
income not enough 
to cover basic needs 
even sometimes
(3) Difficult or very 
difficult to live  
on present  
income
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
 Single or widowed  Married or partnered
Note: For (1) N=191 (119 single, 72 partnered); for (2) N=189 
(119 single, 70 partnered); for (3) N=374 (236 single, 138 
partnered). Vertical bars depict confidence intervals.
Source: Our survey. 
21 The PPP conversion factor is 6.14 for 2018 (World Bank, 2019). Average monthly household income in South Africa was 
ZAR 8,376 (PPP $1,364 in 2011), above the household income of 99% of survey respondents; the huge gap between the 
median and mean reflects the inequality that characterises the South African economy.
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respondents (73%) reported that the platform was 
the main source of their earnings in the previous 
month. Among the remainder, the most common 
sources were another job (permanent or temporary) 
(49%), and spousal or family support (18%). A 
lack of other opportunities was commonly cited 
by those for whom the platform was their only 
source of work, as one interviewee explained: 
There are no jobs in my area so if the 
platform doesn’t send me a booking I will 
be at home sleeping. There is nowhere I 
can go really. (Akumzi, Cape Town) 
The additional work that the platform provided 
is highlighted in the data we collected on time 
use.22 This data suggests around three-quarters  
of registered workers had worked through the 
platform in a given week, and this group had 
worked on average over three days more that 
week than registered workers who had not worked 
through the platform that week. Both those who 
had worked through the platform and those who 
had not had worked around three days on other 
jobs, while a sizeable share of both groups (around 
40%) had also spent time looking for work – on 
average six to seven hours that same week.
Among those who reported other paid work 
alongside their platform work, several participants 
described taking ‘chars’ or ‘side-hustles’ when the 
chance arose, for example, intermittent day labour 
on a nearby farm. However, domestic work with 
private clients was most frequently cited, sometimes 
through private bookings taken from clients they 
met during their work on the gig platform. Workers 
described varied feelings for their other work 
vis-à-vis their platform work – some felt that 
private domestic-work clients can be less reliable 
compared to the platform, while others appeared 
to be more positive about their private clients, 
for example, mentioning ‘extras’ they more 
frequently obtain, such as a Christmas bonus, 
items no longer used in the household and food.
In addition, survey respondents were asked 
how work from the platform differed from other 
jobs they did in three key respects: ease of finding 
work, choice and hourly pay. Their responses again 
indicate that most workers perceived platform 
work as being easier to find than other work, 
with some evidence of more choice over working 
hours and a pay rate that was higher or sometimes 
higher than for other jobs they did (Figure 5). In 
addition, nearly all survey respondents (91%) 
reported that working through the platform 
allowed them more freedom and control in their 
work. But at the same time, most expressed a 
desire for more stable employment – asked if 
they would accept a permanent job with 
acceptable pay, two-thirds (67%) responded in 
the affirmative while 21% were unsure. Just 12% 
indicated they would not accept such an offer.
We also spoke to several workers no longer 
active on the platform – either through voluntarily 
becoming inactive or through being deactivated 
by the platform. Those who had become inactive 
largely did so because they found other employment 
opportunities with conditions they perceived as 
better. One reported during an interview that her 
new contract cleaning job offered better money 
and that working hours ‘are fixed so I am able to 
Figure 5 Compared to other jobs you do, the platform . . .
(1) makes it easier to find  
a job . . .
(3) pays more on an  
hourly basis . . .
 Yes  
 No  
 Sometimes 
Note: For (1) N=208; for (2) 
N=207; for (3) N=208. Survey 
was asked of respondents 
who answered yes to having 
another job or business in 
addition to their work through 
the platform.
Source: Our survey. 
(2) gives more choice over 
working hours . . .
66%
3%
31%
37%
23%
40%
55%
11%
35%
22  We collected this data in rounds 3 and 9 – the results were very similar and are averaged across the rounds.
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plan my life’ (Jostina, Cape Town). Another was 
offered a live-in role with a client she met while 
working on the platform and struggling financially: 
I told her my story that I never got 
maternity leave on the platform when  
I was pregnant and I needed to spend 
more time with my child. That’s when 
she suggested we move in with her. I am 
still registered with the platform, but I 
have not been taking any bookings. 
Looking back, I feel like I made the 
biggest mistake. She gives me ZAR 
1,500 and that’s peanuts. I feel like a 
charity case but I am actually working 
every day. The platform gave me 
flexibility and more money. But I feel 
more secure being here because there 
the bookings are never guaranteed. 
(Charlene, Cape Town) 
The deactivated workers we interviewed all 
cited doing ‘chars’ since being no longer able to 
work via the platform and were seeking more 
stable employment. 
In Kenya, prior to joining the platforms, the 
gig workers we interviewed were either employed 
in casual work in the informal economy, running 
small informal businesses (such as a taxi or 
carpentry shop) or were unemployed and seeking 
work through more ‘traditional’ means. A few 
women interviewed had not worked for pay prior 
to their gig work. For many men, however, gig 
platforms offered a second income source, alongside 
earnings from a small business, traditional casual 
work or other employment. Traditional means of 
finding such work that were cited included, being 
employed at a shop waiting all day for clients to 
come, women waiting by the roadside for a client to 
pick them up for a cleaning or nanny job, knocking 
on people’s doors to offer their services and asking 
friends to refer them to potential employers: 
Most of the time I leave the house and go 
and sit outside apartments at their gates. 
You wait for someone to call you to go 
and wash their clothes. If you’re lucky 
and you get called to go wash, then you 
get some money. That’s how I’ve been 
surviving. (Cynthia, housekeeper, Nairobi)
There was strong evidence that workers engaged 
in multiple income-generation activities to improve 
their earnings. Our survey of workers on one 
Kenyan platform (N=80) suggested that 80% had 
another job or ‘side hustle’ – however the huge 
majority (90%) felt that the platform offered 
them better choices for work than other options. 
Many engaged in similar income-earning activities 
to those carried out via their own small business, 
using the traditional ways of finding clients for 
their services. Indeed, the nature of traditional 
casual work, which often sees participants engage 
in various types of task-based activities, was 
turned to their advantage on the platform where 
most gig workers’ profiles indicated more than 
one skill set (e.g. nanny and cook, or driver and 
gardener). This meant they could be available for 
varied tasks, increasing their chances of finding a 
gig. Often, these skills had been picked up during 
previous paid work, self-taught or gained through 
informal apprenticeships. 
 
4.3 Why are workers engaging in 
the gig economy? 
Workers participating in this research had a 
relatively similar set of motivations for using gig 
platforms (Table 1). In both South Africa and Kenya, 
the majority cited access to work as their primary 
reason for joining – the platforms provided an 
easier way to find work and helped them to find 
more clients. In South Africa, around two-thirds 
(67%) of survey respondents reported that the 
platform gave them better choices for work, while 
the remainder felt they had no other choices. In our 
interviews in both countries, platform workers 
echoed these motivations, perceiving the platform 
as an easier way to access paid work than other 
available options. Interviewees described needing 
an income in the case of those unemployed, or 
needing to increase income or have a more regular 
income for those already in paid work, and feeling 
the platform could give an opportunity to do this:
I was working in a small grocery store as 
a cashier. But that didn’t pay me much. 
That’s why I ended up moving to join the 
platform because it had better money at 
the time. (Charlene, Cape Town)
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I joined the platform because I had  
no job, first of all. (Patience, waitress, 
Nairobi)
Platforms ease the burden of seeking casual 
work, both physically and financially. In Kenya, 
some gig workers described finding platform work 
to be as simple as responding to a text message. 
The cost of airtime notwithstanding, they considered 
this easier and cheaper than traditional ways of 
finding work, which required looking for clients 
by moving from place to place:
Yeah, because you don’t have to go 
door to door, asking for jobs. They’ll do 
it for you. (Martha, housekeeper and 
nanny, Nairobi)
Survey responses demonstrating workers’ 
somewhat positive views around the flexibility 
and choice over gig work relative to other options 
were echoed to some extent in interviews, 
signalling that gig work goes some way towards 
supporting worker-led engagement in the labour 
market. For example, in South Africa, some 
workers described the platform as offering more 
flexible and higher-paid domestic work than other 
work available to them, including other forms of 
domestic work (e.g. Petronella, Johannesburg). 
One worker had previously worked with the 
agency ‘Marvellous Maids’, noting that while this 
company provided some transport to bookings, 
the money was too little and the hours of work 
were fixed (which she perceived negatively). 
In both countries, female gig workers related 
their motivations to their family situation. Most 
sought paid work to enable them to provide for or 
contribute to the financial needs of the household, 
and/or to gain financial independence from their 
husbands. Some had been encouraged and supported 
by their husbands to find paid work for this reason, 
as a participant from Kenya explained: 
Before I joined the platform, yeah, I was 
just depending on my husband. Of which 
it was very difficult life. [. . .] [Platform 
work is] good because it has really helped 
me. Because my kids are now going to 
school. (Isabella, housekeeper and 
nanny, Nairobi)
In South Africa too, several participants 
alluded to family wishes, including those of their 
husbands, as a reason to engage in gig work: 
The money was better than what I was 
getting at [my last job]. I also wanted to 
get home early. Sometimes I used to get 
home at 11 from work and my husband 
would complain. (Zukelwa, Cape Town)
Table 1 Most important and second most important reasons workers reported working through platforms in 
South Africa and Kenya
Motivation for  
joining platform
South Africa Kenya
1st 2nd 1st 2nd
It is an easier way to find work 39% 44% 33% 33%
It gives me flexibility over my work 23% 19%  
It gives me more choice over when I work   15% 10%
It gives me more choice over who I work for   4% 6%
It helps me find more clients 17% 17% 44% 23%
It pays better than other kinds of work 13% 13% 4% 17%
For another reason 8% 5% 2% 4%
There is no other reason  3%  8%
Source: Our survey. 
Note: For South Africa, N=636 (first reason), N=640 (second reason). For Kenya, N=58 (first reason), N=55 (second reason). 
Different wording was used to capture flexibility in each country as a result of cognitive testing: in South Africa, ‘flexibility’ 
was preferred, in Kenya, the concept needed more explanation and we ended up instead dividing it into having more choice 
over when to work and over who to work for.
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5 Gender, the gig 
economy and quality  
of work
This chapter addresses the critical question of 
whether and how the gig economy (and specific 
platform design features) can enable better working 
conditions. In doing so, it draws on key aspects of 
work quality outlined in Chapter 2, highlighting 
those that emerged as salient in the accounts of 
the gig workers we spoke with – among them, the 
level and stability of earnings; flexible working 
arrangements and the extent to which these 
preferences are fulfilled; safety and security; 
access to labour and social protections; learning 
opportunities and the professionalisation of 
offerings; and possibilities for organisation/
collective action. We find that while platforms 
offer some positive features that workers valued 
(and which improved their working conditions), at 
their current scale, the ability of platform companies 
to alleviate the broad structural economic conditions 
that restrict the availability and quality of work 
available to marginalised and disadvantaged 
women in South Africa and in Kenya is likely 
limited. Nevertheless, we argue that gig work is 
experienced in some distinctive ways that require 
the attention of platforms and policy-makers; 
that some aspects of working conditions are able 
to be shaped by platform actions (e.g. safety on 
the job, learning opportunities/training and, to a 
large extent, earnings); and that there is a need to 
ensure that platforms facilitate access to established 
labour rights and social protections. 
5.1 Pay in gig work 
Platform design features determine workers’ terms 
of payment. In some cases, workers bid to carry 
out a service, meaning that the payment for a 
task will vary, whereas in other cases (notably 
where the service is perceived to be uniform), it is 
common to establish a standard rate per hour or 
task. Some platforms also enable clients to tip 
workers through the platform payment system, 
while some workers reported receiving tips or 
in-kind benefits directly from clients.
Each payment modality raises challenges. Under 
the former, where individuals bid for work, it was 
reported that some workers were unsure how to 
price their services, resulting in their bids being 
rejected and/or client complaints about receiving 
a range of quotes for the same service. With 
standard rates, some workers were dissatisfied 
that the platform modality did not allow them to 
negotiate with clients over their pay. 
In South Africa, using platform data, we have 
looked at levels of pay and fluctuations over time 
and among workers, and have compared the 
circumstances of platform domestic workers 
versus those in traditional domestic work 
arrangements. We have also examined worker 
perceptions of their income and its sufficiency 
through survey data and interviews. In Kenya, we 
interviewed workers and key informants about 
their perceptions of gig worker earnings and how 
it compared with earnings in conventional jobs.
5.1.1 South Africa
The platform stipulates an hourly rate, which 
is around double the official minimum wage for 
domestic workers (depending on worker tenure 
on the platform), but without any guarantee of 
regular work. However, the minimum wage – set 
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at 75% of that which applies to other workers 
– has been heavily criticised as being both 
inequitable and insufficient to provide a living 
wage (Harrisberg, n.d.). If a worker is able to 
work eight hours a day through the platform, we 
estimate that this would provide her household, 
on average, with a living wage (using living-wage 
data from Harrisberg, n.d.). However, our 
calculations (see Annex 1 for details) show that, 
on average, workers with full-time availability 
(five days or more) generally had utilisation rates 
that hovered around 60% of a 40-hour week, 
over a 1-year period (November 2017–December 
2018). Platform data additionally suggest that 
utilisation is positively correlated with tenure, 
such that variability in income tends to diminish 
for those workers who have been on the platform 
for longer.
Earnings data, available for detailed analysis 
between June 2018 and mid-September 2019, 
show that weekly earnings for workers with five 
or more days availability per week, excluding 
voluntary ‘days off’, averaged ZAR 900 (PPP 
$145) (with a median of ZAR 910 or PPP $150). 
This is around 45-50% higher than the minimum 
wage for domestic workers working at least 27 
hours weekly as of December 2018 (ZAR 616 or 
PPP $100). However, it nonetheless falls short of 
a living wage (as per Harrisberg, n.d.). 
Estimates of household income needed for a 
household of four to exceed the poverty line are 
ZAR 5,276 (Finn, 2015) and ZAR 4,125 per 
month (Budlender et al., 2015). The coefficient of 
variation suggests average variation from mean 
earnings of close to 50% each week. The data 
exhibit seasonal variation – notably a peak in 
earnings in December and a trough in January 
– but the overall trend over the 16-month period 
is for average and median earnings to rise and 
variation to decline (Figure 6).
An important issue in the literature on gig work 
is the overhead financial costs of such work, 
particularly where gig workers supply equipment 
needed to carry out a task. The chief costs workers 
reported included airtime and transport, and 
childcare for mothers of young children – though 
the South African platform introduced a data-free 
app in November 2018. In South Africa, we assume 
Figure 6 Average and median weekly earnings of platform workers surveyed in South Africa
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transport costs of ZAR 40 for each day worked, 
which is likely to be a conservative estimate as it 
assumes one round trip per day only.23 Nonetheless, 
this equates to over one hour of earnings daily. 
While these costs are not specific to gig work  
(to reach ‘chars’ or other types of day labour or 
employment, for example, workers would generally 
pay for their transport), the short bookings that 
can characterise gig work can render these costs 
a higher share of total earnings. 
Several workers expressed concerns relating  
to overhead costs. As one explained, private 
bookings pay better once earnings after expenses 
are taken into account, factoring in the length of 
gig bookings: 
We work according to the hours which 
you are booked. Sometimes we work 
for three hours sometimes four hours 
but it depends. This is the main reason 
why I only made myself available for 
two days because for me, it doesn’t 
make sense to work for three hours. It’s 
a waste of my money because you only 
work for your transport and this is why 
I prefer my own private bookings. 
(Ayanda, Cape Town) 
Nevertheless, over half of survey respondents 
(56%) reported being satisfied or very satisfied 
with their pay, perhaps because a significant share 
perceived that their hourly earnings were higher 
than they would be in other types of work: 37% 
reported that working under the platform was 
more lucrative than other jobs on an hourly basis 
and 40% indicated this was ‘sometimes’ the case. 
Other workers stressed that the realistic alternative 
to working with the platform was not having 
work given the broader climate, characterised by 
high un- and underemployment: 
I am not saying that I am super excited 
about the money that I am getting but 
it’s better than staying at home. 
(Akumzi, Cape Town)
There are likely to be several reasons for this 
mixed picture: gig workers often had different
forms of work with different income streams 
attached (Figure 7), and much of the work they 
were engaged in (including gig work) seemed to 
be carried out until something better came  
along. Some respondents clearly stated that 
platform work paid better than other work,  
but others reported alternative options more 
favourably – notably an inactive worker who  
had left the platform for a better option, and 
workers who took bookings from well-paying 
private clients. 
Overall, workers were more concerned about 
the hours of work they received than the pay 
rate, and indeed, their satisfaction with their pay 
appeared to hinge on the number of hours of 
work they obtained through the platform: 
It’s OK if you can get everyday jobs 
from Monday to Friday but the 
problem is sometimes you can stay two 
times in a week without going to work. 
(Simlindile, Johannesburg) 
This is a key point: income was often not 
stable as the irregularity in receiving bookings 
meant that some gig workers experienced 
significant changes in their income level from 
week to week. We examined the characteristics  
of those workers with full-time availability who 
appeared to be faring better on the platform 
Figure 7 Share of South African platform workers’ 
income from the platform in the previous month
 All income from platform (43%)  Most of it (20%) 
 Around half (18%)  Small amount (15%)  None (4%) 
Source: Our survey. N=386.
23  Following Harrisberg (n.d.), we use as a benchmark the cost of getting from Khayelitsha, a Cape Town township, to a Cape 
Town suburb, which takes two minibus taxi trips; in early 2019, we estimated the cost at ZAR 40–44 for a return trip.
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Box 5 Who are platform superstars?
An issue that has received some attention in debates over the gig economy is the distribution of 
available jobs among registered workers. Some past research has probed whether there is 
evidence of a ‘superstar’ effect in which a small share of workers take a disproportionate share 
of jobs versus a ‘long tail’ effect in which jobs are more evenly distributed (Codagnone et al., 
2016). Noting that the evidence is ‘limited and inconclusive’, Codagnone and colleagues’ review 
nonetheless finds no evidence of a longtail effect in either crowdwork or on-demand platforms 
and clear evidence of a concentration effect. They attribute this to the positive effect of reputation 
(i.e. ratings) rather than skills, and the negative effect of discrimination. 
To illustrate, Ipeirotis (2010) finds that on Mechanical Turk, a crowdwork platform, 10%  
of ‘Mturkers’ performed 75% of completed tasks and earned 70% of total income. Along 
similar lines, Musthag and Ganesan (2013) find that in an on-demand platform active in several 
US cities, 10% of workers completed 80% of tasks, which they attribute to the willingness of 
‘super agents’ to travel longer distances to reach jobs and to organise their work efficiently, so 
that they perform several jobs in nearby areas. In theory, a concentration effect can be expected 
where there is ‘vertical’ differentiation in quality (of the task or the worker), and a longtail effect 
where there is ‘horizontal differentiation’ or variety (Bar-Isaac et al., 2012, cited in Codagnone 
et al., 2016). 
On the platform in South Africa, we might expect greater evidence of a longtail effect. At the 
same time, it is plausible that concentration on all platforms would be likely to increase over 
time given that some workers have the opportunity to acquire more experience than others 
(and those with higher ratings are more likely to focus on the income-generation opportunities 
the platform provides). Indeed, we do not find the concentration that has been observed on other 
platforms – but nonetheless, we find that the top 10% of full-time workers (those available for 5 
or more days weekly) were taking on around one quarter of the available hours of work carried 
out by full-time workers (see Table 2). 
We consider determinants of being a 
‘superstar’, defined in terms of being in the  
top decile in terms of hours worked (see 
Annex 1 for details). Ratings, first and 
foremost, as well as tenure and the number  
of days a worker is available for ‘platform’ 
work each week display a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with 
‘superstar’ status. Socio-demographic 
markers including age, marital status, 
education and geography (at the city level) 
do not display any statistically significant 
association. Critically, the positive 
relationship between ‘days available’ and 
the likelihood of being a ‘superstar’ points 
to flexibility being inversely related to top 
performance (even among workers with at 
least 5 days available per week). So, while 
flexibility is a feature the platform offers its 
workers, it is not necessarily associated with 
being a top performer.
Table 2 Cumulative share of hours worked by 
share of workers on th platform (%)
Share of workers Share of hours
0 0
10 0.002
20 1
30 4
40 10
50 19
60 31
70 44
80 59
90 77
100 100
Note: N=83,973.
Source: Computed from the platform’s data. 
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than others in terms of capturing a larger share 
of the available work – so called ‘superstars’. 
‘Superstar’ status does not seem to be linked  
to any socio-demographic characteristics or 
attitudinal variables, but rather to ratings, tenure 
on the platform and being relatively more available 
(Box 5).
Most survey respondents (84%) reported being 
the person who contributed the most to their 
household income while nearly all (95%) had 
financial dependents. However, in absolute terms, 
the majority signalled that their platform earnings 
were insufficient, with some indicating that they 
could not meet their basic needs and financial 
responsibilities through platform work, nor were 
they able to save:
I have to balance everything with the 
money that I earn. I sacrifice to eat  
less and opt to walk distances than 
paying for taxi fares [to gigs].  
(Akumzi, Cape Town)
I have to pay for everything and the 
money I earn is too little. Its peanuts.  
I can’t even afford to buy myself 
clothes. I have to rely on the clothes 
that the people I work for give me. I am 
a charity case even though I work every 
day. And you see things are now 
expensive. (Michelle, Cape Town)
The ability for workers to save money varied 
– one interviewee reported being able to save if 
she took many gigs, although this changed after 
she had a child and her expenses increased, but 
several workers reported having no option to 
save money after their expenses: 
There is no chance to save through the 
platform. If I die today, I know I’m 
leaving my child with nothing.  
(Ayanda, Cape Town)
We are not saving anything. Once you 
get the money you pay rent, school fees, 
transport to school, and crèche fees for 
the little one, and buy clothes for kids. 
In general I can say expenses run over 
my salary so there is no saving. It’s just 
trying to make ends meet.  
(Petronella, Johannesburg)
Importantly, the workers interviewed who 
were no longer active on the platform reported 
that stability of income was a positive feature of 
their new employment – even where the overall 
level of pay was low: 
At the guesthouse it’s much better 
because you know every day you go  
to work and you get your fixed salary 
at the end of the month. With the 
platform it’s very uncertain, everything 
is uncertain. From the money you are 
going to earn to getting the booking 
itself and once you get the booking  
you don’t even know what to expect 
because you might find a house that has 
not been cleaned for two months. 
(Matodi, Cape Town)  
5.1.2 Kenya
As in South Africa, gig work in Kenya clearly 
remains a survival strategy for most workers, but 
at a minimum it enabled workers to earn some 
income for themselves and their families. For 
instance, Simon, a building contractor, who had 
joined the platform during a challenging time, had 
been able to move from ‘a tin house’ to a bigger 
two-room stone house as a result of increasing 
his client base through the platform. For others, 
gig work ensured they could meet the sustenance 
needs of their family: 
At least I know at the end of the  
day there is food on the table for  
my kids. (Isabella, housekeeper and  
nanny, Nairobi)
While we did not ask workers to specify the 
amount they earned, we were interested in the 
words they used to describe their pay (typically 
words such as ‘good’, ‘okay’, ‘average’ and ‘better’). 
We interpreted this as meaning either the pay was 
equivalent to what they would earn in similar 
jobs acquired through traditional means, or that, 
regardless of its level, they were content with the 
opportunity to earn an income. Notably, gig workers 
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did not express any concern over the amount they 
were paid per gig, but rather a need to work more 
so that they could earn more. They also valued 
being paid through the platform, as this ensured no 
delays or need to follow up directly with the client. 
Yeah. It’s just my main source of income. 
Although it is very painful because now, 
I am just going only one day and the 
other six days I am just in the house. 
(Isabella, housekeeper and nanny, 
Nairobi)
One representative of a platform offering 
household services said that they ensured that 
workers were paid at the ‘market rate’ for their 
service (i.e. the rate they would be paid to 
perform the same service outside the platform 
economy), pointing out that this was often higher 
than the government rate for casual labourers 
(platform representative, Nairobi). However, 
several key informants, notably worker union 
representatives, expressed concerns over the 
pricing of some on-demand work models which 
rely on worker bids rather than a standardised 
pricing structure. In fact, one platform was in  
the process of standardising both the prices that 
workers charged for their services and product 
offerings – in a pilot to promote this shift within 
one of their service categories they reported 
recording more sales in two weeks than they had 
in the previous two years.24 
The representative from the Ministry for 
Information and Communication Technology 
described a Ministry study which found that 
most gig workers (in on-demand and crowdwork) 
earned on average about the recommended 
minimum wage per month. However, this 
estimate did not specify the number of tasks or 
hours a worker would have to complete to earn 
this amount, nor did it factor in overheads such 
as the cost of an internet connection, airtime, 
transport, etc. The adequacy of the minimum 
wage itself is another concern, as previously 
discussed, with evidence suggesting it is well 
below a living wage for a typical family (Guzi 
and Kahanec, 2018).
5.2 Flexibility
In Chapter 2, we distinguished between employer- 
and worker-led flexibility. Our findings for both 
South Africa and Kenya suggest that flexibility is a 
core offering that platform companies advertise to 
their workforce, and also provide some evidence 
of worker-led flexibility. However, we find that 
platform operating models mainly strengthen 
employer-driven flexibility, whether the platform 
or its clients are considered to be the employer. 
This is because, by design, the operating model 
allows platforms and clients to contract workers 
only when they need them, and therefore respond 
to fluctuating demand at minimal cost.  
5.2.1 Flexibility in the location of gigs
In South Africa, most workers that we interviewed 
raised the location of gigs as a challenge – being 
too far away and with no reliable and affordable 
transport link with their home neighbourhood. While 
workers can specify on the platform where they 
wish to work, the legacy of racial and economic 
segregation in South Africa persists such that many 
workers live in township or other low-income areas 
that are geographically far from their more affluent 
clients’ neighbourhoods, with poor transport links. 
At first I used to work in the area [A]  
. . . But I found out that this area was 
too expensive for me in terms of transport 
because I would use two to three taxis on 
one trip. Then I changed to the area [B].  
(Alister, Cape Town) 
Some interviewees cited distance and associated 
commuting challenges as a reason to decline 
bookings (e.g. Faheema, Cape Town). However, 
others chose to take bookings in faraway suburbs 
in zones where the houses are big – by making 
themselves available to travel to and work in 
these areas, some workers found that they could 
more easily obtain longer bookings/shifts (e.g. 
Zukelwa, Cape Town). 
In Kenya too, the cost of commuting to a gig 
– in terms of time and transport – were important 
24 It should also be noted that other factors than the standardised pricing structure may be at play; this pilot was accompanied 
by a focused marketing campaign, to which some of these additional sales may also be attributed.
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influences over worker decisions to bid for/accept 
a gig. The gig workers we spoke with all lived in 
different areas of Nairobi, often in the informal 
settlements or neighbouring counties where rents 
were more affordable. For several workers, this 
necessitated long commuting times, which in turn 
could mandate very early starts and, for some, 
additional financial outlay for childcare and/or 
transport. For example, Ruth, a housekeeper, 
would start her days as early as 3.30 a.m. – this 
required her to pay for a motorcycle, because she 
feared being mugged if she walked to a public 
transportation stop at that hour. As in South 
Africa, workers recounted rejecting or not 
pursuing gigs that they deemed to be too far 
away due to higher transport costs.  
5.2.2 Flexibility in the timing of gigs
On the face of it, some evidence suggests platform 
work affords considerable flexibility to workers 
in the timing of work. Indeed, 92% of our survey 
respondents in South Africa reported having 
worked on convenient days during the previous 
week and 88% reported having worked at 
convenient times. Indeed, the platform allows 
workers to specify the days they are available to 
work (which they can change if their circumstances 
alter), to take a certain number of ‘days off’ and 
to specify longer periods during which they are 
unavailable. Platform data suggests that one-
third of active workers opt to work less than 
full-time and, on any given day, approximately 
30% of active workers opt to take a ‘day off’.
Some workers reported a mix of ad hoc and 
regular clients, with some ad hoc bookings turning 
into a longer-term, more regular relationship with gigs 
booked further in advance and during the same time 
slot.25 Among our survey respondents, nearly two- 
thirds (63%) reported having at least one regular 
booking with a client while around 40% worked 
only through regular bookings with the same client. 
Yet our interviews suggest mixed experiences 
among workers in relation to the benefits of this 
flexibility. Several interviewees agreed that, 
comparatively, platform work was more flexible 
than other types of work, including ‘traditional’ 
domestic work – and therefore a reason to join 
the platform along with the low pay of previous 
roles (or persistent unemployment). For example, 
one worker explained how she felt the platform 
allowed her to manage other commitments better 
than other paid work options: 
choosing hours is good because I can 
accommodate the other things that I 
want to do somewhere else. Interviewer: 
You have said that you want to go to 
church. Interviewee: Or else I want to 
go to clinic first then I can choose a 
booking that can start at 2 pm or 1 pm 
other than someone that I am employed 
to who says strictly 8.00 a.m. That 
hour choosing is better because you can 
accommodate anything in your life. 
Interviewer: OK, and the platform is 
helping you to choose working hours 
whenever you like. Interviewee: Yes. 
(Petronella, Johannesburg)
This ostensible flexibility, however, must be 
interpreted alongside other features of how the 
platform model operates in practice. First, the 
flexibility the model offers is circumscribed by the 
number of workers a platform registers, as well as 
client demand for bookings and their preferences 
over the day, timing and length of bookings. This 
‘constrained flexibility’ is inherent to any service 
offering, but arguably poses more of a constraint 
to gig workers who work for a range of different 
clients and therefore may find it harder to build 
trust (and the flexibility this may bestow) than a 
worker in a more stable placement. Second, the 
ability of clients to book (and cancel) cleaners  
on an ad hoc basis – which is designed into the 
platform operating model – introduces considerable 
uncertainty for workers. Third, the need to agree 
to a fixed number of hours in advance increases 
the likelihood for clients to insist on more work 
than can reasonably be done in a given time, 
putting pressure on workers to acquiesce (or risk 
being rated negatively or not being booked again by 
that household and therefore losing someone from 
their client ‘pool’). We explore each issue in turn.
First and foremost, the extent of workers’ 
economic opportunities in the gig economy depends 
25 Such longer-term relationships can stay on the platform, though some workers and clients end up making private arrangements.
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largely on client bookings. Perhaps the most
common issue that workers raised in relation to 
time was not being able to find as much work as 
they would like. This need for more work emerged 
as a more pressing concern than having more time 
to spend with family or on household chores. 
Indeed, when we analysed determinants of life 
satisfaction among gig workers, hours worked 
showed a strong positive association, while neither 
measure of flexibility we considered (the number 
of days a worker made herself available and 
identifying flexibility as a key motivation for 
gig-work engagement) was statistically significant 
(Box 6). When asked if they would have preferred 
Box 6 The contribution of flexibility to life satisfaction
Nearly two-thirds of workers surveyed (64%) reported being satisfied or very satisfied with 
their lives. We sought to understand better the extent to which job-related characteristics were 
associated with life satisfaction. 
Although hampered by small sample sizes, our analysis yielded some thought-provoking results 
(see Annex 1 for details). The only variables positively associated with life satisfaction, our 
dependent variable, at statistically significant levels are age (age is negatively associated with 
life satisfaction till the early 30s, and positively associated thereafter), being in better health, 
and hours worked (which is highly correlated with earnings). Notably, the variables associated 
with flexibility (number of days available per week, and reporting flexibility as a motivation for 
being on the platform) do not display any significant associations with life satisfaction. In this 
our results contrast with those of Berger et al. (2018), in whose study Uber drivers in London 
reported higher levels of life satisfaction than other workers, which the authors attribute in part 
to a preference for the flexibility and autonomy that the platform offers. In the present study, we 
do not see any evidence that flexibility, per se, is associated with higher levels of satisfaction; 
rather, the results highlight a desire for more hours of work.
In our surveys, workers were asked to specify in their own words one thing they would change 
about their work on the platform, if anything. It is notable that the largest share of respondents 
answering this question (17%) answered ‘none’, which could express satisfaction with their 
conditions or, conversely, a feeling of having no control over most aspects of the platform model.26 
The next most common response was a desire for longer hours and more work (20% of workers). 
Smaller shares of workers wanted assistance with transport (8%), a respectful workplace (6%) 
and higher pay (6%). Worker responses included:
The platform is helping me and I am gaining a lot of experience while I am booked from 
different clients and it’s helping me to do the things I couldn’t do when I was unemployed.
The platform is good because I am able to take care of my family and have some sort of 
development in my life. It’s also nice because you work and rest and you don’t work 
every day – the work is also really easy.
I have nothing to hate about my work through the platform because work is easy. I also 
like the fact that we can choose our off days, but the problem is that I am not getting 
the bookings and I don’t know why.
I would like to change the working conditions because sometimes when you are going 
for a booking you use your own money and you don’t know where you are going. [. . .] 
Every day I must be on the app looking for work, it’s inconvenient for me. I just need to 
know that every day, I’m going to a certain place so that if I am buying a bus ticket, I do 
that and budget my money. Sometimes the hours are too little, sometimes they are too much.
26 Out of 809 respondents, 64% opted to respond to this question. Among those who did respond, 17% of responses were inaudible.
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to work more in the previous week, 74% of 
respondents responded affirmatively, also indicating 
that the main reason they did not work was not 
having enough bookings. Furthermore, when 
asked more broadly if they would like to work 
more hours than they did via the platform, 62% 
responded ‘yes’ and 34%, ‘sometimes’; just 5% 
did not want to work more than they already did. 
Importantly, workers felt that if they got regular 
work, the platform was a better option for them: 
Working for the platform is ok, at least 
if you can get everyday jobs from 
Monday to Friday but the problem is 
sometimes you can stay two times in a 
week without going to work. 
(Simlindile, Johannesburg)
Not getting enough bookings in some cases 
was a key reason that workers considered leaving 
a platform and seeking work elsewhere:
there is a day that you sit at home 
because you didn’t have any booking 
available of which it’s [a day marked 
available on the platform]. This will 
make you to decide to leave . . . for a 
full-time position. The bookings are a 
few. I do not work completely. It’s like 
[names day] I ended up removing, [names 
day] I am not getting anything at all. 
(Happiness, Johannesburg)
According to the platform representative, the 
platform has been through a process of learning 
about ‘utilisation’, explaining that ‘supply and 
demand is a very difficult thing to balance’ and 
that a lot more people want to join the platform 
than they can cater for, given rife unemployment. 
In addition, the platform ratings system is also a 
key determinant of the frequency of bookings 
and therefore working schedules. As the 
representative explained, workers with a higher 
average rating get more gigs but want longer 
hours, while those with lower ratings get less 
work (days with gigs booked) and so just want 
more confirmed bookings: 
your utilisation is largely based on ratings 
and so . . . those who are above the mean, 
for them getting longer bookings is more 
the issue because they are getting more 
than enough work and those at the 
bottom end of the market [the issue] is 
that they just want more work. (KII, 
platform representative)
The ability of the platform to provide work 
clearly rests on the volume of client bookings; 
clients also determine the days and times that 
bookings are available. The platform plays an 
active role in mediating schedules, notably 
through trying to regulate supply and demand 
throughout the week through a mixture of 
pricing/earnings incentives and by providing 
information to workers around which days are 
likely to provide the most income to them. 
Critically, one consequence for some workers 
was that they opted to be available for work 
when demand was likely to be higher rather than 
in line with their initial preferences – e.g. to work 
at weekends, rather than during the week. 
Client trust also emerged as a key issue driving 
demand – often clients want to be at home with a 
worker, particularly when the relationship between 
worker and client is new. Although in a very few 
cases workers felt that clients were willing to agree 
gig timings in line with workers’ preferences (e.g. 
Precious, Cape Town), most workers reported 
that the client determined their schedule. This 
meant that workers often needed to wake up 
very early to be punctual and keep the client 
happy, as well as to meet client preference around 
their start time – which was often early in the 
morning as the clients themselves often had to 
leave to get to work. After a client and worker 
have built a relationship, the platform suggests or 
gives incentives (such as lower prices) to move a 
booking from the weekend to the week, to better 
spread supply and demand across the week. 
The main thing that we have really 
tried to do is to use pricing to try  
and funnel more people into the week  
[. . .] but yeah, it’s been difficult to shift 
clients away from Saturdays and 
Sundays and a lot of it was because  
of security concerns in South Africa.  
[. . .] So trust is a big factor . . .  
(KII, platform representative) 
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Most frequently, workers voiced a preference to 
work at times that would allow them to commute 
in daylight due to the significant security risks 
they face travelling in the dark. Early mornings 
in particular were discussed at length by several 
workers, with many reporting having been the 
victim of aggressive robberies in the dark, notably 
in winter: 
 Like now its winter and I stay in [area] 
. . . people are getting robbed every day. 
So 6 a.m. it will be very dark, and for 
instance you will be having a booking for 
7 a.m. which means I will have to wake 
up by 5 a.m. then I will take my child 
to crèche by 6 a.m. because at the 
crèche they open at 6 a.m. I will then 
go to take whatever that I will take but 
it’s not safe to move from my house to 
the school because it will be very dark 
so I do not want a 7 a.m. booking 
because it’s a risk. I can’t risk my life 
for ZAR 150 it won’t work.  
(Faheema, Cape Town) 
In this regard, workers perceived that the 
platform prioritised client preferences when this 
issue was raised: 
A lot of people complain but they say 
the client wants to go work so they 
cannot change the time.  
(Faheema, Cape Town)
This is clearly a challenge: the platform changing 
the start times would likely result in clients no 
longer booking, and therefore fewer gigs available 
to workers. 
A second main feature of the operating model 
is that its reliance on client bookings of cleaners 
on an ad hoc basis can introduce considerable 
uncertainty for workers. Workers would generally 
know by the afternoon if they had work for the 
following day, as they had to confirm booking 
requests (assuming the client did not cancel the 
booking). However, several workers cited the 
inconsistency of times worked from week to 
week, discussing frequent changes in the days 
and number of hours worked using terms such  
as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘waiting’ for bookings. 
Most of the times I work in [area] from 
Monday to Saturday. Interviewer: I 
understand these are the days that you 
are available to work, but what is your 
reality – do you always get bookings 
every day from Monday to Saturday? 
Interviewee: No, sometimes I do not get 
bookings once or twice in a week. 
(Akumzi, Cape Town)
Regular clients (as opposed to ad hoc clients) 
who made repeat bookings with the same worker 
via the platform seemed to be viewed more 
favourably by workers as they provided some 
stability/ongoing predictability – although it 
cannot be said that this provided total stability as 
some workers also reported that regular clients 
would cancel gigs, including at the last minute. 
These days I have been getting Monday 
bookings, but sometimes you can be 
disappointed when you are trusting that 
obviously Monday I am going to work. 
You already have a client that you have 
recruited that takes you every week so 
sometimes they can cancel the booking 
and you don’t have anything to do 
other than staying at home.  
(Precious, Cape Town)
A third feature that restricted worker-led 
flexibility in practice was, in some cases, a 
perceived need to overwork to meet client 
demands for certain tasks to be completed within 
a fixed number of hours. While being able to 
leave the booking on time was cited as a positive 
attribute of some clients, several workers described 
how clients booked a few tasks in a short time 
slot on the platform, with the worker then asked 
to do much more work when they arrived. In this 
situation, the clients often put pressure on workers 
to finish but if they rushed to do so quality could 
be compromised, and so the worker risked getting 
a bad rating:
Let’s say I have been booked for five 
hours [. . .]. It will be a big house that 
does not even tally with those five hours 
[. . .] but the client expects me to finish 
that job, so I am forced to add hours  
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[. . .]. The client will be putting pressure 
on me to work fast, but if I work fast,  
I will get a bad rating attributed to not 
cleaning properly as the job was rushed. 
There is a serious problem there. 
(Faheema, FGD participant, Cape Town)
In response to this challenge, some clients added 
hours to a booking, and one worker reported 
that a client let her negotiate her hours and finish 
a job the next day. Another respondent reported 
that ‘others are just so rude’ (Jostina, Cape Town), 
while others described how the longer-than-
expected hours can be problematic for the 
management of unpaid care (discussed further in 
the next chapter). The platform representative 
interviewed recognised these negative experiences 
and explained that workers are paid for time 
worked when this exceeds time booked and that 
the platform contains a mechanism for workers to 
no longer provide services to clients whom they 
rate poorly. 
Finally, it should be noted that, for some 
workers, the concept of working to a schedule 
determined by hours was novel. Some saw this 
very positively, appreciating that the amount of 
time they were due to work at a gig was much 
clearer than in other kinds of non-platform work: 
‘why I love to work for the platform is that I 
work with hours’(Portia, Johannesburg).27
Similar challenges emerged in Kenya too – with 
workers describing long working hours, a need to 
comply with client demands regarding scheduling 
(and associated unpredictability), and, at times, the 
underestimation of the hours needed to complete 
a task. In Kenya, our focus on several different 
platforms revealed key differences in sectors geared 
towards providing household services (where we 
would argue that worker-led flexibility is limited) 
and those focused on services like ride-hailing, 
where higher demand – including throughout the 
whole day/night – enables greater worker say over 
when and where they work. Reflecting the nascent 
state of gig work in Kenya, a key difference with 
South Africa is the much lower availability of 
regular bookings with the same client – though, at 
times, workers reported developing relationships 
with their clients to a point where they trusted 
working for them outside the gig platforms. 
For platforms reliant on providing services to 
households, again, clients often set the time of 
the day/week to conduct a gig, with workers 
adjusting their schedules accordingly. Essentially, 
workers’ constant need for a gig (and uncertainty 
regarding when the next gig would be available) 
made it difficult for them to decline requests for 
their services at times they would prefer not to 
work, e.g. at weekends when caring for their 
family, etc. Further, gig platforms themselves 
prefer workers who are flexible with their working 
hours, i.e. who will not choose specific times and 
days of the week to work. There were some accounts 
of a limited ability to negotiate the timing of gigs, 
which could vary from client to client:
It’s them who tell me what time to 
arrive. That’s when I explain to them 
the situation with my child and ask to 
come at this particular time. Then we 
agree. If they refuse, then the hours that 
they have said I should be there, I sacrifice 
and go at that time.  
(Cynthia, housekeeper, Nairobi)
Gig work also can be said to redefine notions of 
‘time off’. Because workers have multiple clients, 
and in theory, are managing their own schedules, 
it is up to them to decide whether they take days 
off. Some workers who valued a day off did not 
accept gigs on that day, or negotiated a day off if 
they had a regular, long-term assignment. Others 
opted to make themselves continually available, 
though in practice, apart from for drivers, there 
was insufficient demand for daily gigs.
Some workers such as Marah who worked 
with regular days and clients as a housekeeper, 
nanny and cook had successfully negotiated 
having a rest day after six working days (in line 
with Kenyan labour law). Others, like Ruth, 
perceived no option but to be available as much 
27 Some evidence points to a process of adaptation to working in this way – the platform representative suggested the company 
has to (and has an appetite to) educate workers on the model: ‘We previously had someone in ops from Germany teaching our 
workers how to count hours and we have noted this as we cannot take it for granted since education is needed to work well.’ 
(KII, platform representative, South Africa)
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as possible; once her child was three months old, 
she returned to her regular cleaning gigs, taking 
her child with her. 
I have been working throughout except 
for the time I had a miscarriage, I took 
some time off to rest. And also, when I 
got this baby, then I also rested.  
(Ruth, housekeeper, Nairobi)
As in South Africa, in many sectors of work in 
Kenya (ride-hailing being a notable exception), 
gig workers are reliant on client descriptions of 
the tasks they need to complete – if a client 
underestimated the work involved in completing 
a task, workers nonetheless typically reported 
feeling that they had no choice but to complete 
the workload (not least to secure a positive 
rating that would help in securing future gigs). 
While some aspects of extended time for gig 
work could be considered as overtime, neither 
workers nor platform companies considered 
charging for these extended working hours. 
While some workers did share with us 
complaints about having to work longer hours 
than the norm to complete client requests, they 
did not put forward any request for additional 
compensation, presumably for fear of jeopardising 
the next gig. 
More broadly (and again with ride-sharing as 
the exception), there is rarely consistency in work 
because the nature of a gig changes with every 
client. Rather, workers are constantly adjusting 
to fit into the gigs available, working long hours 
to accomplish tasks given, but also waiting to 
know when the next gig will be available. The 
irregularity and unpredictability of gig work 
renders it difficult for workers to plan their time 
and budget their income. This is, in part, a 
function of the ‘start-up’ nature of many platforms 
in Kenya, which are not yet working at a scale that 
can provide regular work and face challenges in 
balancing supply and demand. However, one 
platform representative spoke of experimentation 
with a model that could place limits on flexibility 
in return for certain guarantees from the platform 
(see Chapter 7), and also of the platform’s intent 
to acquire regular clients and thereby offer gigs on 
a regular basis to workers (as with the platform in 
South Africa). 
Worker strategies to cope with this uncertainty 
included, where viable, registering on a platform 
in more than one category and registering on 
more than one platform (as 19% of our survey 
respondents in South Africa did) to increase  
their chances of being offered work. The ride-
hailing apps in particular were criticised by 
respondents for not having capped the number  
of registered drivers, with the consequence that 
drivers were registering on all available platforms 
in the hope of receiving work. Some workers also 
expressed a need to remain alert and available 
for work at all times, including remaining 
connected to the platform app throughout the 
day and night. Workers also expressed a desire  
to cultivate relationships with their clients,  
which could facilitate negotiations over working 
hours and pay (and having time off, when 
needed); however, they noted that gig work 
typically did not afford the possibility to build 
such relationships.
5.3 Safety and security
Crime rates are a concern for workers in LICs 
and many MICs, particularly in South Africa. 
One gauge of this is the intentional homicide 
rate, which is 34 per 100,000 inhabitants in 
South Africa, over 5 times the LIC and MIC 
average of 6 (similar to the Kenyan average of 5) 
(World Bank, 2019). 
Broadly speaking, workers are exposed to 
distinct types of risk, based on their profiles, 
transport patterns and sites of work. Working 
hours often pose a considerable risk to platform 
workers because of the amount of time they spend 
travelling between gigs and because gigs often 
involve travelling during early mornings or late 
evenings. Some gig work – notably ride-sharing 
– can pose hazards to workers from clients in 
their vehicle or as a result of travelling to or 
through risky areas. Providing services to a range 
of unknown clients in their homes may also 
heighten safety risks to on-demand workers 
(Hunt and Machingura, 2016). 
In South Africa, early starts were reported as a 
concern: workers relayed several instances of the 
armed and aggressive robbery of gig workers 
travelling to and from gigs:
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Last month when I was on my way to 
my booking, the robber wanted to take 
my handbag that had my cell phone 
inside. I could not afford to give away 
my handbag to the robber, so the robber 
stabbed me with a knife.  
(Akumzi, Cape Town)
One day when I was leaving the complex 
[client’s residence] I met robbers with a 
car and they robbed me. They took 
money and my bank card [. . .] and they 
withdrew all the money. It was [right after 
we were paid by the platform] . . . all the 
money was taken away by the robbers. 
(Portia, Johannesburg)
This insecurity also compromised workers’ 
ability to comply with platform requirements for 
regular communication. For example in South 
Africa, platform workers’ reluctance to use their 
phones in public could render it difficult for them 
to report on their whereabouts, as ‘it means that 
the otherwise sense of professionalism that they 
would like to have they are unable to, because their 
own safety is at risk’ (KII, platform representative, 
South Africa).
Platforms focused on household services  
raise distinct concerns as the worker provides  
the service in a private home. In Kenya, a 
worker’s sense of security determined if they 
accepted a given gig; women especially reported 
declining gigs at night or with clients they 
perceived as unsafe, even when the alternative 
was to be without work. For example, Mercy, 
who offered beauty services, automatically 
rejected all requests from male clients for this 
reason. Some workers also felt that platforms 
made too little effort to vet clients and on some 
platforms they themselves did not have the 
ability to rate clients or any other formal 
mechanism to provide feedback. Some workers 
had raised complaints over a client to a platform, 
but none knew if any further action had been 
taken. In both South Africa and Kenya, some 
workers reported instances of rude, aggressive or 
abusive treatment by clients, as well as accounts 
of other inappropriate behaviours including 
clients being drunk or using illegal drugs while 
the worker was in their home.
The client lifestyle is going to be a 
challenge to me because when you go 
to a client who takes marijuana or 
takes drugs or someone who wants to 
take something, a tot or a shot before 
you give the person service. . . . Especially 
marijuana because it is going to affect me. 
(Prudence, beautician, Nairobi) 
For drivers too, safety considerations are 
paramount and indeed they have been cited as a 
key barrier to the recruitment and retention of 
women drivers on ride-hailing platforms (IFC, 
2018). In Kenya, Ivy, a ride-hailing driver, and a 
Digital Taxi Forum (DTF) representative both 
explained that drivers decline requests from clients 
in areas deemed insecure, particularly at night. The 
DTF representative recounted that 34 driver deaths 
had been recorded in a 4-month period, alongside 
reports of robbery, sexual abuse and harassment.
5.4 Access to labour and  
social protections
A chief critique of digital platforms is that they 
deny workers the status of employees and 
therefore restrict their access to labour and 
contributory social protections, while removing 
the need for the platform to make any 
contributions on their behalf (De Stefano, 2016). 
This may be particularly harmful for women 
workers, given that they tend to be more reliant 
on flexible and less protected forms of work. 
However, in LIC and MIC contexts, gig-economy 
offerings are likely to be on par with other casual 
and informal jobs, which constitute the bulk of 
employment opportunities (Hunt and Samman, 
2019). Indeed, platform-mediated work may 
even offer some advantages over other casual  
and informal jobs in that while the platforms  
we examined have not sought any linkages  
with the public social protection system, there 
have been limited attempts to develop some 
private forms of provision (which we revisit in 
Chapter 7).
In South Africa, around half (52%) of our 
survey respondents reported having a funeral 
plan, and 5% a medical plan, while a further  
6% had both (and 37%, neither). Of those with 
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either plan, 71% of respondents paid for it 
themselves; of those that had neither, around half 
(52%) cited low earnings. Three-quarters of 
survey respondents were not entitled to paid 
leave and/or days off when sick in any of their 
jobs. Just 7% of workers were covered under a 
pension scheme (almost always through a spouse/
partner, relative or someone else). 
Workers articulated being unable to access 
income via the platform, including at times when 
it was most needed (e.g. a maternity-leave income), 
leaving them in extreme financial precarity: 
I was pregnant when I joined the 
platform [but] it’s no work no pay 
there. I wasn’t active for three months. 
(Simlindile, Johannesburg)
Another currently inactive worker gave a  
clear account of how her financial situation 
deteriorated during pregnancy and after 
childbirth, including because she did not receive 
any protections while on maternity leave. This 
eventually led to her taking up another offer of 
work elsewhere: 
I would get bookings every day of the 
week and before I had a child I was fine 
really [. . .] When I found out that I was 
pregnant, the father of the child did not 
want anything to do with us. That’s when 
I saved up enough to sustain myself when 
the baby comes. It was not easy [. . .]  
I needed to pay rent, transport to work 
and still make sure I save enough for 
the child’s preparation and for the three 
months when I will not be working. 
Also, I asked worker support if they 
assist us during maternity leave and 
they said they don’t. That was the 
toughest time of my life.  
(Charlene, Cape Town)
Furthermore, workers’ coverage by public social 
protection was low, for both social insurance 
schemes but also social assistance – for example, 
just under one in three workers (27%) were in a 
household in which anyone received a South 
African Social Security Agency (SASSA) grant 
(while 12% were unsure), far below the 70%  
of households nationally who receive a social 
grant.28 At the same time, 96% of workers felt it 
was ‘very important’ (81%) or ‘important’ (15%) 
for them to have benefits such as medical aid or a 
pension. Access to maternity protections – including 
cash benefits – is limited for ‘traditional’ and on- 
demand domestic workers alike (Box 7). Some 
key barriers appear common to both groups, 
highlighting the importance of expanding 
coverage and access as the gig economy grows to 
avoid further exclusion.
Key informants discussed the link of platform 
work with statutory labour rights – which they felt 
may be complied with to a certain extent – but the 
link with statutory social protections was considered 
weak. The Social Law Project explained that, in 
their view, platforms are regulated in the sense 
they comply with certain aspects of labour law, 
for example, on minimum wage:
So they comply with the law but as you 
are aware, the minimum wage for 
domestic workers (starting wage) is very 
low and that is the standard wage. So it 
is not different for the different kinds of 
domestic work. The whole issue of wages 
needs to be re-looked at [across the 
whole sector]. (KII, Social Law Project)
However, key informants also highlighted that 
workers may remain unlikely to get the full 
benefits of ‘collective bargaining, unfair dismissal 
and all the legal protection that goes with formal 
employment that goes in inverted commas if and 
when they become employees’ (KII, Social Law 
Project), given that in the ‘traditional’ domestic 
work sector, full employer compliance to labour 
rights and protections is limited. 
A minority (18%) of workers reported paying 
income tax, while 55% did not and 27% were 
‘unsure’. The main reasons for not doing so were 
not earning enough (40% of workers who did not 
28 SASSA is a national agency that distributes social grants on behalf of the Department of Social Development. These include 
the Child Support Grant, Older Person’s Grant, Disability Grant, Grant-in-Aid, Care Dependency Grant, War Veteran’s Grant 
and Foster Child Grant. All but the Grant-in-Aid and Foster Child Grant are means tested (Kelly and GroundUp Staff 2017).
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Box 7 Protection in name only: domestic worker access to maternity benefits in South Africa
Examination of the maternity-leave benefits accessed by ‘traditional’ domestic workers in South 
Africa highlights persistent gaps in coverage and access. Going forward, consideration of how to 
ensure gig workers’ access to protections will be critical as the gig economy grows – not least as 
many gig workers are simultaneously active in the ‘traditional’ sector, meaning measures to 
recognise multiple employment relationships within social protection systems will become ever 
more important. 
On paper, there are a range of maternity protections. The 1996 Constitution establishes that 
everyone has the right to social security (South Africa, 1996), following which the 1997 Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 stipulated that workers are entitled to four months of unpaid 
consecutive maternity leave, to be taken at any time from four weeks before the expected date of 
birth and not to end until six weeks after birth, unless authorised by a medical practitioner 
(Dupper, 2002). This act was later amended by Sectoral Determination 7 in 2002, which entitles 
domestic workers to the same maternity leave (South Africa, 2002). 
In 2001, the Unemployment Insurance Act No. 64 established an Unemployment Insurance 
Fund (UIF) for employees, with enrolled workers entitled to maternity benefits for a maximum 
of 17 weeks or 6 weeks if they have a miscarriage or stillborn child (Department of Labour, 
2013). On 1 April 2003, domestic workers and their employers were officially included (ibid.). 
To enrol in the UIF, employers must register themselves and their domestic workers with the fund 
and make contributions monthly. To contribute, employers deduct 1% of their worker’s salary 
and pay 1% themselves (Department of Labour, 2008). To claim maternity benefit, workers must 
apply in person at an employment office at least eight weeks prior to birth. Benefits are then 
provided on a sliding scale ranging from 38% to 60% of the contributor’s prior income (Department 
of Labour, 2001). 
Yet while these provisions represent major progress in securing domestic workers’ maternity 
protection coverage, access to benefits remains low in practice. Several categories of workers  
are excluded from the UIF, including foreign individuals working on a contract, as well as 
individuals employed for less than 24 hours a month for a single employer (ibid.). This time 
stipulation poses a key barrier, given many domestic workers work less than 24 hours per month 
for any single employer, instead working part-time hours for different employers (du Toit, 2013). 
Employer non-compliance and domestic workers’ limited awareness of their rights pose further 
barriers (Gobind et al., 2013). Even when more aware and entitled, many domestic workers fear 
losing their jobs and therefore do not question their employers if they take actions which contradict 
the law (Magwaza, 2011). Navigating the claimant application process poses insurmountable 
challenges to many too (see Liao, 2019).
The platform’s polling of its workforce in 2019 suggested that just 5% of on-demand domestic 
workers were definitely registered for UIF, while 32% did not know. This low level of registration 
may well be attributable to eligibility requirements: only 6% of single worker–client relationships 
for the month of June were for more than 24 hours per month. However, 66% of the platform 
workers worked for more than 24 hours in a sample month (August 2018), highlighting the 
significant implications for workers’ entitlement (and contributions) depending on whether 
their employer is considered to be the household client or the platform company that mediates 
their work.
Note: We are extremely grateful to Aasha Jackson who carried out a comprehensive literature review during a placement 
at ODI in Spring 2019, which informed the content in this box.
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pay tax or who were unsure whether they did) and 
being engaged in part-time work (31%).
All gig workers are conceptualised by the 
platform as independent contractors and agree to 
terms and conditions stipulating this. However, 
workers frequently expressed confusion over 
their status with the platform, including that they 
didn’t know what it meant or who they were 
working for: 
Another issue that is confusing is this 
word of ‘independent contractor’ –  
we do not know what it means or 
which company we are working under 
because when we go to clients we are 
under the platform but when we go  
to the platform with our issues they  
say they are not responsible for us.  
This is bothering us, we don’t know 
where we stand.  
(Olinda, FGD participant, Cape Town)
Yet some of these same workers were aware  
of some of the limitations of their independent 
contractor status, notably in relation to their 
inability to access various protections and 
benefits: 
How important are these benefits  
[such as medical aid] to you and  
what do you hope to see from 
companies? Participant: Presently  
the company looks at us as  
individual contractors; we need 
someone to stand with us.  
(Olinda, FGD participant, Cape Town)
Along similar lines, in Kenya, participants 
associated obligations and benefits such as 
remitting taxes, health insurance and social 
security with formal employment (and indeed 
were an aspiration, rather than something 
achievable in their current work status), while 
good employer–employee relations and working 
conditions were seen as pertinent issues that 
employers and clients should adhere to. 
Furthermore, according to a key informant from 
the Central Organization of Trade Unions 
(COTU), Kenya, within Kenyan labour law 
informal workers who do not have any social 
benefits from the employer are still protected at 
their workplace as casual labourers.29
From the platform perspective, there is a 
delicate balancing act between the desire to 
provide some incentives to workers to register 
and stay with them while avoiding conditions 
that could be considered to constitute an 
employment relationship. On the one hand,  
some platform companies offer workers perks 
such as training, free airtime, bank loans and 
access to materials required to carry out their gigs. 
However, their representatives were clear that 
this did not mean acknowledging the workers as 
platform employees (with the associated obligations 
this would entail as an employer):
I would love to find a way to make it 
easier to like provide benefits without 
taking the responsibility of then being 
their employer. Which is not possible to 
do as a digital platform.  
(KII, platform representative, Kenya)
The platform companies expressed aversion to 
becoming recognised as gig worker employers, 
due to the associated government regulations 
through which their engagement with workers 
would be governed, and any mechanisms through 
which gig workers themselves could become 
recognised through existing policies and/or 
associations. Yet some worker representatives 
were pushing for greater regulation of the sector, 
focusing on the limitations on security and 
protections faced by workers subject to independent 
contractor status:
And also, what we are pushing most 
were regulations. ‘Unaona’ [You see]. 
Because there is no regulation to follow. 
Because you see, the major problem 
with the gig company or being an 
independent contractor is, this person 
29 The key informant further elaborated that as per the Employment Act 2007, Labour Institutions Act 2007, Labour Relations 
Act 2007, Occupational Safety and Health Act 2007 and Work Injury Benefits Act 2007. There are also institutions such as 
the Labour Board that determine policies in Kenya and Employment Labour Relations Court.
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doesn’t care about your future. No one 
cares about you. No one cares what 
you go through. No one cares how we 
are. No one cares about your health, 
whether you save for your future. 
Whether you earn something decent. 
No one cares. Why? Because you are  
an independent contractor.  
(KII, DTF representative)
5.5 Learning opportunities  
and professionalisation
In both countries, workers appreciated many 
aspects of the platform operating model; in Kenya, 
especially, this included professional development. 
Key informants also cited support for further 
professional development – in job-related and 
transferable skills – as key to professionalising 
lower-skilled service jobs and improving worker 
opportunities either to stay in the same field or to 
move into another line of work.
In South Africa, 91% of survey respondents 
believed that the work they did through the 
platform gave them opportunities for ‘learning on 
the job’. It also appeared to enable a significant 
share of workers (26%) to pursue studies 
alongside work. The platform representative we 
interviewed spoke of providing training in soft 
skills such as scheduling and customer interaction. 
At the same time, several key informants felt 
that, collectively, domestic workers need holistic 
support, at an individual and collective level.  
This included increasing their ability to access 
comprehensive education programmes for workers 
to build transferrable vocational and financial 
skills (including to transfer away from domestic 
work if they wish), and participation in education 
programmes which – importantly – would seek 
to build social awareness and empowerment 
(KII, Social Law Project). 
In Kenya, workers appeared to particularly value 
belonging to a platform and the networking this 
afforded. They appreciated platform marketing 
strategies that promoted worker portfolios, which 
increased their visibility and enabled them to 
attract more clients. Moreover, workers felt that 
the relationships they cultivated at work widened 
their networks, increasing their likelihood of 
referrals to other potential clients, on or off the 
platform. For instance, Simon, a building 
contractor, spoke of having participated in a 
roundtable meeting to negotiate a large-scale  
deal with a housing agency on behalf of the 
platform company.
Some workers also spoke of opportunities for 
learning that gig work offered, including acquiring 
skills in how to dignify their work and to price 
their services and products reasonably: 
Yeah, I’ve learnt so much. Like when 
they are asking you for the quotation, 
they ask you . . . ‘How much are you 
going to charge for your transport? 
How much are you going to charge for 
your labour?’ Those are some of the 
things you don’t think about when 
you’re giving out a service.  
(Prudence, beautician, Nairobi)
Domestic workers in particular spoke of a lack 
of respect for the service they were providing:
Those of us who work as housekeepers, 
we are disrespected a lot. They disrespect 
us a lot. They see us as if we are not 
learned. Someone talks to you rudely. 
The woman can give you clothes to 
wash and she has even left a pad on  
the panty for you to remove. Because 
she is seeing you are useless! (Isabella, 
housekeeper and nanny, Nairobi)
Workers felt that being on a platform and 
acquiring such transferable skills enhanced their 
level of professionalism, enabling them to stand 
out above their peers who were doing similar 
work using conventional approaches. 
Both platform representatives and our key 
informants were explicitly seeking to improve the 
skill set of gig workers and to strengthen the 
qualifications and certifications attached to gig 
work. One key informant spoke of the importance 
of developing a means of testing, measuring and 
registering skills, not only as a way of ensuring 
that clients receive quality services (and that this 
is reflected in worker wages) and as a means of 
dignifying informal jobs, but more broadly as an 
important step in fostering the transition from an 
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informal to a formal economy. This proposition 
receives some support in the very limited empirical 
literature. Kässi and Lehdonvirta (2019) find that 
on a crowdwork platform, certification increases 
the earnings of workers but not the likelihood of 
their obtaining work; they suggest such schemes 
are most likely to benefit workers with some 
previous experience.
5.6 Worker organisation and 
collective action
Among gig workers registered with the platforms 
we focused on, formal gig worker organisation 
was non-existent or nascent in both Kenya and 
South Africa, and there were relatively few signs 
of collective action.30 As a result, workers expressed 
that they were limited in their ability to express 
grievances to the platform, or to advocate for 
changes in their working conditions, using any 
official mechanisms. 
5.6.1 South Africa
In South Africa, the workers we spoke with were 
increasingly in contact with each other informally 
through social media. Indeed, the platform, unlike 
many companies, adds workers to social network 
groups and sets them up with a representative. 
The emphasis is on workers supporting each 
other, including in vernacular language given the 
platform business is conducted in English, passing 
on tips and tricks, and arranging to share transport. 
Because the platform is also active on these groups, 
‘we are able to observe and get the information 
of where we are failing and what we need to do to 
better cater for them’ (KII, platform representative). 
But several interviewees described challenges 
reaching and having problems satisfactorily dealt 
with by the platform’s worker support team. This 
was corroborated by the platform itself, whose 
key informant admitted it cannot always offer 
extensive support from its small office, and who 
felt that the peer-to-peer network is an important 
additional source. However, we also found that 
workers were highly active in their own private 
social network groups where they felt more able  
to speak candidly about their experiences. So far, 
this has not yet led to any concerted collective 
action, despite shared grievances having been 
aired regularly in these groups. 
In our survey, three-quarters of workers (74%) 
reported interacting with other workers on the 
platform on a regular basis. The most popular 
mechanism by far was WhatsApp (67% of 
respondents) followed by workplace encounters 
(presumably at the platform office) (15%) and 
Facebook (9%) (Figure 8). Of the respondents 
who regularly interacted with other platform 
workers, 60% discussed their working conditions 
‘a lot’, 33% discussed these ‘somewhat’ while 7% 
did not discuss them at all. 
Beyond these specific interactions with other 
workers on ‘the platform’, social media appeared 
to be the most common forum for discussion of 
working conditions. About half (49%) of our 
survey respondents reported belonging to 
another group where they discussed working 
conditions. It was a WhatsApp group for 82%  
of these workers; for 8% it was through 
Facebook, while 11% reported belonging to 
‘another group’.
There was no evidence of any formal 
organisation of the platform workers, such as 
union membership. None of our survey 
30 With notable exceptions, such as a tripartite agreement in the ride-hailing sector in Kenya (which riders later complained had not 
been fully implemented by companies) and a legal case against Uber in South Africa, which the company later successfully appealed.
Figure 8 Most common means by which the platform’s 
workers interact on a regular basis in South Africa
 WhatsApp (67%)  At workplace (15%)  Facebook (9%) 
 Somewhere else (5%)  Public places (4%) 
Source: Our survey. N=247.
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respondents reported membership in any kind of 
formal group outside the platform that would 
advocate for their rights. One-third (32%) 
professed not to know how to join such a  
group and one-quarter (26%) felt that such 
organisation was for workers in the formal 
economy. If they experienced a problem at work 
while working through the platform, most 
workers (82%) stated that they would seek help 
from the platform itself, while an additional  
12% would seek help from a workers’ group 
(including either the company sponsored or 
private WhatsApp groups).
Key informants felt this organisation should  
be more formal – that workers need to organise, 
and have support to do so:
They need support from people  
like ourselves who can mobilize 
resources, provide tech support, 
education and training, ensure 
organizations become self-sustaining 
and acquire resources to continue.  
(KII, Social Law Project)
While South Africa’s main domestic workers’ 
union, SADSAWU, recognises the emergence of 
gig companies, and reports some complaints 
from platform workers, it has not yet had the 
scope to focus on them. A key informant noted 
that workers would need to be members for them 
to help them on a sustained basis and that they 
would need to establish a working relationship 
with gig companies.
Aside from providing direct support to workers, 
key informants were keen to initiate a stronger 
social dialogue, bringing diverse stakeholders 
together to start to discuss issues (KII, SADSAWU) 
and fostering advocacy to local and national 
government to improve conditions. Critically, 
however, platform workers had limited knowledge 
of any forms of formal support and they were 
unaware of SADSAWU. Ultimately, several key 
informants were of the view that although 
self-organisation is critical, engaging the current 
company-led gig economy model and established 
social dialogue approach had inherent limitations: 
Self-organization and support in self-
organization is in my view the key to 
everything else. The current union model 
doesn’t really find traction because at 
the moment no one can negotiate and 
workers are dispersed and so on, its 
more a question of congregating and 
working together. Workers need to be 
empowered to do things for themselves. 
(KII, Social Law Project)
Several informants raised the proposal of 
worker-owned platform cooperatives, in which 
workers come together with designers to develop 
and own platforms under a different model:
. . . we form some company without 
Marvellous Maids or anybody involved. 
. . . why don’t we equip domestic workers 
to form their own little cooperative 
company? And then work themselves 
and whatever they pull together, organise 
a transport pool for them, basically 
enrich each other. I know it will not 
happen tomorrow, but it can happen. 
Why must we enrich a company, when 
we can form cooperatives?’  
(KII, SADSAWU representative) 
5.6.2 Kenya
In Kenya, gig worker organisation is nascent. When 
asked about labour laws that should protect them 
at work, most workers cited limited awareness, 
and had no intention of joining any type of union 
or raising any complaints about their working 
conditions. Although ride-hailing drivers have 
made efforts to organise themselves into various 
unions,31 because most workers are in the gig 
economy for survival, they tend to avoid activism, 
citing the time and expense involved and a fear of 
platform deactivation. Indeed, a representative of 
the DTF reported that drivers who had participated 
in strikes had been deactivated from a ride-
hailing platform. In addition, most gig workers 
had few opportunities to meet one another and, 
as in South Africa, perceived that unions are only 
31 For example, the Digital Taxi Association of Kenya (DTAK), Public Transport Operators Union (PUTON), Rideshare Sacco, 
Kenya Online Taxi Workers Association (KOTWA) and Drivers and Partners Association of Kenya (DIPAK).
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for those in formal employment. Moreover, most 
of the workers we interviewed aimed for their 
engagement in gig work to be temporary while 
they sought a more secure job, rendering them all 
the more disinclined to involve themselves in any 
collective action. 
A representative of Kenya Union of Domestic, 
Hotels, Educational Institutions, Hospitals and 
Allied Workers (KUDHEIHA) expressed the view 
that this inability to express grievances to their 
‘employer’ compromised gig workers’ ostensible 
independence and amplified their insecurity: 
Yes, you have a job, but you do not 
have a voice. And most of the time 
because it is a job that has got a lot of 
precariousness in it, that is within the 
informal economy, then any time you 
want to voice, you’re sacked and 
another one is employed.  
(KII, KUDHEIHA representative) 
5.7 Discussion of key findings
This chapter has argued that, relative to the 
alternatives open to many gig workers, digital 
platforms offer some positive features that 
workers value (and which improve their working 
conditions). Yet it is clear that, overall, platforms 
do not yet meaningfully overcome the adverse 
economic conditions that limit the availability and 
quality of work available to marginalised and 
disadvantaged women in South Africa and in Kenya. 
These women face widespread unemployment and 
informality, and a physical urban environment 
distinguished by long distances, poor transport 
links and, notably in South Africa, extremely 
high levels of crime and insecurity. 
Nonetheless, gig work is experienced in some 
distinct ways from other forms of informal and 
causal work – which are typically the alternatives 
open to the workers in our study. There is a  
need for policy-makers and platforms to better 
understand these differences, as well as the 
concerns of gig workers, in order to improve 
working conditions. 
At a minimum, platforms offered some paid 
work, whereas the alternative was often 
unemployment (particularly in South Africa) or 
precarious and casual work. In South Africa, 
workers perceived their earnings as relatively high 
on an hourly basis; however, in both countries, 
workers struggled with the unpredictability and 
variability that often characterise earnings from 
gig work. Many felt that their overall earnings 
were insufficient to meet household needs. The 
platform in South Africa, in turn, cited an inability 
to raise its prices to bolster worker incomes, as 
this would price some clients out of the market, 
resulting in less work being available: 
We don’t feel like we are able to pay 
workers or to charge clients what we 
feel our workers deserve. We really 
have tried to look at mechanisms of 
better optimising that, but I would  
say there are enormous challenges in 
trying to make ends meet in our current 
economic circumstances. (KII, platform 
representative, South Africa) 
This issue of low pay for domestic workers  
is not particular to the gig economy though. 
Indeed, it is indicative of the undervaluation of 
the domestic work sector and, more generally,  
of work in female-dominated professions. The 
platform in South Africa was seeking to 
challenge clients’ perception of domestic work  
as a low-value commodity by presenting it as a 
professional service. However, although the 
platform started out with a higher price for 
clients, no one made bookings until hourly rates 
were lowered. So, while the platform might want 
to pay workers more, a representative observed 
that ‘razor thin margins and no willingness to pay’ 
among clients make this extremely challenging 
for a start-up company (KII, platform representative, 
South Africa).
Second, while platforms often highlight the 
flexibility they offer workers – and indeed some 
workers sought out and valued this aspect – this 
flexibility is limited by client demand. Clients 
determine the volume of bookings, and their 
location and timing (with the frequent imperative of 
early bookings, which workers found inconvenient 
and, at times, a safety risk). Some workers reported 
feeling compelled to meet client demand to do an 
unreasonably large amount of work within a given 
booking (or to complete the work even if they 
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would not be paid for the extra time it took). All 
these factors restrict the extent to which workers 
can, in practice, avail themselves of flexible working 
conditions. Relatedly, there is some evidence that 
a small share of the platform’s workers in South 
Africa are taking on a disproportionate share of 
the available gigs, a so-called ‘superstar’ effect. It 
is noteworthy that being a platform ‘superstar’ 
positively correlated with ratings, tenure on the 
platform, and availability, signifying that 
flexibility is not necessarily associated with being 
a top performer.
Third, many workers felt that platforms 
afforded them the opportunity to learn on the 
job (moreover, in South Africa, a sizeable share 
were undertaking further studies alongside gig 
work). More broadly, platform representatives in 
each country spoke of a more ambitious aim to 
‘professionalise’ the gig workforce and ‘dignify’ 
service-based work by standardising services, 
certifying and marketing worker offerings and 
providing workers with training in ‘soft skills’, 
such as how to present themselves and how to bid 
for services. While arguably self-serving, in that it 
enables charging out workers on the platform at 
higher rates, it also improves workers’ skill sets 
and (if this became more widely scaled) could 
offer the promise of raising earnings more 
broadly within the service industry. 
Fourth, gig workers face threats to their security, 
including the risk of robbery and assault. This is a 
general risk of casual and insecure service-based 
work, and a notable feature of South African 
society in particular. However, it is arguably 
experienced distinctly by gig workers due to the 
high mobility required to travel between gigs, the 
timing of gigs (notably, early starts) and poor 
public transport, as well as work that takes place 
for a varied range of clients, often in private or 
isolated locations such as clients’ homes or in 
private vehicles. A platform representative in 
South Africa described transport as the biggest 
structural challenge workers faced, because of its 
cost and the restrictions it places on economic 
opportunities: ‘Public transport is something 
which completely undermines the working class 
across South Africa’ (KII, platform representative). 
Workers also described situations they perceived 
as a threat to their safety when carrying out gigs 
in private households. 
Fifth, owing in part to their status as independent 
contractors – but in common with the broader 
informal workforce – gig workers have limited 
access to social protection. This means that life 
events common to women risk further exacerbating 
economic precariousness. For example, workers 
often had limited means of coping during 
maternity periods in which they could not work 
– especially in South Africa where many were 
single mothers. Several platforms interviewed for 
this study across both countries reported that they 
are carefully considering how to extend protections 
and benefits to workers – and in some cases had 
already put in place private insurance and other 
schemes such as supporting access to bank 
accounts. However, difficulties remain in ensuring 
comprehensive social protection, in part because 
they see themselves as technology platforms not 
employers.
Finally, the workers who participated in this 
study displayed limited awareness of the benefits of 
unionisation or collective action and, particularly 
in Kenya, had little appetite for any activity that 
could jeopardise their gig earnings. While in 
Kenya there were some nascent attempts at gig 
worker organisation, and in South Africa workers 
interacted extensively with one another through 
informal channels such as social media, few 
collective initiatives currently offer significant 
promise for exerting change vis-à-vis companies 
and/or the government.
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6 The gig economy  
and unpaid care and 
domestic work
This chapter explores the extent to which the gig 
economy helps workers better manage unpaid 
care and domestic work and paid work. To do 
this, we first identify the types of unpaid care and 
domestic work that gig workers are involved in 
and the implications of this for their time use.  
We find that unpaid care and domestic work 
responsibilities are strongly gendered, with women 
taking on the bulk of related tasks. 
We explore women workers’ preferences 
around managing unpaid care and domestic 
work alongside their paid work, and how this 
plays out in practice. We identify a range of 
strategies used to manage different aspects of the 
day. Significantly, we also find that although 
many workers view gig work as more flexible, 
offering them a better work–life balance than 
other forms of paid work available to them, they 
are, nonetheless, still forced to make difficult trade- 
offs between their time use, income-generation and 
caring role. The extent to which flexibility is able to 
be realised in practice is limited for many workers. 
Therefore, while flexible-work modalities may 
offer some promise to support management of paid 
and unpaid work, a broader approach is needed. 
6.1 The unpaid care and domestic 
work in which gig workers are involved
Existing understanding of unpaid care and time 
use in Kenya and South Africa is at very different 
stages, with significantly more known in South 
Africa following the implementation of time-use 
surveys in 2000 and 2010, and the associated 
development of a relatively comprehensive literature. 
In South Africa, consistent with global trends, 
women’s time spent on care activities is at the 
expense of activities such as learning, leisure and 
paid work (Floro and Komatsu, 2011). The 2009/10 
South Africa time-use survey shows that women 
spent 2.3 times more time on unpaid care work 
than men (Charmes, 2016). Women living with 
children aged seven years and younger spent more 
than 4 hours on household maintenance and 1 hour 
25 minutes on child and adult care, while men in 
these households spent 1 hour 16 minutes on 
household maintenance and 15 minutes caring for 
household members and children (Ahmed, 2018). 
Among ethnic groups in South Africa, black 
African women spend the most time on unpaid 
care in absolute terms – 4 hours 26 minutes daily 
compared to 3 hours 18 minutes for white women, 
who spend the least time (Orr and van Meelis, 
2014). Gendered differences in care work in South 
Africa may be explained by fractured family 
arrangements, where only around a third of 
children live with both their mother and father, 
and many women being left to carry out both 
caregiver and breadwinner roles in a country of 
limited economic opportunities and high 
unemployment (Budlender and Lund, 2011). 
Indeed, evidence suggests single-parent households 
are highly associated with being time-poor, 
especially where the household is female-headed 
(Antonopoulos and Memis, 2010). 
Data on time use in Kenya is scarce; to date, no 
nationally representative time-use survey has been 
conducted. However, an ActionAid study found 
that women in Kenya tend to work predominantly 
in the private domain, leaving work in the public 
sphere and the associated decision-making to men. 
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After accounting for sleep, Kenyan women spend 
most time on housework, while men spend most 
time on unpaid work such as farming for own 
consumption, sleep and other forms of self-care, 
social and cultural activities, and media 
consumption (Budlender and Moussié, 2013). 
These time-use surveys in Kenya estimate that, 
on average, women spend around 1.4 hours on 
unpaid care work compared to every hour spent 
by men, giving rise to what is termed as a ‘double 
workday’, particularly in poor rural and urban 
areas, where households cannot afford a paid 
care worker (ibid.). This gender gap has been 
attributed to lack of services and infrastructure 
(e.g. inadequate access to water, sanitation, 
electricity, roads, safe transport, healthcare, etc.) to 
reduce unpaid household and care work, alongside 
gender-based and social norms under which 
women are considered primary caregivers (ibid.).
Our findings clearly confirm prevalent gendered 
domestic roles, with unpaid care and domestic 
work within their own homes overwhelmingly 
being the responsibility of, and carried out by, 
women workers in both South Africa and Kenya 
– a dynamic which most participants appeared to 
have internalised without question.
As noted above, nearly all survey participants 
in South Africa lived with children: 98% lived 
with at least one child under 18 and 83% lived 
with one or more children under 6. Moreover, 
most respondents (91%) were the main person  
in the household responsible for caring for any 
children. Sizeable shares of respondents also 
indicated that they cared for someone who was 
elderly (50%, while an additional 28% did so 
‘sometimes’); and/or for someone who was sick 
or disabled (23%, while an additional 19% did 
so ‘sometimes’). In Kenya too, participants also 
frequently cared for children, older people, 
disabled and ill persons. Given the high rate of 
participants with primary responsibility for 
childcare, we explore this aspect of unpaid care 
in more detail in this chapter, recognising that  
the implications of caring for older people and 
people with disabilities for gig and other 
precarious workers is an important area for 
further investigation. 
During interviews in South Africa and Kenya 
we asked gig workers to describe the domestic 
tasks they carry out in and around the household. 
Across both contexts, most frequently noted by 
women were cleaning, laundry and cooking for 
child(ren) and husband, taking children to/from 
school and other activities, with shopping and 
fetching other household necessities such as water 
also mentioned. It is worth mentioning that 
several participants in South Africa specifically 
said that they didn’t feel they had much domestic 
cleaning work of their own to carry out, as they 
live in a one-room dwelling (often in a township). 
Ruth from Kenya summed up how many 
participants described the gendered responsibility 
for these tasks: 
As a woman, you must cook, wash dishes. 
In the morning, you prepare the children 
to go to school. So much work. You must 
wash clothes. So that’s the job. And also 
take care of the chickens. I am everything.  
(Ruth, housekeeper, Nairobi)
Several women workers noted that childcare is 
more important than housework to them, and 
they all spent more time detailing the unpaid care 
work they carried out than the domestic work, 
often identifying time spent looking after their 
child(ren), husband and other family members. 
Family care-related activities cited, included: 
playing with children, working hard to make 
sure children have food and a roof over their 
heads, making sure the child looks good, being 
there when they are ill, and making time for their 
husband. Love and the affective aspect of care 
was cited, including being present to understand 
and get to know the child and learning what the 
child likes/doesn’t like, even when that was not 
always easy for the women due to tiredness, as 
this worker in South Africa noted:
As a mother you have to sacrifice to 
offer love and care. You may be tired 
from work but have to accommodate 
family. (Petronella, Johannesburg) 
While the tasks carried out were often similar, 
time-use data we collected among women gig 
workers in South Africa shows vastly different 
amounts of time spent on caring for others and 
household chores on the previous day, with the 
unpaid load extremely heavy for some women 
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Figure 9 Hours the platform workers spent on 
unpaid care and domestic work on previous day in 
South Africa
Share of workers Number of hours
None <1
hour
1–2
hours
2–3 
hours
3–4
hours
4–5
hours
5–6
hours
All 
day
0% 0
25% 6
20% 5
4
15%
3
10%
2
5% 1
 Hours spent on unpaid care and domestic work 
 Average hours of paid work
Note: N=398. ‘All day’ refers to more than six hours of 
unpaid care and domestic work.
Source: Our survey. 
Figure 10 Hours the platform workers report that 
their partners spent caring for others or on household 
chores on previous day in South Africa
Share of workers Number of hours
None 1–2
hours
3–4
hours
5–6
hours
All  
day
I don’t 
know what 
s/he did
0% 0
40%
35%
5
4
30%
325%
2
20%
15%
10%
5%
1
 Hours worker’s partner spent on unpaid care and 
domestic work 
 Average hours of paid work (worker)
Note: N=143. This question was asked only of married or 
partnered respondents whose spouse or partner was not 
away during the previous week.
Source: Our survey. gig workers. Overall, our data suggest that the 
typical married or cohabiting respondent in our 
survey spent 2.3 times as many hours as her 
partner did on unpaid care and domestic work, 
in line with the 2009/10 South Africa time-use 
survey (Charmes, 2016).32 As Figure 9 demonstrates, 
women’s unpaid care inversely correlates with 
their paid work, with women who worked more 
hours through the platform on a given day 
spending less time on unpaid care that day.  
At one extreme, the nearly 20% of women who 
spent no time on unpaid care worked, on average, 
around four hours via the platform; at the other 
extreme, the nearly 15% who spent ‘all day’ on 
care (i.e. more than six hours), engaged in just 
over one hour of paid work on average. 
This time-use data further demonstrates 
gendered domestic roles, confirming that women 
workers’ spouses contributed relatively little 
unpaid care and domestic work. Figure 10 
depicts the unpaid care work that women 
platform workers’ partners carried out relative  
to the amount of paid work each gig worker 
undertook, showing that most men engaged very 
little in care and domestic work – around 35% 
did none at all, while nearly 25% did one to two 
hours. This data also reveals that the amount of 
unpaid care men carried out displays almost no 
correlation with women’s hours of paid work, 
suggesting that women undertaking more paid 
work on a given day is not being compensated 
for by their spouse taking on more care and 
domestic work on that same day. 
Instead, men’s role within the household was 
most often cited as a financial contribution, with 
little dedication to other household work even 
when they were the only adult in the home. In the 
exceptions identified, men tended to carry out home 
maintenance-related tasks such as household 
repairs or decorating. As this male gig worker in 
Nairobi, Kenya explained: 
Me? No. Me my work is only to go to 
work to search for the income . . . so 
32 To collect time-use data simply, given our reliance on AVR technology, we asked women to input their own time use and 
that of men in categories (for women, none, less than an hour, 1–2 hours and so on, up to ‘all day’; for men, none, 1–2 hours 
and so on, up to ‘all day’). To compute the median for each category we assigned them a value of time in the middle of each 
category (e.g. 1.5 hours, for 1–2 hours).
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the remaining people are normally do 
the cleaning and the preparation of  
the house . . . I don’t engage in house 
chores as I have older girls of class 
seven and six and three. So, the older 
ones prepare the younger ones. My 
work is to provide for how they will 
survive. (Anthony, general masonry 
worker, Nairobi)
Indeed, gendered expectations around financial 
contributions to the household were so deeply 
entrenched in Kenya that single women described 
taking care of the man’s responsibility in 
addition to their own care responsibilities. For 
instance, when Ivy, separated from the father of 
her son, was asked to list all her household chores, 
she said:
Well, for me I do more of what you  
say maybe people could consider  
men responsibilities and women’s 
responsibilities. So, from partly paying 
for the house, to the food, all the 
necessities, to the school fees. 
Everything. [Paying for] my mum 
because she needs medical care. She  
has heart failure. So her medical bills.  
I do everything. (Ivy, cab driver, Nairobi)
Several participants explained that if their 
husband/partner was around the house and not 
working he may ‘help’ or ‘assist’ them with 
unpaid care and domestic work – for example,  
the man may go shopping, play with their child 
while the participant was cleaning the house, or 
help a child with homework. At the same time, 
there were often limits to the kind of tasks the 
men would be willing to undertake. Their partner 
might do some things e.g. help cook, but not 
others e.g. tidying/cleaning. Gender roles were 
also entrenched in some of the tasks performed 
outside the household itself. For example, one 
participant noted it was her responsibility to 
pick their child up from the crèche even if her 
husband was also available or finishing work 
around the same time. The times when men 
bucked the general trend tended to be when their 
wives were working late, or were ill, leaving no 
other option.
6.2 Workers’ preferences around 
organising unpaid care and domestic 
work, paid work and other activities
Any effort to improve workers’ lives must be based 
on a firm understanding of their preferences and 
priorities, an approach that has formed a core 
pillar of this research. To begin to understand 
how gig workers would like to organise unpaid 
care, paid work and other activities, we asked an 
open question during interviews about what their 
perfect working day would look like. Most had 
trouble answering at first. Further probing 
revealed this was because they have rarely, if ever, 
been in a position to think about their ‘ideal’ or 
‘desired’ way of organising their time and activities 
and what this would entail for them. For many,  
their main preoccupation was battling to make 
ends meet and survive. 
Importantly, the nature of a perfect working 
day eventually articulated by most interviewees 
was highly reminiscent of the kind of day often 
associated with the standard employment 
relationship found in the formal economy. That is, 
to work for regular income during daytime hours 
(e.g. around eight hours a day) and have weekends 
largely free from paid work. Almost all women 
interviewed wished for a schedule that allowed 
them to manage family responsibilities with work 
while, at the same time (and this was critical), 
earning a secure income sufficient to meet their 
daily needs. Indeed, in the few cases where 
participants mentioned occasionally having this 
perfect day through gig work, it was because 
they obtained long enough bookings to obtain 
better earnings, but not so long that they couldn’t 
satisfactorily manage their unpaid work. 
At the same time, many women’s perfect day 
featured their children’s schedules – notably that 
the women would like their children to wake up 
or for them to travel later in the morning so the 
children could rest more, or that the women 
would be able to go themselves to pick children 
up from school or childcare or have more time to 
play or do homework with children. As Ivy from 
Kenya summarised: 
[I would] end before 7 p.m., you know. 
So that I can go home, teach homework 
to the children. Even just watch news, 
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‘ya saa moja ile ya Kiswahili’ [the  
7 o’clock Swahili news]. Just have a 
normal life. (Ivy, driver, Nairobi)
Of particular note is that many of the participants 
invoked sleep and rest as something that would 
form part of their perfect day – either by having 
time to rest by watching television, for example, 
or being able to sleep more hours during the night, 
as these quotes demonstrate: 
[If I had a shorter working day] at least 
I would get home at around 3 p.m. and 
go fetch my child. I would also have 
time to rest before I start cooking for 
my family. I’d also be in bed early. 
(Ayanda, Cape Town)
I would like to have at least seven-hour 
bookings starting from 8 a.m. Because 
then I would be able to prepare my 
child for crèche and prepare breakfast 
for my husband. I will also be able  
to come back and rest on time . . .  
A booking should allow me to wake up 
at a reasonable time but I should also 
earn decent money. (Julia, Cape Town) 
Critically, several women participants in both 
countries were acutely aware of the expectations 
of them imposed by others, notably their husbands 
and children. They articulated their vision of their 
perfect day to fulfil these expectations. As one 
from South Africa explained: 
when [my husband] comes home he 
must find the house warm showing that 
I have arrived home early. That will make 
our husbands not run away from us. Not 
that you arrive home and your husband 
is the one who is there already there and 
you are still on your way. Then you cook 
for the children and also have enough time 
to rest and have time to talk to the kids. 
(Portia, Johannesburg) 
For the male gig workers interviewed in 
Kenya, a perfect working day was also difficult 
to describe because they were often already 
primarily engaged in what they perceived was 
their duty as men and providers in the household: 
carrying out paid work. Many described a perfect 
working day as being able to earn an adequate 
income while still having time to spend with  
their family. This related to relaxing with family 
members after work or activities such as helping 
children with homework, as opposed to the 
household tasks women often mentioned fitting 
into their day: 
when it comes to work and family, let 
me concentrate on that one. It’s my 
desire to have plenty of time with my 
family. So, you find that sometimes 
when I go out and there is not much 
[paid work] out there, I will come back 
to the house and even sit with the 
children, we do homework together. 
(Simon, building contractor, Nairobi)
Given the centrality of childcare to most 
women participants’ lives, we also tried to 
ascertain their preferences in this area. Across  
the board, cost was a key consideration, meaning 
many preferred to leave their children with 
family members or other trusted people such as 
neighbours when possible, even if this incurred a 
small fee or cost, rather than send them to a 
crèche or other childcare service. This preference 
was particularly pronounced when leaving a 
child with family was free, as the following 
quote highlights: 
there is no one who helps me look after 
the child. I do this on my own. Right 
now my sister is here for the June 
holiday; she is going back to Free State 
on the 15th of July. If my sister is there 
mostly my child doesn’t go to crèche. 
(Faheema, Cape Town) 
However, in addition to cost, trust and safety 
were key considerations – some participants 
preferred to leave children with someone known 
well to them rather than take them to a crèche 
they felt to be of poor quality, even where they 
paid that person to look after their child: 
for now I really won’t be able to afford 
a proper crèche and I feel he is still too 
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young. I have never thought about taking 
him to the local crèche to be honest. I 
trust my friend and she has been doing 
a good job taking care of him.  
(Julia, Cape Town) 
Finally, we identified that women workers’ 
preferences around how to organise their working 
day also depended on the age of the children 
involved. Those with young children most often 
preferred gig times which allowed them to return 
home in the late afternoon so that they could 
care for their families throughout the evening. 
Yet, where gig-work options during the evening 
or night were possible (e.g. ride-sharing, catering/
restaurant trade) and older children were present, 
some preferred working at night to be able to spend 
the daytime/early evening with their children and 
then leave them at home in the care of another 
family member – at times an older child. 
In summary, then, none of the workers 
interviewed envisaged any lifestyle significantly 
different to the one they had in terms of unpaid 
care and domestic work. For example, in terms  
of shifts in gender norms that could lead to 
redistribution of household tasks such as cooking, 
cleaning, shopping or laundry – it could be said 
that they were resigned to their situation. Among 
the women, there was very little mention that 
anyone else, other than themselves, could/would 
carry out the care and household work that they 
were already engaged in. Instead, ‘ideal’ working 
days were articulated in terms of what time 
allocation would allow them to best balance the 
various paid and unpaid work tasks for which 
they were already responsible, alongside rest and 
leisure activities. They most frequently expressed 
a preference for regular paid work carried out in 
the daytime during weekdays, although the 
extent to which this was able to be realised was 
subject to trade-offs and often limited in practice, 
as we discuss below. 
6.3 Strategies used to manage paid 
work, care work and other activities
We turn now to explore in more detail the 
realities of how gig workers manage paid work, 
unpaid care and other activities. The fairly scant 
existing literature in this area indicates limited 
structural support for work–life balance in both 
South Africa and Kenya. 
A thin debate has emerged in the South African 
context around the notion of work–life balance 
and flexible work as an option for individuals to 
reconcile their participation in paid work with 
other aspects of life. Where it exists, the debate 
on work–life balance and worker-led flexible 
work arrangements focuses overwhelmingly on 
formal white-collar jobs in South Africa (e.g. 
Mageni and Slabbert, 2005; Potgieter and Barnard, 
2010; Jackson and Fransman, 2018). In this 
literature, flexitime and flexible work arrangements 
are perceived as instruments to achieve better 
work–life balance, to expand workers’ choices and 
to encourage women’s employment (Dancaster, 
2006; Jackson and Fransman, 2018). For example, 
Whitehead and Kotze (2003) report that flexible 
work hours were uncommon, and according to 
interviewees their organisations were unaware of 
the importance of work–life balance policies 
(ibid.). Another study of workers in a higher-
education institution found that financial well-
being, work–life balance and productivity were 
statistically significant predictors of job satisfaction 
(Jackson and Fransman, 2018). However, a 
further study of academics and support staff in a 
higher-education institution found that the lack 
of job security was a greater source of stress for 
the workers than work–life balance (Coetzee and 
Rothmann, 2005).
Different strategies to manage unpaid care have 
also been identified, with South Africa’s large paid 
domestic work sector playing a notable role in 
supporting better-off women (and their families). 
Kinship networks have been found to be particularly 
important for care management in post-Apartheid 
South Africa, notably among black South Africans 
who rely on family and other close acquaintances 
to aid with the time demands of paid work as 
well as childcare (Madhavan and Gross, 2013). 
Available data for the country suggests that 
various childcare strategies are employed for 
children under six years old: for around half of 
these children, the reported strategies involve 
sending the child to a crèche/educare centre 
(22.5%), preschool, nursery or grade 00/000 
(pre-reception) (10%), having children in Grade R 
(reception year) (9.8%), in school (6.7%) or in a 
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home/community group (0.9%) (computed from 
STATS SA, 2018c). Of those children not in any of 
these forms of childcare, 84.7% stayed at home 
with a parent, foster parent or other guardian, 
with 11.1% staying at home with another adult, 
1.5% of children going to someone else’s dwelling, 
and 0.4% being left at home with someone under 
18 years (ibid.). Those children who stayed at 
home were less likely to live in a household with 
an employed member (65% of children at home 
had an employed member, compared with 76.5% 
of those who attended a facility outside the home) 
suggesting that households with a non-working 
member may be more likely to care for a young 
child at home (ibid.). 
As with other sub-Saharan African countries, 
the organisation of paid and unpaid work in 
Kenya has been affected by trends such as 
urbanisation and globalisation, which have 
provoked structural shifts in the labour market 
and family networks (Muasya, 2016a). Literature 
on flexible work in Kenya remains sparse, with 
more focus on paid management strategies 
including childcare and paid domestic work.  
A study of teachers’ strategies to accommodate 
work–life balance suggests they were allowed to 
take time off on a discretionary basis when lack 
of domestic support led to acute time constraints, 
for example, with few formal mechanisms to 
reduce their workload or attain a more flexible 
schedule (Muasya, 2016b). Similarly, surveys 
carried out in the Kenyan university sector, where 
no structural support such as on-campus housing 
or childcare provision is available, shed light on 
the challenges posed by a lack of childcare and 
flexible worktime arrangements (Muasya, 2016a). 
Additionally, in Kenya, traditional kinship 
networks have been interrupted, making it difficult 
for women to rely on other family members for 
childcare. Women employed in the formal economy 
often rely on domestic help to attend to household 
work but have been affected by recent legislation 
on domestic labour. This legislation, which has 
introduced a minimum wage for domestic workers, 
has had the unintended effect of provoking a 
shift to more informal employment of domestic 
workers and has led some employers to change 
their domestic routine, sending their children to 
day care centres (ibid.). Research has also shown 
that poorer workers struggle most to access good- 
quality childcare services. For example, among 
those based in informal settlements in Nairobi, 
poor child supervision and caregiver capacity, 
health concerns, high costs and limited accessibility 
– notably during the rainy season – hamper access 
and take-up (Doughman et al., 2017).
Our research sheds further light on the strategies 
used to manage paid and unpaid work by a cohort 
of largely poor and informal workers. It is clear 
that most women gig workers are managing 
unpaid care with very little support. For example, 
in the South Africa survey only slightly more 
than one-third (36%) of workers with care 
responsibilities reported that someone else in the 
household ‘helped them’ with either care or 
household chores, while 30% said this was the 
case ‘sometimes’. Just over one-third (34%) had 
no help, which includes 37% of single workers 
and 29% of married workers, revealing only a 
fairly small difference between the two groups.
Participants in South Africa described in detail 
the strategies they used to manage unpaid care 
and domestic work alongside their paid gig work. 
Most participants described doing their own 
cleaning/housework on the days when no 
bookings were made for their time through the 
gig platform, which for many was at the weekend 
when they chose not to work. However, it clearly 
emerged that the daily care of children – such as 
cooking, bathing and playing with them – had to 
be managed around gig work. At the same time, 
childcare clearly emerged as a major barrier to 
engaging in paid work: just one in five of all 
workers felt that childcare responsibilities did  
not limit the paid work they could do – the 
remainder reported that it did (37%) or that it 
did ‘sometimes’ (44%). Again, there was only a 
small difference in the experiences of single and 
partnered women, suggesting that both groups 
received little support with childcare within the 
household: 79% of single women were limited 
(35%) in the paid work they could do or limited 
sometimes (43%); compared with 81% of 
married women (31% limited, 50% sometimes). 
The chief reasons why childcare limited 
respondents’ ability to undertake paid work  
were: having limited time available for paid  
work (34%), the cost of childcare (24%) and an 
inability to find work at convenient times (18%) 
(Figure 11).
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A critical finding is that most respondents in 
South Africa felt that their work through the 
platform balanced well with their family/personal 
commitments (54% said ‘very well’ and 33% 
said ‘well’). Furthermore, workers clearly viewed 
work through the platform as a helpful strategy 
to manage their childcare duties and paid work: 
all workers were asked whether platform work 
made it easier or harder for them to manage 
childcare and paid work than other jobs, with 74% 
responding that working through the platform 
made it easier. The remainder of respondents felt 
that it made no difference (15%) or that it made 
it harder (11%). This signals that platform 
modalities can be seen as a potentially promising 
means of managing paid and unpaid work in 
South Africa at least. 
At the same time, it is clear that gig-work 
modalities – including flexibility – are not enough 
to fully support unpaid care. In South Africa, 
workers identified various strategies to manage 
unpaid care, with significant effort going into 
finding care for their children while they were  
at work. The message from many participants 
was clear: without regular childcare they would/
could not engage in paid work, be it gig work or 
other forms of work, and they employed various 
strategies to manage childcare – some more 
permanent, others more ad hoc (and often a 
combination of the two): 
Interviewer: ‘What happens if your 
neighbour is not available on that day?’
Akumzi, Cape Town: ‘ahhh unotorega 
kuenda kubasa kwacho’ [you end up 
not taking any booking at all] 
Survey data point to some interesting points  
of difference between the strategies employed by 
single parents to manage childcare and those 
who were partnered. The latter were more likely 
to rely on their partner or another female child 
or to look after the child themselves. Single 
respondents reported higher reliance on ‘other 
relatives’ in particular, as well as friends and 
neighbours, and were slightly more likely to use 
formal childcare, as Figure 12 shows. In some 
cases, care provided by family was short-term/
daily, while in other cases consisted of a longer-
term arrangement. For example, one interview 
participant explained how financial precarity 
since being left by their spouse meant that she 
sent her recently born baby to stay with family 
elsewhere, so she could continue in paid work  
to survive:
We had a child together who was born 
prematurely. During that time I stayed in 
hospital for two months with my child. 
Soon after I left hospital I separated with 
my husband. I then found work through 
Figure 11 Whether and how childcare responsibilities limit platform workers’ economic opportunities in 
South Africa
Note: For (1), N=378; for (2), N=133. (2) was asked only of 
respondents who answered ‘yes’ or ‘sometimes’ to (1).
Source: Our survey. 
(1) Do your childcare responsibilities limit the paid work or 
business you can do?
(2) What is the main reason your childcare responsibilities 
limit the paid work or business you can do?
 No (20%)  Yes (37%)  Sometimes (44%)  I have limited time for paid work (34%)  
 Childcare is too expensive (24%)  
 Other (20%)  
 I can’t find work at convenient times (18%)  
 I can’t find childcare (5%) 
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the platform and had to send my baby 
home to Zimbabwe . . .  because things 
were very tough for me, especially after 
separating with the father of the child.  
I had no money and even to take care 
of her it’s really tough with the kind of 
work I do . . . There is no one at all, 
‘baba vemwana havatombomutarise 
zvamuchose’ [the father of my child 
does not even look at her, let alone look 
after her]. (Akumzi, Cape Town)
Some primary caregivers of children under six 
years old reported extreme strategies to manage 
childcare and their paid work – particularly, leaving 
children alone, which subsequently exposes these 
children to significant risks to their safety and 
healthy development (UNICEF, 2017a). Figure 12 
shows the share of respondents in each childcare-
strategy category who left a child without adult 
supervision in a given week. Overall, 24% reported 
having to leave their child alone for more than an 
hour in the previous week (88% of whom did so 
to work via the platform). A further 9% reported 
having to leave their child in the care of another 
child who was less than 10 years old for an hour 
in the previous week (again, 84% did so to work 
through the platform), suggesting a rate vastly 
exceeding the 0.4% of children reported to have 
been left with a person under 18 in South Africa’s 
Global household survey data (computed from 
STATS SA, 2018c). 
The share of survey respondents leaving a child 
without adult supervision was highest among 
women who reported that they usually cared for 
their child themselves, followed by those who 
engaged formal childcare/nursery, domestic worker/
hired help, and then those whose spouse/partner or 
another male child sometimes took on childcare. 
This suggests that the highest risk factors for 
children being left alone relate to a lack of other 
care options, notably more formal options, including 
childcare services and paid help – with a possible 
explanation being that children were left alone at 
times when these more formal options were not 
available, such as early mornings. 
In addition, the high rate of children being left 
alone among those who might otherwise be cared 
for by a partner/spouse or another male child 
suggests that these options are not consistent or 
reliable. Conversely, the rate of left-alone children 
is lowest for those reliant on neighbours, friends/
other, followed by relatives and other children 
(notably female children), further highlighting 
the importance of informal networks and family 
to support childcare – and the associated risk 
posed to children when these are not available. 
These findings are clearly alarming and reinforce 
the need expressed by participants for accessible 
and reliable childcare. At the same time, the 
Figure 12 Who looks after South African platform workers’ children while they engage in paid work and share 
of children left without adult supervision in a given week
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
 Single or widowed (%)  Married (%)  Left their child without adult supervision (%)
Note: For question on who looks after child while respondent engages in paid work, N=297, for question on share of children 
without adult supervision, N=327.
Source: Our survey. 
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findings merit further attention to explain in greater 
depth the divergence between the high rate of 
participants in our survey reporting leaving children 
alone and the nationally representative data, which 
suggests a far lower rate, and what ‘being left 
alone’ means in practice. Previous analysis has 
highlighted the need to place reports of children 
left ‘home alone’ into social and geographical 
context. This is both as a result of divergent 
understandings of survey translations, and due  
to living conditions in informal settlements and 
other crowded residential zones that limit privacy 
and make it unlikely that children ‘left alone’ are 
completely isolated or unnoticed by others (Ruiz- 
Casares et al., 2018). Therefore, we highlight this 
as a critical area for future research (see Chapter 8). 
Interviews in Kenya with women gig workers 
revealed a similar mix of strategies to manage 
childcare on the days they carried out gig work, 
including family assistance via relatives who lived 
nearby or who came to live with the family, and 
some families relying on older children for help 
– notably teenage girls. Others relied on help 
from neighbours and friends (generally in return 
for payment, albeit at lower rates than an official 
crèche or childminder), and in some cases from a 
church or other community group. Some opted 
for paid-for childcare in a childcare facility, with 
a clear divide emerging between better-off and 
poorer workers, thus corroborating recent research 
that found that poorer workers in Nairobi faced 
the biggest barriers to accessing quality, reliable 
childcare (Doughman et al., 2017). 
It is worth noting that a number of interviewees 
with school-age children cited dropping off/picking 
up children as a critical activity to coordinate, 
often managed by enrolling children in schools 
near the household to reduce the cost and time 
for care as children are allowed to walk to and 
from school unaccompanied. In instances where 
the schools are far away from their homes, workers 
would sometimes ask a neighbour or motorbike 
transporter to drop the children home with either 
of these options attracting a charge. Again, engaging 
this type of paid help is not possible for the poorest 
workers, meaning they are more likely to need to 
accompany their children and manage the time 
required to do this during days of paid work. 
In summary, across both South Africa and 
Kenya, most women gig workers demonstrated 
good time-management skills, meaning they were 
adept at navigating care work in order to ensure 
time was available for paid work as well. However, 
many women reported significant challenges 
managing their daily commitments, with overall 
work–family balance not necessarily achieved in line 
with their preferences. Notably, the disproportionate 
focus for many on juggling paid work and unpaid 
care and domestic work came at great cost to 
their time spent on rest and leisure activities. This 
was was exacerbated for the poorest workers 
who were struggling to make ends meet, and for 
whom rest time was unimaginable, unattainable 
and a luxury rarely dreamt about. 
6.4 Challenges and trade-offs in 
balancing gig work and unpaid care 
and domestic work
6.4.1 Challenges 
While our research provides evidence that platform 
work can be seen to be relatively favourable, it 
also clearly highlights the perpetual challenges 
workers face in managing childcare – notably of 
the youngest children not yet at school. Despite 
survey respondents in South Africa suggesting 
that they found unpaid care easier to manage 
with platform work than other forms of paid 
work, participants in our qualitative interviews 
nonetheless articulated a range of challenges  
that were more focused around care than their 
domestic work. A key challenge was the 
unavailability of paid childcare services. This 
often coincided with times of highest demand  
for platform workers’ services; for example, 
because crèches close for the weekends and 
holidays (notably December) which, according  
to a platform representative, is when many 
clients want their houses cleaned. This is highly 
significant as it suggests that the majority of 
platform workers with young children (83% of 
our survey respondents) are disadvantaged 
compared to those without such responsibilities. 
Another pressing challenge across both South 
Africa and Kenya is the often long and/or 
unpredictable hours worked on gig platforms, with 
gigs often starting early or finishing later than the 
booked time, as described in the previous chapter. 
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In some cases, workers without family members 
or other childcare support reported having to 
forego gigs that demanded extended working 
hours, for others it meant being regularly rushed 
and under pressure.
Many participants described how it was difficult 
for them to arrange childcare when gigs started 
early, as some had to leave the house as early as  
4 a.m. or 5 a.m. to reach their client’s home on 
time. Many of these women relied on family or 
neighbours being available at this time, while 
others engaged their informal – and therefore 
fairly flexible – network of family and friends 
only when a gig was available. Although a critical 
source of childcare support, participants reported 
that informal networks were not always available, 
which limited their ability to do paid work. Further, 
changing family forms can mean that such support 
is waning, and respondents highlighted that while 
some older family members assisted with unpaid 
care, sick or very elderly relatives generated extra 
care loads for them.
Despite the challenges, underemployment 
manifested through irregular and part-time work 
led many to engage informal networks instead of 
a formal childcare service, such as a crèche, where 
fees were paid monthly: 
At the crèche we do not pay every day 
we pay monthly a sum of ZAR 300. So 
whether you take your child or not it’s 
a fixed amount ZAR 300 that you pay. 
(Faheema, Cape Town) 
Further, several of those who did use formal 
arrangements spoke about what happened with 
childcare if they were running late finishing a gig 
(a fairly regular occurrence due to high workload, 
as described above). Some (but not all) childminders 
charged extra fees if parents picked up their child 
later than the agreed time, which represented a 
significant challenge for workers with an already 
stretched income. Again, informal arrangements 
appeared to help some workers here. One 
participant described how she paid a fixed rate 
each week to her childminder, but also brought 
food as an extra ‘thank you’ when she was 
running late from a gig to pick up her child. 
Another said that her childminder was very 
understanding and would charge her less if she 
only got a short booking as she knew the worker 
didn’t earn much. However, such favourable 
arrangements were far from universal. 
The unpredictability of gig-work timings clearly 
emerged as a cause of stress and pressure for 
workers who wanted to keep their clients happy 
and maintain a high rating, meaning they often 
didn’t have a choice but to stay late. This often 
created emotional costs through increased stress 
at not being able to pick their child(ren) up as 
planned and spend time with them as they would 
have liked to do, as well as stress related to the 
financial costs of childcare. 
Responses from Kenyan participants reinforced 
the finding that low earnings mean that few gig 
workers can afford paid help to assist with their 
unpaid work and household chores either. As this 
key informant explained:
Remember she still has these chores 
back at home. So, [she does] double 
work for just survival pay. . . . This 
woman cannot hire someone to relieve 
her of her chores back at home. So, she 
will go find something for survival, 
come back home and still deliver the 
[unpaid] work that was left. 
(KUDHEIHA representative)
This clearly highlights the survival nature of 
much of the paid work respondents engaged in, as 
well as the inherent inequality between better-off 
women who can afford help with childcare and 
other domestic work and the poorest women who 
have no such option and are instead more reliant 
on family and other informal networks. One 
further message clearly emerged: even when women 
were earning too little from gig work, they still 
preferred to earn a small income to help meet 
household needs instead of solely attending to their 
children and household chores and earn nothing.  
6.4.2 Trade-offs 
We identified a range of trade-offs faced by workers 
in managing paid and unpaid work. Aside from 
the challenge in finding childcare, many workers 
from both South Africa and Kenya preferred not 
to work at the weekend so they could look after 
and spend time with their children and carry out 
63
domestic work, or engage in other low-cost activities 
such as attending church or chamas (savings and 
welfare groups) – although, as discussed below, 
this was not always possible in practice. Where 
some gig work allowed more autonomy over hours 
worked – for example, in ride-sharing – some 
workers chose to work longer hours from Monday 
to Friday to earn more, but this exacerbated 
unpaid care challenges during those days. 
A clear finding across the board was that many 
workers viewed their non-gig work days as 
‘sacrificing’ pay, with any days not in paid work 
seen as wasted time when they could otherwise be 
earning money: 
Yes there are days that I would like to 
spend with my child, like off days and  
I sometimes sacrifice money to spend 
time with my child at home but the 
money that we earn, you want to do 
quite a lot with it so I would say if I  
can spend one day at home with my 
child it’s fine, not more than that.  
(Precious, Cape Town) 
Ivy, a ride-hailing driver from Kenya described 
how every minute was a chance to earn an 
income to support her family: ‘I can get to decide 
I am resting on Sunday. But, if I decide I am 
resting on Sunday, then that means I will have to 
work more over the week.’ She carried a packed 
lunch so she didn’t lose time in a restaurant and 
could be ready for a client at any moment and 
had reduced time spent on self-care, including 
going to the hair salon by cutting her own hair. 
Yet fear of losing income had also prevented  
her from striking with other drivers for better 
working conditions: 
What was happening like in this last 
strike, is that people were told, ‘Do not 
. . . do not work.’ So, ‘do not work’,  
for us as ladies, mothers, what does it 
mean? Our families do not eat.
On some of the platforms studied, the high 
frequency of short bookings (notably for ride-
sharing and in some cases domestic work) 
meant that such gigs could be accepted by 
respondents, including at short notice at the 
weekend, because workers could return home 
relatively quickly. While many found that they 
achieved a better work–life balance when they 
did not get many gigs because they had more  
time, the resultant overall low income posed a 
severe challenge: 
it’s nice to work when you want to 
work but the main issue is money.  
All I want is to earn a little bit more 
than I earn now and still have time  
to take care of my family.  
(Jane, Johannesburg)
Workers displayed two main strategies in the 
face of the trade-off between managing unpaid 
care and generating income. For some, they were 
simply unable to take on more paid hours: 
It is very difficult because I have to 
wake up very early at 5 a.m. and 
prepare lunchboxes for the kids, I have 
to wash them both. Their transport 
picks them up at 6 a.m. and I have  
to be at a booking at 7.30 a.m.  
After work I have to make sure I’m 
home by 4 p.m. because that’s when 
the transport drops off the kids. So I 
can’t even work overtime.  
(Michelle, Cape Town) 
Other workers were forced by their difficult 
economic circumstances to deprioritise their 
families in order to take up gig work, including 
those who reported leaving their young children 
alone or in the care of older children. In Kenya, 
in particular, gig work was common among both 
male and female workers – both due to the need 
to earn an income at all possible moments, and 
because of their associated lack of negotiating 
power with clients who wanted them to work at 
the weekend. Critically, this pattern of working  
is not dissimilar to other forms of casual work 
described by participants, suggesting that those 
workers in most financial need are those least 
able to benefit from the flexibility and work–life 
balance ostensibly offered through digital 
platforms, and whose working conditions are 
most reminiscent of conditions in the wider 
informal economy. 
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6.4.3 Implications for children and families
For some participants, the challenge in managing 
paid and unpaid work was simply too difficult 
– several sent their child(ren) to live with family 
in a different location away from the city in 
which they resided. In some ways this meant  
that their paid work became easier, for example 
their working hours/schedule was not so much  
of a problem to manage alongside other 
responsibilities: 
When I first started work, I had to leave 
my child with my neighbour at 4 a.m. in 
the morning so that I get to work on 
time. And as a first-time worker I had 
to be at work on time. So I found it 
better for me to send my child back 
home and let her come during holidays. 
Maybe one day when she is older she 
can live with me permanently . . . I had 
to wake up early at 4 a.m. when my 
child will still be sleeping so I take a 
bath, drop my child next door in her 
sleep and go to the train station. I have 
to take the early trains because trains 
delay and I end up being late for my 
booking. This is why I ended up leaving 
my child next door because no crèche 
opens at 4 a.m. (Akumzi, Cape Town)
Interviewer: What happens if your 
neighbour is not available on that day? 
Interviewee: ‘ahhh unotorega kuenda 
kubasa kwacho’ [you end up not taking 
any booking at all]. This is why it’s 
difficult to have my child live with me. 
(Akumzi, Cape Town) 
This arrangement of sending children away to 
stay with family was felt to be positive for some 
children – notably given the security/safety risks in 
large South African cities, and because respondents 
felt they may have better educational opportunities. 
However, other workers were unhappy about the 
situation, because they were unable to see their 
children often and could not afford to visit as 
much as they would like, or because they worried 
they were neglecting their children or their children 
felt neglected. 
As mentioned previously, gig work was also 
seen by some participants as posing a risk to 
children in some cases. For example, one worker 
(Petronella, Johannesburg) explained how she 
had to leave her child to travel to school alone 
when she had an early booking. Similarly, in 
Kenya, Ruth, a platform domestic worker, would 
go to work with her three-month-old baby as she 
was breastfeeding, so couldn’t be away from the 
infant during her long working days. However, 
Ruth’s home was far from her workplace and 
early start times endangered not only her own 
safety, but also that of the baby she carried and 
her three other children – aged nine, seven and 
four years – left behind at home when she was 
out working. 
However, one of the most frequently recurring 
reports across interview respondents in both 
South Africa and Kenya was that gig work 
ultimately came second when a child was sick 
– this was despite the possibility of sanctions 
being imposed by the platform company which 
could affect their future opportunities of 
obtaining gig work, which they may not 
experience in other forms of work. During these 
times, participants’ first response was often to 
look for emergency care – notably from family  
or close neighbours. If this was not possible, 
workers would cancel or leave a booking, even  
if they risked a poor rating from clients or 
deactivation from a platform for cancelling at  
the last minute. 
If a child falls sick and I want to go to 
work, I will report immediately that my 
child is sick even if I get a warning or 
deactivation. I have no choice because my 
child is sick. If my child falls sick and I 
am at work I will speak to my client 
and notify him/her that this is what 
happened. What I will not know is how 
he/she accepts or react to the situation. 
(Precious, Cape Town)
Losing income both for the missed gig and 
through disrupted relationships with clients 
caused significant anxiety. Even if platforms 
purported to be entirely flexible, workers feared 
that exercising this flexibility at the last minute 
may well jeopardise future opportunities: 
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The first thing I ask myself is when I 
think about coming back home to take 
care of the child. If I leave the job and 
then tomorrow they tell me I don’t have 
the job, how will the child survive? What 
will we eat? But I also tell the teacher to 
take care of the child as if they were theirs. 
(Cynthia, housekeeper, Nairobi)
6.5 Discussion of key findings 
This chapter has explored the extent to which 
gig work supports or constrains the management 
of unpaid care and domestic work. It finds that, 
relative to other options available to many 
workers, platform-working modalities need to 
adapt in this regard. At the same time though, 
many workers’ ideal was to have working days 
reminiscent of standard employment – with 
regular hours and income – because of the stability 
that this would provide and because they felt that 
such a working pattern would help them manage 
paid and unpaid work alongside other critical 
well-being activities like rest and sleep. 
Many workers faced trade-offs between 
exercising choice over their working hours and 
income. While the ability to accept fewer or shorter 
bookings facilitated the management of care 
work, for many workers, their earnings remained 
insufficient to support themselves and their families 
– meaning some had no choice other than to take 
more bookings and ‘get by’ with childcare and 
domestic work. Those workers in most financial 
need – and therefore least able to work fewer 
hours, at times most suited to them – were those 
least able to benefit from the flexibility and 
work–life balance promoted by the platforms.
Furthermore, it is clear that women faced 
significant challenges in managing unpaid care 
and domestic work due to wider structural 
factors. These include the highly gendered 
allocation of unpaid work and lack of support 
within the household as well as a widespread 
lack of comprehensive childcare options outside 
the home – which pose significant barriers to 
their engagement in paid work or business. 
Strategies to manage childcare differed 
somewhat between single and partnered  
women. However, there was an overall high 
reliance on informal networks (including family, 
neighbours and friends) to provide childcare  
due to the perceived cost, trust, convenience  
and affordability of formal childcare, which 
participants felt was likely to be low-quality and 
costly. The inability to access either formal or 
informal support also led some workers to 
engage in high-risk strategies, including leaving 
young children alone or in the care of other, 
slightly older children. 
It is clear, therefore, that employment-based 
modalities such as flexible working options offer 
some promise to support the management of 
paid and unpaid work, but are not enough alone. 
Gig work purports to offer a means of reconciling 
work and care, and may offer improvements for 
some workers, but it does little to overcome the 
broader structural constraints to work–life 
balance and women’s time poverty – including 
the notion that responsibility for unpaid care  
and domestic work rests with women. In this 
context, it emerged that the workers most likely 
to be able to exercise the most choice on 
platforms are those without unpaid care 
responsibilities such as childcare, because they 
are likely to be able to choose their working 
hours with fewer constraints. These findings  
cast doubt on the premise that platform work 
provides an ideal option to working mothers 
wishing for optimal work–life balance. 
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7 Implications and  
ways forward to improve 
gig work
This research has explored working conditions in 
the gig economy in South Africa and Kenya and 
its effects on how women workers manage paid 
work alongside unpaid care and domestic work. 
We have identified a mixed picture in relation to 
these two interconnected aspects of women’s 
working lives. 
On the one hand, gig platforms clearly play  
a growing role in increasing the economic 
opportunities available to workers experiencing 
the negative effects of persistent structural 
unemployment and informality. Moreover, for 
some workers, the conditions of gig work are an 
improvement on what they experience in other 
forms of paid work – from hourly earnings to 
improving the isolation often felt by those 
accustomed to working alone and behind closed 
doors. As Faheema from Cape Town explained: 
Clients will treat you right because they 
know that you have someone behind 
you. It’s different than when you go to 
a client’s house alone looking for work, 
they don’t trust you.
On the other hand, workers identified significant 
challenges in overall working conditions and in 
realising the promise made by platforms that 
flexible gig work can significantly help to manage 
paid and unpaid work. Overall low and unstable 
income is ultimately at the heart of many of the 
challenges faced by workers – both in terms of  
an ongoing insufficiency in income to meet daily 
needs, and a lack of protections to support major 
life events such as childbirth. Low incomes also 
significantly offset the benefits offered by 
worker-led flexibility in the gig economy, 
rendering it likely that workers will take on gigs 
outside their preferred schedule to maximise 
earning potential, with many resorting to 
insecure and, at times, risky childcare strategies 
due to a lack of other options. In short, workers 
prioritise gaining more hours of work and 
therefore more income, not more flexibility.
Yet the question of how to improve workers’ 
experiences remains a conundrum. A key challenge 
is that – as platform representatives interviewed 
for this research confirmed – the gig economy in 
South Africa and Kenya (as elsewhere) is presently 
a buyers’ market, with clients using platforms to 
procure cheap, convenient services at the touch 
of a button. Experience shows clients are often 
unwilling to pay significantly higher prices for 
platform-mediated services and goods as they can 
be procured significantly cheaper – or on terms 
that suit them better – in the traditional informal 
economy. This constrains platforms’ ability to 
take seemingly simple action in response to 
worker concerns, such as moving gig start 
timings so domestic workers can travel more 
securely. To do so would likely limit client demand 
for platform workers’ services, serving only to 
reduce the economic opportunities offered against 
a backdrop of high un/underemployment. 
A further part of the conundrum, and one at the 
core of many debates the world over surrounding 
the gig economy, relates to the nature of the 
employment relationship between workers and 
platforms. It questions whether the best route to 
improving conditions is through establishing a 
formal employee–employer relationship instead of 
an independent-contractor model, and the presumed 
67
income stability and labour/social protections 
that accompany it. Our findings show clearly 
that many workers desire the type of schedule 
predictability and increased economic security 
often found in standard employment, adding 
important weight to such an approach. 
Yet as our key informant legal experts discussed, 
establishing a standard employment relationship 
is not necessarily a panacea. This may quickly 
reduce the number of workers to whom platform 
work is available, or cause gig companies to 
change platform contracts or working conditions, 
or render workers’ status as independent (or 
uncertain). In the case of gig sectors such as 
domestic work, even when an employment 
relationship has been established in the ‘traditional’ 
sector, in reality it has not always helped workers. 
For example, in South Africa, where employment 
law is premised on the idea of a single employer 
in a static workplace, highly dispersed domestic 
worker employees are not always able to avail of 
full labour protections. Many workers do not 
work a sufficient number of hours weekly to 
qualify for the rights and protections afforded by 
law and face significant challenges in exercising 
their right to collective bargaining to improve 
conditions. Such challenges are exacerbated by 
poor employer compliance with the existing law, 
and the gaps in protection under current legislation 
which include medical care, pension, employment 
injury benefit and family benefit (see ILO, 2016c). 
At the same time, we caution against ‘solutions’ 
to improve the gig economy premised on binary 
notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ employment modalities, 
a category into which discussions around employment 
relationship versus independent contractor arguably 
fall. Instead, we propose that platform companies 
be mandated to provide a minimum set of worker 
protections, which accord – at a minimum – with 
national regulation in place. In this way, we align 
with the European Parliament’s approach to gig 
work, in seeking to ensure ‘fair working conditions 
and adequate legal and social protection for all 
workers in the collaborative economy, regardless 
of their status’ (European Parliament, 2017a: 
para. 39). It places the onus on governments to 
‘ensure proper surveillance of the terms and 
conditions of the employment relationship or 
service contract, preventing abuses of dominant 
positions by the platforms’ (European Parliament, 
2017b: para. 5b). This approach is sensitive to the 
realities of the labour markets in which this research 
is situated, but rejects measures that might 
exacerbate the precarious conditions that many 
informal and non-standard workers currently face. 
Going forward, the recognition of a formal 
employment relationship may well be identified 
as a priority means of improving working 
conditions in some contexts and as a means to 
ensure gig platforms do not undermine hard-won 
advances towards strengthened employment 
regulation and associated protections (notably 
where sectoral employee protections are already 
relatively stronger). In other contexts, a focus on 
the role of platforms in a phased introduction of 
the benefits of formal, standard employment to 
platform workers – under the approach termed 
‘incremental formalisation’ (ILO, 2015; Stuart et 
al., 2018) – may be deemed more appropriate by 
those invested in achieving quality work. At the 
same time, while some platforms already offer 
individualised worker insurance through private 
schemes, which exceeds cover provided by their 
government, the realities of many workers’ 
patchwork and fluctuating livelihoods mean that 
efforts to ensure gig workers are integrated into 
comprehensive and sustainable public social 
protection systems remain critical for their long- 
term security and well-being. 
Finally, improving conditions for all workers 
requires linking paid and unpaid spheres of 
economic activity, challenging the invisibility and 
lack of recognition of unpaid care and domestic 
work, and the disproportionate load borne by 
women to meet domestic responsibilities. Unpaid 
care and domestic work remain outside the scope 
of much traditional labour-relations discourse and 
policy – despite being critical to the functioning 
of economies through the ongoing maintenance of 
the current workforce and enormous investment 
in bringing up future generations of workers  
(see Folbre, 1994). At the same time, increasing 
female labour force participation has gathered 
momentum as a key policy objective from global 
to local levels over recent decades – a trend that 
shows no sign of abating. Quite simply, boosting 
women’s entry into paid work will have limited 
positive effect on their empowerment as long as 
the deeply gendered challenge of unpaid care 
and domestic work remains unaddressed. As this 
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research has shown, flexible working – the favoured 
platform modality to address this challenge – may 
offer some promise, but it is not enough alone. 
And with too few workers fully benefiting from 
flexibility in practice, any gains it may provide in 
theory, still remain elusive for many workers. 
Improving conditions in the gig economy 
– and ensuring all workers’ work–life balance is 
supported – requires a comprehensive approach, 
recognising that the root cause of many of the 
challenges gig workers face is structural inequality 
in the societies and economies in which they live, 
and recognising that many workers’ economic 
lives simultaneously span several sectors as they 
undertake other precarious work alongside the gig 
economy. While ensuring that platform modalities 
are conducive to quality work is critical, efforts to 
ensure better gig work must also seek to achieve 
economic and gender justice by addressing the 
broader underlying environment. Such an approach 
will consider what platform features can be 
‘designed in’ to support workers while also 
envisioning a key role for governments to ensure 
economic, labour and social policy responds to 
the realities of gig workers’ economic lives in LIC 
and MIC settings. These are often characterised 
by structural challenges related to transport, crime, 
childcare, multiple livelihoods, precarity and 
highly unequal gender norms in the home and 
workplace, and further compounded by context-
specific intersecting inequalities such as racial 
discrimination in South Africa. A ‘worker-centric’ 
approach, which foregrounds workers’ voices, 
preferences and experiences, and which ensures 
that flexibility meets workers’ needs and goals,  
is a critical starting point (Lehdonvirta, 2018; 
Hunt and Samman, 2019). 
However, there is hope; a long history of 
improvements to conditions in the informal economy 
and marginalised workers’ access to care support, 
often through informal worker organising, offer 
positive examples to draw on as the gig economy 
grows. And despite discussion – and at times 
controversy – about the role of platforms in the 
future of work, they are set to become an ever-
larger part of labour markets globally in the years 
to come. Perhaps counterintuitively, this growth 
may offer more potential to ensure that the gig 
economy delivers for the world’s most marginalised 
workers. An increased share of workers engaged 
in the gig economy should increase impetus for 
policy-makers and workers’ groups to ensure the 
policy and regulatory environment is fit for purpose. 
Increased client demand is a prerequisite for 
platforms to reach scale, which in turn can also 
provide platforms more leverage to develop 
supportive modalities – from better designed and 
more accessible platform technology, to training 
and certification and increased worker access to 
protections, to developing partnerships with 
complementary financial, care or transport 
services. Addressing challenges in the near term  
is therefore critical to ensure the potential for 
longer-term gains for workers through increased 
– and better quality – economic opportunities in 
the gig economy is realised. 
With this in mind, we propose a set of 
recommendations to address the key challenges 
identified, noting that the heterogeneity of the  
gig economy means that further tailoring to 
platforms, sectors and country contexts may be 
relevant as different measures and approaches 
are implemented. 
7.1 Recommendations
7.1.1 Critical area one: ensure economic 
security
Improving gig workers’ economic security through 
ensuring stable and sufficient income is a critical 
priority, requiring focused action from platforms 
and governments. Priority measures include:
 • Increasing the demand for platform workers’ 
services as a key means of ensuring regular 
income and ensure that earnings are fair and 
adequate. Key means to achieve this include: 
 – For platforms and policy-makers: work to 
professionalise the gig economy through 
certification, training and skills development 
(including sector-specific skills and ‘soft’ 
skills needed by workers to navigate online 
workplaces). This can increase the quality 
and consistency of services delivered, create 
more aggregate demand from clients for 
platform-mediated services and an environment 
in which clients are increasingly willing to 
pay fair prices, and standardise skills to help 
level the field and support equal opportunities 
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between gig workers.33 A positive example 
of a skills programme for the gig economy 
is the Government of Kenya’s Ajira Digital, 
which aims to support the country’s youth 
into digital work.34 
 – For platforms: increase recognition and 
verification of workers’ education, skills 
and experience on platforms, by integrating 
work histories – including experience in the 
informal economy and on other platforms 
– into workers’ profiles. This can help to 
reduce reliance on individual platform 
ratings, counteract discrimination and 
provide a more comprehensive overview of 
workers’ aptitudes and qualifications – which 
is particularly critical on platforms with gig 
bidding systems where demonstrating workers’ 
competencies is central to their ability to 
command fair remuneration from clients. 
 • For platforms and policy-makers, undertake 
robust economic analysis of the cost of living 
in close partnership with workers to ensure 
gig rates are fair, and ensure the minimum 
wage is provided (and that this equates to 
a living income, including, accounting for 
overhead costs associated with the work). In 
some cases, this will require raising national 
or sector-specific minimum wages, where 
these undervalue the labour carried out or  
are insufficient to meet the cost of living (e.g. 
as with the minimum wage for domestic 
work in South Africa). Companies will ideally 
be proactive in this. However, given that they 
typically guard their own data closely (Gupta 
et al., 2017, Kässi and Lehdonvirta, 2019), 
this may also involve legal action to ensure 
worker access to their personal platform 
data (Open Society Foundations, 2019), 
legislated labour inspections and complaints 
mechanisms to enforce wage compliance and/
or the development of robust complementary 
data sources. Methodologies are also needed 
to understand the gig economy, such as 
improved labour force and other surveys 
and systematisation of worker’s stories for 
qualitative methods. 
 • For platforms and policy-makers, ensure that 
workers can access social protection as a 
critical means of supporting their economic 
rights, security and well-being. Focused 
measures that ensure that women informal 
workers access protection throughout the life-
course are crucial, given the disproportionate 
and historical exclusion of this group and 
their growing share of the gig-economy 
workforce. Measures may differ according to 
context, but at a minimum:
 – Entitlements linked to worker status should 
be based on a comprehensive definition of 
work and employment, so that protections and 
associated benefits are not limited to those 
classed as ‘employee’, which in many contexts 
currently means the most marginalised 
workers are excluded from vital support.
 – Social protection programmes should 
recognise the diverse livelihoods of many 
gig workers, which are often characterised 
by multiple forms of employment that 
workers are concurrently engaged in. 
Portable benefits are an increasingly 
important means of ensuring that protection 
systems respond to this reality, while at the 
same time, linking with national social 
protections systems is critical to ensure 
workers are protected across the life-
course, and to support the sustainability of 
these systems through employment-linked 
contributions (see Box 8).
 • For platforms, actively seek to engage with 
initiatives aimed at raising standards in the gig 
economy, to become better informed about 
best practice and areas for improvement. 
Examples include the global ‘Fairwork’ 
principles, which aim to set and measure 
principles for decent work in the gig 
economy, including fair pay, conditions  
and contracts.35 In the US, the National 
33 As noted previously, experience from the ‘traditional’ domestic work sector highlights that training-focused professionalisation 
initiatives can play an important role in raising the status of domestic work as a recognised profession, thereby helping to 
redress the widespread undervaluation of domestic work (for example, see ILO, 2018).
34  See https://ajiradigital.go.ke/home
35 See https://fair.work/principles/
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Domestic Workers’ Alliance developed the 
‘Good work code’, a set of eight principles of 
good work in the digital economy, signed by 
several major gig-economy platforms.38 
 
7.1.2 Critical area two:  
rebalance and support unpaid care  
and domestic work
There is a clear need to provide support to unpaid 
care and domestic work, especially childcare, 
notably by redistributing care and related tasks 
from women to men within households and 
outside the household, in line with Razavi’s 
(2007) care diamond (Figure 1). This may be 
particularly acute for those gig workers who 
have unpredictable and fluctuating schedules, 
and consequent income volatility, as these factors 
may impede their ability to secure a regular 
childcare arrangement.39 
Priority actions include:
 • For policy-makers:
 – Develop national childcare plans that 
prioritise the needs of working families and 
which comprehensively address the needs 
of informal workers.
 – Promote public investment in social 
infrastructure to provide care, which would 
Box 8 Social protection for gig workers
Social protection is critical in smoothing income shocks and providing support during life events 
including maternity, sickness and older age. Yet many gig workers remain in highly informal 
conditions without full access to protection. Nonetheless, promising examples of mechanisms to 
extend social insurance to gig workers can be identified.36
In the US, the National Domestic Workers’ Alliance has developed Alia, a digital portable 
benefits programme through which multiple clients can contribute to each cleaner’s account, 
which cleaners then use to purchase benefits including disability, accident, critical illness and/or 
life insurance and paid days off. Alia is accessible to all US-based domestic workers registered 
with the platform regardless of migrant status.37
The largest gig platform in Indonesia – GoJek – became a global pioneer in 2018 by developing 
the SWADAYA programme, a partnership between the platform, BPJS Ketenagakerjaan (BPJS 
Employment) – part of the country’s public social security system – and Bank Mandiri to make 
it easier for platform drivers to register and pay BPJS Employment Social Security contributions. 
This makes accident and life insurance available, with benefits including workplace accident cover, 
medical treatment, wage compensation if not working, as well as death and funeral compensation 
for their family in the event of their death.    
In our focus countries, steps should be taken to address shortcomings in otherwise promising 
public protection mechanisms to increase worker coverage. This could involve review of the UIF 
in South Africa to reflect the realities of workers’ lives – including ensuring that employers are 
identified and held accountable for paying employee contributions; recognising that many 
domestic workers work in multiple households throughout the month, either directly or via gig 
platforms or other agencies, thereby often far exceeding the 24-hour monthly minimum to be 
entitled to UIF benefits; and developing accessible mechanisms for registration and contributions 
across these different sub-sectors. 
36 See https://www.myalia.org/
37 See https://www.go-jek.com/blog/go-jek-dan-bpjs-ketenagakerjaan-bandung/
38  See www.goodworkcode.org/
39 Working for multiple clients may preclude many gig workers from establishing an agreement whereby they can bring their 
child with them to a job, which may help to explain the large number of ‘left-alone’ children that our respondents reported. 
We defer this question for future research.
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improve outcomes for children and boost 
choice and access to quality employment, 
particularly for women.
 – Initiate programmes aimed at including men 
in caregiving and foster broader processes 
of normative change aimed at changing the 
traditional gendered divisions of labour.
 • For platforms: 
 – Platform companies may benefit from 
recognising the strong business case for 
investment in childcare in reducing 
absenteeism and turnover, improving 
morale and productivity and enhancing 
corporate reputations (IFC, 2017). A 
continuum of options is available to 
companies interested in supporting their 
workers’ need for quality childcare, 
ranging from those that are more resource-
intensive such as providing care services 
directly (potentially less suited to platform 
companies) to those that are less resource-
intensive, such as ensuring workers can opt 
for flexible schedules and/or subsidising 
access to public services (ibid.). Initial steps 
to this end include:
• Identify the benefits and costs of 
providing or facilitating access to quality 
childcare.
• Canvass worker demand for and 
preferences with respect to childcare 
services.
• Support public policies that promote 
financing to ensure affordable and 
quality care. 
7.1.3 Critical area three:  
realise worker-led flexibility and  
choice over working schedules
Worker-led flexibility can make a critical 
contribution to work–life balance and can be an 
important means of supporting workers’ choice 
and autonomy in their working lives. Therefore, 
supporting workers’ access to flexible working 
schedules is an important step towards increased 
empowerment and good working conditions.  
The converse of this is that workers need some 
assurance of stability in their work. Critical steps 
that can be taken by platforms to realise worker-
led flexibility while supporting security include:
 • Ensure workers have greater control of 
their own schedules, including the ability 
to choose when to engage in gigs and when 
to cancel gigs they are no longer willing/
able to carry out (e.g. at short notice if a 
child is sick). Platforms undoubtedly face 
challenges ensuring the continuity of service 
required to maintain the sizeable, loyal 
client base essential to providing workers 
with economic opportunities in the face 
of late changes. Therefore, we advocate 
approaches that maximise both flexibility 
and positive working conditions – notably by 
removing sanctions and instead encouraging 
consistency and predictability among 
workers through a positive reinforcement 
system, such as improved ratings or a 
payment bonus if they fulfil a set period 
without late cancellation. 
 • Increase client demand at times preferred 
by workers. The means to achieve this are 
likely to vary significantly between gig 
sectors but may include pricing structures 
that incentivise clients to book gigs at 
times preferred by workers, and improving 
understanding among clients of the challenges 
faced by workers and highlighting ways they 
can support workers to overcome these (e.g. 
by booking gigs at times that pose lower 
security risks to workers on their commute). 
 • Address the issue of client underreporting the 
amount of work required at time of booking 
to ensure workers finish within the allocated 
time. To achieve this, workers should be 
supported and encouraged to report 
instances of forced overtime or inaccurate  
gig descriptions to the platform, which are 
then followed up with the client to ensure  
any repeat booking is representative of the 
tasks to be carried out. 
 • Enact measures to provide gig workers with 
some stability, such as guarantees of a 
minimum number of hours of work in a given 
period, and compensation if clients cancel 
gigs they have committed to carrying out. 
Legislative initiatives from the US seeking to 
ensure a ‘fair workweek’ could provide some 
guidance in this respect, and this need not 
eliminate the flexibility that some workers seek 
(see Box 9).
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7.1.4 Critical area four:  
ensure physical security and safety
The physical security and safety experienced by 
gig workers is at risk during journeys to/from 
gigs, as well as during ‘working time’. Addressing 
the various forms of violence and abuse linked to 
gig work requires holistic action from platform 
companies and policy-makers: 
 • For platforms, take proactive steps to ‘design-
in’ measures to prevent violence and abuse 
during gigs, as well as to support workers 
who experience it, including: 
 – Experiment with providing workers with 
transport to/from gigs, including providing 
safe transport where feasible.
 – Build in platform features to ensure that 
workers can quickly and safely access 
support in the event of a safety threat or 
violation. Examples of this include ‘panic 
buttons’ within app interfaces which may 
connect to the platform office, police or 
other reliable support services, as well as a 
freephone emergency phone line. A positive 
example of this was developed by Uber in 
South Africa in 2018 (and elsewhere), 
whose ‘emergency assistance button’ allows 
drivers, clients and delivery riders to access 
private emergency and security services via 
the app (Kansal, 2018). 
 – Ensure worker reports of client abuse, 
harassment or other negative behaviour 
towards workers are treated seriously, with 
robust sanctions or other appropriate 
responses to deter and tackle such behaviour 
– including reporting crimes to the police 
where the worker supports this course of 
action. Ensuring a two-way rating system so 
workers can rate clients and that client 
ratings are available to all workers can 
facilitate this outcome. 
 • For policy-makers, develop understanding 
of the specific experiences of violence and 
abuse faced by platform workers, and ensure 
they are fully incorporated into policies and 
programmes to ensure worker safety, both in 
the workplace and during the journey to/from 
work. This can involve: 
 – Expanding the remit of government 
workplace inspections to include the 
Box 9 US legislation of fair working hours and the gig economy
In the US, between 2014 and 2017, five cities (San Francisco, San Jose and Emeryville, California, 
New York City, New York and Seattle, Washington) and the state of Oregon passed comprehensive 
‘fair work-week’ laws geared at providing workers (mainly those working in fast-food and retail, 
which are most likely to be subject to income volatility) with greater predictability, stability and 
flexibility in their work schedules. The specifics differ across contexts, but these laws generally include 
provisions that workers receive advance notice of their schedules, additional compensation for 
unexpected schedule changes, the right to accept or decline additional or extended shifts, mandatory 
‘rest periods’ between shifts and the right to request scheduling accommodations. Many of these laws 
also mandate that part-time staff be given the opportunity to increase their hours of work before 
employers hire new staff. Similar legislative proposals have been advanced at a national level.
Following legislation in some US states mandating the treatment of gig workers as employees, 
ride-hailing companies have warned that this would require scheduling drivers in advance, and 
thereby would reduce the flexibility they offer their drivers to choose when and where to work. 
However, experts have contested this claim. The key will be to balance the diverse needs of the 
gig work force, some of whom will privilege flexibility and others greater stability in terms of 
working hours and earnings. Specific proposals include guaranteeing minimum working hours to 
gig workers with a certain tenure and offering regular employment contracts to those workers 
carrying out most of the work.
Sources: Wolfe et al. (2018), Conger and Scheiber (2019), De Stefano, Aloisi and Silberman (2019), Muro et al. (2019).
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locations in which gig work takes place, 
and measures that would benefit all workers, 
such as ensuring that strategies to tackle 
gender-based violence include abuses linked 
to work and employment.
 – Explicitly designing infrastructure and 
transport policy and planning to tackle 
violence and abuse.  
7.1.5 Critical area five:  
base policy and practice on worker 
experience and priorities 
Gig workers remain largely unorganised globally, 
which poses a critical barrier to ensuring worker-
led policy and platform models. Key routes to 
improvement include:
Box 10 Incremental improvement – steps taken by the platform to improve working conditions
During this two-year research project, we worked with a domestic work platform in South Africa 
to better understand gig workers’ paid and unpaid working lives, identifying a range of opportunities 
and challenges. During and subsequent to our data collection, and following discussion with the 
company about our emerging findings, additional measures aimed at improving working conditions 
have been put in place, including: 
 • Expanding options for increasing income and reducing income volatility:
 – Workers receive remuneration if a client cancels a booking later than 3.00 p.m. the day 
before, through a ‘late cancellation’ charge applied to clients (SweepSouth, n.d.b).
 – A new pricing model based on a minimum booking time of three hours for which workers 
receive payment equivalent to at least the current national minimum wage for a full day’s work. 
This replaces the previous model under which workers were paid per hour worked. Hours 
booked past the three-hour minimum are now charged to clients at a cheaper rate, incentivising 
clients to book longer gigs and thereby further increasing worker utilisation and earnings. 
Workers booked for three-hour gigs only are able to engage in more than one booking daily.
 – A data-free app has been rolled out, eliminating airtime costs for workers to connect to the platform.
 • Increasing protections and benefits:
 – Accidental death and disability cover insurance is offered to workers following completion 
of 50 hours of work on the platform via a private insurance partner.
 – Workers are insured against breakages at clients’ homes, eliminating their financial liability 
for associated costs. 
 – The platform has introduced guaranteed payment of workers following gigs, even if a client 
does not make payment to the company for services received. 
 • Supporting information-sharing, training and skills development:
 – A regular newsletter is distributed to workers providing tips on topics such as how to use the 
‘EarnMore’ platform, videos to demonstrate cleaning skills, time management and handling 
difficult clients. 
 – Training is delivered to workers in Cape Town to develop their knowledge on using home 
appliances via partnership with Hirsch’s, a major South Africa appliance retailer.
Future avenues under exploration include:
 • options to better link workers/employers to the UIF, notably for workers who take recurrent/
longer-term bookings with clients and so meet the minimum UIF weekly time requirements
 • use of a skills development online platform to deliver training to workers.
The realisation of these changes highlights the positive value of collaboration (including sharing 
platform data) and constructive dialogue between independent researchers and gig companies. 
Their rapid implementation also highlights the agility of gig companies, showing that positive, 
tangible – and at times immediate – change in workers’ experiences is entirely feasible when 
platforms commit to improving conditions.
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 • For platforms, establish collective mechanisms 
through which gig workers (and clients where 
relevant) can share experiences and negotiate 
positive working conditions, including improved 
labour rights and social protections. Some 
promising examples of this kind of agreement 
have already emerged, including in Denmark 
where a pioneering collective agreement 
between Hilfr.dk, a Danish platform for 
cleaning in private homes, and 3F, a Danish 
trade union, came into force in August 2018 
(Hilfr, n.d.). 
 • For policy-makers, ensure that gig worker 
representatives meaningfully participate in 
labour, social and economic policy discussion, 
with the aim of ensuring that their voice, 
priorities and experiences are represented, 
and that policy and regulation is fit for purpose 
as the gig economy grows. 
 • For unions and other worker collectives, 
increase understanding of the experiences of 
platform workers through meaningful 
engagement of platform-worker groups and 
their representatives, and seek to include 
them in union membership, union strategies 
and development of collective-bargaining 
processes/policy engagement. Social media,  
in particular, provides a promising means to 
identify and engage with platform workers, 
particularly in the first instance, given that 
many platform workers engage in active 
dialogue with each other through social media. 
 • For worker groups, the development of 
platform cooperatives – in which worker 
cooperatives harness platform technology to 
reach customers – may provide a promising 
option to take more control of their economic 
lives and ensure quality work. Promising 
examples include Up & Go in New York  
City, a platform cooperatively owned by 
professional home cleaners which operates to 
self-defined ethical principles, including paying 
a fair wage to all members and using non-
toxic cleaning products – thereby supporting 
the occupational health of workers and the 
wider environment.40 
 • For funders and other advocates looking to 
support worker groups, seek to identify and 
meaningfully engage with representative  
gig worker unions/collectives, including 
burgeoning platform cooperatives. Support 
their work and strategic priorities where  
they already exist and provide support for the 
development and strengthening of nascent 
unions/collectives as they emerge and grow. 
To ensure comprehensive and gender-
responsive support, this may involve working 
with informal economy-focused unions as 
well as women-focused movement actors  
and unions.
40 See https://www.upandgo.coop/
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8 Future research 
directions 
This report has focused on two key questions:  
1) what do the implications of the burgeoning  
gig economy signify for working conditions in 
lower-income settings reliant in large part on 
informal or casual work? and 2) does gig work 
offer workers, primarily women workers, 
flexibility that helps them to manage paid work 
and unpaid care responsibilities? While we have 
provided some responses to these questions, 
based on empirical data we have collected, other 
issues either emerged in the course of this research 
or go beyond the scope of this report, and would 
benefit from future research. 
Specific issues that arose in the course of this 
research apply to gig work as well as the wider 
realities of workers lives. These include (but are 
not limited to):
 • The ‘superstar’ effect. Our results show 
that in South Africa, gig work tends to be 
distributed somewhat unevenly among 
platform domestic workers, and we have 
speculated that concentration of work 
among a small share of workers may be 
part of the dynamic of the evolution of 
platform companies more broadly. This 
concern requires more empirical study, and, 
if indicative of a broader trend, consideration 
of the implications for those workers who 
may be more likely to become marginalised 
through platform work and how they could 
be supported better.
 • Children ‘left alone’. Our results suggest that 
a sizeable share of respondents felt compelled 
to leave young children alone or in the care  
of other young children while they engaged  
in gig work. This could be interpreted as a 
risky strategy to address childcare needs, 
potentially endangering young children. More 
work is needed to validate this finding and to 
probe more into what ‘alone’ means, given 
the realities of their parents’ living conditions, 
and what kinds of policy supports would 
address this issue. 
 • Informal care networks. Networks of family, 
friends and neighbours emerged as an important 
support network to women gig workers to 
meet their childcare needs. Further study of 
what this support involves in practice would 
foster understanding of the impact, quality 
and sustainability of this type of care (and 
again, if additional supports to these carers 
would be useful). A better understanding of 
the role of fathers, particularly those living 
outside their children’s households, is also 
warranted.
Beyond these specific issues, we recognise that 
the nature of the employment relationship between 
the platform and worker is likely to remain a bone 
of contention for some time to come in discourse 
and in relation to the way the gig economy is 
organised. This is reflected in ongoing litigation 
and regulatory oversight being pursued by workers 
and labour advocates in many settings globally, 
including South Africa and Kenya. 
Going forward, we encourage further exploration 
of how to ensure that regulation is comprehensive 
and provides for labour and social protections for 
gig workers, notably in contexts where labour-
related policy advances remain focused on 
improving conditions in the informal economy. 
This is a significantly different starting point 
from many high-income contexts where the gig 
economy is assumed to signal a regression in 
standards experienced by workers previously 
accustomed to conditions associated with 
standard/formal employment. This may include 
legal analysis to ensure a comprehensive 
statutory definition of employment and/or work 
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under which gig workers can access labour rights 
and protections; political economy analysis to 
understand the context-specific political incentives 
shaping local labour and social policy, the social 
contract governing labour relations and the 
distribution of shared responsibility, risk-pooling 
and perceptions of cost/benefits shaping social 
protection systems; and gender analysis to ensure 
that the future of work supports – and does not 
further marginalise – women workers. 
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Annex 1. Analysis of 
platform data and 
regressions
Utilisation
Utilisation can be challenging to measure in a context in which workers have the ability to specify the 
number of days they are available for platform work and to take ‘days off’ due to unforeseen circumstances 
on days when they would otherwise be working. To compute the rate at which workers on the 
platform are utilised, we focused on those workers available for full-time work (five or more days 
currently available – the platform representative noted that this metric is likely to be a proxy for previous 
days available, as it does not change often; it is the most straightforward metric at our disposal for 
assessing worker availability). Over the course of a year, we only considered those workers who had 
undertaken at least one job in a given month (to exclude those workers who might be registered on 
the platform but not be accepting any jobs – which the platform representative indicated is an ongoing 
challenge). We factored in the ‘days off’ a worker chooses to take by subtracting these from total 
availability in a given month (and capping the number of ‘days off’ at 21). We assume that a full-time 
working week would consist of 40 hours of work (e.g. five days of eight hours per day), minus any 
days off. We then computed the share of hours in a month that our ‘full-time’ cohort of employees 
worked, in practice, as a share of those for which they were available for work.
utilisation_ft_=(hoursworked)/[(40 hours/week)*(4.34524 weeks/month)-(daysoffcount_ft*8)
 
Wages and their variability
To assess wages, we again distinguished full-time and part-time workers as our main interest was in 
the pay secured by those workers available to work five or more days weekly. Having identified this 
cohort, we used platform data on hours worked and on average earnings per worker (which relate 
to tenure on the platform) to estimate weekly earnings per worker. We then computed the estimated 
average weekly earnings of workers presumed to be available five or more days weekly over a 16 
month period and the average coefficient of variation. The difference between the two indicators 
reveals the extent to which fluctuations in wages are determined by worker decisions to take time off 
paid work versus the platform being unable to provide work on a given day (though of course we 
cannot discount the possibility that a worker chose to take a ‘day off’ on the grounds that she did not 
think the platform could provide work). To look at wage variability in more depth, we identified the 
subset of workers who had been on the platform for a 52-week period and measured the level and 
dispersion of their wages – then looked at the average and median coefficient of variation across all 
workers. This provided a measure of standard deviation standardised by mean income.
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Distribution of work
For full-time workers and all workers, we looked at the cumulative distribution of hours worked relative 
to the cumulative share of workers, again factoring in ‘days off’ that the worker opted for.
Regression: determinants of life satisfaction
Following Berger et al. (2018), we employed an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to measure 
determinants of life satisfaction on the basis of ‘extensive evidence based on a variety of datasets showing 
that the assumption of cardinality of responses and the use of linear models typically yields very similar 
results to using ordered models, and that the debate over whether subjective well-being measures are 
ordinal or cardinal has limited empirical relevance (e.g. Helliwell, 2003; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 
2004; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006 cited in Berger et al., 2018: 20).
Variables Life satisfaction OLS
Age −0.258* (0.148)
Age squared 0.004* (0.002)
Married 0.288 (0.176)
Highest level of education: matric/O levels −0.060 (0.204)
Highest level of education: diploma −0.223 (0.330)
Highest level of education: university degree −0.513 (0.439)
Highest level of education: other tertiary qualification 0.054 (0.390)
Highest level of education: other −0.321 (0.558)
Health: good −0.159 (0.176)
Health: fair −0.718** (0.283)
Health: bad −1.096** (0.497)
Health: very bad −0.991 (1.053)
City: Centurion −0.152 (0.421)
City: Durban −0.039 (0.376)
City: Johannesburg 0.019 (0.222)
City: Pretoria 0.324 (0.339)
City: Roodepoort −0.425 (0.342)
Hours worked 0.002** (0.001)
Demand for flexibility −0.093 (0.178)
Has another job 0.104 (0.187)
The platform offers better alternatives 0.049 (0.177)
Current days available 0.085 (0.052)
Constant 7.284*** (2.507)
Observations 170
R-squared 0.227
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Regression: determinants of superstar status
We employed a standard logistic regression and a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
to measure determinants of ‘superstar’ status. In the logistic regression, the binary variable indicated 
whether or not the number of hours that a full-time worker worked each month in 2017/18 placed her 
in the top decile of the distribution in terms of the share of hours available that she worked. In the 
OLS regression, the dependent variable was hours worked.
Variables (1) Superstar: 
Logistic
(2) Superstar: 
OLS
(3) Superstar: 
Logistic w/o 
flexibility
(4) Superstar: 
OLS w/o 
flexibility
(5) Superstar: 
Logistic w/o 
days av
(6) Superstar: 
OLS w/o days
What is your age,  
in years?
0.105
(0.235)
0.022
(0.036)
0.093
(0.234)
0.020
(0.035)
0.048
(0.233)
0.006
(0.036)
Age squared –0.002
(0.003)
–0.000
(0.001)
–0.002
(0.003)
–0.000
(0.001)
–0.001
(0.003)
–0.000
(0.001)
Is married 0.154
(0.326)
0.037
(0.054)
0.144
(0.325)
0.036
(0.053)
0.118
(0.319)
0.028
(0.055)
Highest level of education:  
Matric/O levels
0.325
(0.391)
0.039
(0.061)
0.290
(0.388)
0.034
(0.060)
0.414
(0.380)
0.056
(0.061)
Highest level of education:  
Diploma
0.420
(0.653)
0.045
(0.109)
0.424
(0.654)
0.045
(0.109)
0.514
(0.638)
0.076
(0.111)
Highest level of education: 
University degree
1.055
(0.660)
0.197
(0.123)
1.046
(0.660)
0.197
(0.122)
1.020
(0.654)
0.197
(0.125)
Highest level of education:  
Other tertiary qualification
0.066
(0.888)
0.018
(0.116)
0.057
(0.877)
0.018
(0.114)
–0.156
(0.877)
–0.006
(0.117)
Highest level of education:  
Other
1.065
(1.027)
0.198
(0.178)
1.049
(1.026)
0.197
(0.177)
1.063
(1.015)
0.197
(0.180)
City = 2,  
City: Centurion
–1.114
(1.134)
–0.145
(0.140)
–1.069
(1.132)
–0.138
(0.139)
–1.232
(1.124)
–0.168
(0.142)
City = 3,  
City: Durban
–0.870
(0.730)
–0.107
(0.105)
–0.852
(0.727)
–0.103
(0.104)
–0.711
(0.715)
–0.082
(0.106)
City = 4,  
City: Johannesburg
–0.299
(0.382)
–0.041
(0.063)
–0.264
(0.376)
–0.034
(0.062)
–0.402
(0.374)
–0.057
(0.064)
City = 5,  
City: Pretoria
0.391
(0.473)
0.074
(0.082)
0.422
(0.470)
0.081
(0.081)
0.223
(0.455)
0.047
(0.083)
City = 6,  
City: Roodepoort
–1.607
(1.108)
–0.158
(0.111)
–1.574
(1.108)
–0.153
(0.110)
–1.530
(1.082)
–0.161
(0.112)
City = 7, omitted – – –
Number of days available  
per week
0.710***
(0.235)
0.114***
(0.038)
0.722***
(0.233)
0.116***
(0.037)
Demand for flexibility  –0.071
(0.348)
–0.002
(0.055)
–0.013
(0.339)
0.005
(0.056)
Has another job –0.569
(0.427)
–0.096
(0.065)
–0.593
(0.425)
–0.100
(0.064)
–0.417
(0.415)
–0.066
(0.065)
SS offers better 
alternatives
0.212
(0.343)
0.028
(0.054)
0.222
(0.338)
0.031
(0.053)
0.042
(0.330)
0.010
(0.055)
More than 400 hours 
tenure
0.769**
(0.356)
0.122**
(0.057)
0.779**
(0.354)
0.122**
(0.056)
0.805**
(0.347)
0.135**
(0.057)
Mean client ratings 1.028**
(0.454)
0.087**
(0.041)
1.018**
(0.450)
0.086**
(0.040)
0.952**
(0.432)
0.082**
(0.041)
City = 7,  
City: Stellenbosch
–0.385
(0.419)
–0.381
(0.417)
–0.388
(0.426)
Constant –11.861**
(4.775)
–1.176*
(0.687)
–11.689**
(4.752)
–1.154*
(0.683)
–6.344
(4.319)
–0.234
(0.622)
Observations 280 281 282 283 280 281
R-squared   0.126   0.126   0.095
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Annex 2. Demographic 
characteristics of workforce
 Variables Mean Standard deviation Observations
Is a student 0.26 <0.44> 642
Female 0.93 <0.25> 642
Married 0.37 <0.48> 642
Single 0.59 <0.49> 642
Widowed 0.04 <0.20> 642
Age 34.44 <6.25> 642
Age group: 15−24 0.05 <0.22> 642
Age group: 25−34 0.47 <0.50> 642
Age group: 34−44 0.42 <0.49> 642
Age group: 45−65 0.06 <0.24> 642
Highest level of education: didn’t finish school 0.27 <0.44> 627
Highest level of education: matric or O Levels 0.54 <0.50> 627
Highest level of education: diploma 0.06 <0.24> 627
Highest level of education: university degree 0.05 <0.22> 627
Highest level of education: other tertiary education 0.05 <0.23> 627
Highest level of education: other 0.03 <0.16> 627
Race/ethnicity: black African 0.96 <0.20> 629
Race/ethnicity: ‘coloured’ 0.02 <0.13> 629
Race/ethnicity: Indian/Asian 0.01 <0.08> 629
Race/ethnicity: white 0.01 <0.10> 629
Race/ethnicity: other 0.00 <0.07> 629
Language: English 0.41 <0.49> 642
Language: Ndebele 0.06 <0.24> 642
Language: Shona 0.10 <0.29> 642
Language: Sotho 0.03 <0.18> 642
Language: Xhosa 0.14 <0.35> 642
Language: Zulu 0.26 <0.44> 642
How many children do you have? 1.76 <2.16> 861
How many of your children live with you in your main household? 3.19 <2.44> 546
How many of your children are under 18? 2.92 <2.55> 528
How many of your children are under six? 2.47 <2.99> 526
Main person responsible for children 422
Household size   526
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